The elusive quest for growth: economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics

William Easterly

The Elusive Quest for Growth Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics

The Elusive Quest for Growth

Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics

William Easterly

The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Lyrics from "God Bless the Child," Arthur Herzog, Jr., Billie Holiday © 1941, Edward B. Marks Music Company. Copyright renewed. Used by permission. All rights reserved. This book was set in Palatino by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong, in '3B2'. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Easterly, William. The elusive quest for growth: economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics I William Easterly. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262 05065-X (he. : alk. paper) 1. Poor-Developing countries. 2. Poverty-Developing countries. 3. Developing countries-Economic policy. I. Title. HC59.72.P6 E17 2001 00-068382 338.9'009172'4 dc21

To Debbie, Rachel, Caleb, and Grace

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Prologue: The Quest I

Why Growth Matters

To Help the Poor

5 16

Intermezzo: In Search of a River

Panaceas That Failed

Aid for Investment Intermezzo: Parmila

21 25 45

Solow's Surprise: Investment Is Not the Key to Growth

Intermezzo: Dry Cornstalks 4

Educated for What?

71 85

Intermezzo: Without a Refuge 5

Cash for Condoms?

Intermezzo: Tomb Paintings

The Loans That Were, the Growth That Wasn't Intermezzo: Leila's Story

121

101

viii

Contents

123

Forgive Us Our Debts

Intermezzo: Cardboard House

138 141

III People Respond to Incentives 8

Tales of Increasing Returns: Leaks, Matches, and Traps Intermezzo: War and Memory

170

Creative Destruction: The Power of Technology Intermezzo: Accident in Jamaica

Under an Evil Star

195

Intermezzo: Favela Life 11

193

215

Governments Can Kill Growth

217 240

Intermezzo: Florence and Veronica 12

Corruption and Growth

241

Intermezzo: Discrimination in Palanpur 13

Polarized Peoples

255 282

Intermezzo: Violent for Centuries 14

Conclusion: The View from Lahore

293 Notes References and Further Reading Index 335

313

285

253

171

145

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Ross Levine and Lant Pritchett, who made comments on various drafts and provided many insights through numerous discussions of growth. I am also grateful for comments to my editors at MIT Press, five anonymous referees, Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, Roberta Gatti, Ricardo Hausmann, Charles Kenny, Michael Kremer, Susan Rabiner, Sergio Rebelo, Sergio Schmukler, Michael Woolco*ck, to my coauthors of various studies I use here, from whom I have learned much, including the late Michael Bruno, Shanta Devarajan, David Dollar, Allan Drazen, Stanley Fischer, Rou meen Islam, Robert King, Aart Kraay, Paolo Mauro, Peter Montiel, Howard Pack, Jo Ritzen, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Lawrence Summers, Joseph Stiglitz, Holger Wolf, and David Yuravlivker, to the orga nizers of the very educational National Bureau of Economic Research meetings on growth, including Robert Barro, Charles Jones, Paul Romer, Jeffrey Sachs, and Alwyn Young, and to the many partic ipants in seminars, classes at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and training courses where I have presented parts of the draft of this book. I alone am responsible for views expressed here.

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Prologue: The Quest

The theme of the quest is ancient. In many versions, it is the search for a precious object with magical properties: the Golden Fleece, the Holy Grail, the Elixir of Life. The precious object in most of the stories either remains elusive or is a disappointment when found. Jason got the Golden Fleece with the help of Medea, who betrayed her own father, but Jason and Medea's subsequent marriage was rather dysfunctional. Jason betrayed Medea in turn for another princess; she worked out her disappointment by killing Jason's new bride and her own children. Fifty years ago, in the aftermath of World War II, we economists began our own audacious quest: to discover the means by which poor countries in the tropics could become rich like the rich countries in Europe and North America. Observing the sufferings of the poor and the comforts of the rich motivated us on our quest. If our ambi tious quest were successful, it would be one of humankind's great intellectual triumphs. Like the ancient questors, we economists have tried to find the precious object, the key that would enable the poor tropics to be come rich. We thought we had found the elixir many different times. The precious objects we offered ranged from foreign aid to invest ment in machines, from fostering education to controlling population growth, from giving loans conditional on reforms to giving debt relief conditional on reforms. None has delivered as promised. The poor countries that we treated with these remedies failed to achieve the growth we expected. The region we treated most inten sively, sub-Saharan Africa, failed to grow at alL Latin America and the Middle East grew for awhile, but then spiraled into a growth crash in the 1980s and 1990s. South Asia, another recipient of inten sive attention from economists, has suffered from erratic growth that

xii

Prologue: The Quest

has still left it the home to a huge proportion of the world's poor. And most recently, East Asia, the shining success we celebrated over and over, went into its own growth crash (from which some, but not all, East Asian nations are now recovering). Outside the tropics, we tried applying some of the tropical remedies to the ex-communist countries-with very disappointing results. Just as various claims to have found the elixir of life proved groundless, we economists have too often peddled formulas that violated the basic principle of economics. The problem was not the failure of economics, but the failure to apply the principles of eco nomics in practical policy work. What is the basic principle of eco nomics? As a wise elder once told me, "People do what they get paid to do; what they don't get paid to do, they don't do." A wonderful book by Steven Landsburg, The Armchair Economist, distills the prin ciple more concisely: "People respond to incentives; all the rest is commentary.'' Economists have done of lot of research over the past two decades on how economic growth responds to incentives. This work has variously detailed how private businesses and individuals respond to incentives, how government officials respond to incentives, and even how aid donors respond to incentives. This research shows that a society's economic growth does not always pay off at the individ ual level for government officials, aid donors, and private businesses and households. Incentives often lead them in other, unproductive, directions. This research makes clear how unfortunately misguided, with the benefit of hindsight, were the past panaceas-including some still in force today-for economic growth in the tropics. To find their way from poverty to riches, we need reminding that people do what they get paid to do. If we do the hard work of ensuring that the trinity of First World aid donors, Third World governments, and ordinary Third World citizens have the right in centives, development will happen. If they don't, it won't. We will see that the trinity often did not have the right incentives, following formulas that violated the basic principle of economics, and so the expected growth did not happen. This is a sad story, but it can be a hopeful one. We now have sta tistical evidence to back up theories of how the panaceas failed and how incentive-based policies can work. Incentives can change and start countries on the road to prosperity. It won't be easy. Incentives are not themselves a facile panacea. We will see how the interlocking

Prologue: The Quest

xiii

incentives of aid donors, governments, and citizens form a compli cated web that is not easily untangled. Moreover, there is already widespread disappointment that the quest has not been more successful. Protesters from Seattle to Prague call for abandoning the quest altogether. That is not acceptable. As long as there are poor nations suffering from pestilence, oppression, and hunger, as I describe in the first part of the book, and as long as human intellectual efforts can devise ways to make them richer, the quest must go on. Four notes before I begin. First, what I say here is my own opinion and not that of my employer, the World Bank. Occasionally I am even critical of what my employer has done in the past. One thing I admire about the World Bank is that it encourages gadflies like me to exercise intellectual freedom and doesn't stifle internal debate on World Bank policies. Second, I am not going to say anything about the environment. I tried to say something about the environment in early drafts of this book, but found I didn't have anything useful to say. There is a big issue about how growth affects the environment, but that's a different book. Most economists believe that any negative effects of growth on the environment can be alleviated with wise environ mental policies, like making polluters bear the costs of their delete rious effects on human welfare, and so we don't actually have to stop economic growth to preserve the environment. This is a good thing, because stopping growth would be very bad news for the poor everywhere, as I discuss in the first chapter. Third, I am not trying to do a general survey of all of economists' research on growth. This research has exploded in the past decade and a half, following the seminal work of Stanford Business School professor Paul Romer and, later, the inspirational work of Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas. There is not yet a scholarly consensus on some issues, although I think the evidence is strong on others. I try to follow the thread of work that specifically relates to the efforts of economists to figure out how to make poor tropical countries rich. Fourth, I am going to insert snapshots of daily life in the Third World, "intermezzos," between chapters to remind us that behind the quest for growth are the sufferings and joys of real people, and it is for them we go on the quest for growth.

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Why Growth Matters

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As I pursue my career as a self-anointed expert on poor countries, the differences in the lives of the poor and the rich supply motivation. We experts don't care about rising gross domestic product for its own sake. We care because it betters the lot of the poor and reduces the proportion of people who are poor. We care because richer people can eat more and buy more medicines for their babies. In this part, I review the evidence on growth and relief from poverty.

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To Help the Poor

When I see another child eating, I watch him, and if he doesn't give me something I think I'm going to die of hunger. -A ten-year-old child in Gabon, 1997

I am in Lahore, a city of 6 million people in Pakistan, on a World Bank trip as I write this chapter. Last weekend I went with a guide to the village of Gulvera, not far outside Lahore. We entered the village on an impossibly narrow paved road, which the driver drove at top speed except on the frequent occasions that cattle were crossing the road. We continued as the road turned into a dirt track, where there was barely enough space between the village houses for the car. Then the road seemed to dead-end. But although I could not detect any road, the guide pointed out to the driver how he could make a sharp right across an open field, then regain a sort of a road-flat dirt anyway. I hated to think what would happen to these dirt roads in rainy season. The "road" brought us to the community center for the village, where a number of young and old men were hanging out (no women, on which more in a moment). The village smelled of manure. The men were expecting us and were extremely hospitable, welcoming us in to the brick-and-mortar community center, everyone grasping each of our right hands with their two hands and seating us on some rattan benches . They provided pillows for us to lean on or with which to otherwise make ourselves comfortable. They served us a drink of lassi, a sort of yogurt-milk mixture. The lassi pitcher was thickly covered with flies, but I drank my lassi anyway. The men said that during the week, they worked all day in the fields, then came to the community center in the evenings to play

Chapter 1

cards and talk. The women couldn't come, they said, because they still had work to do in the evenings. Flocks of flies hummed every where, and some of the men had open sores on their legs. There was one youngish but dignified man nicknamed Deenu to whom every one seemed to defer. Most of the men were barefoot, wearing long dusty robes. A crowd of children hung around the entrance watching us-only boys, no girls. I asked Deenu what the main problems of Gulvera village were. Deenu said they were glad to have gotten electricity just six months before. Imagine getting electricity after generations spent in dark ness. They were glad to have a boys' elementary school. However, they still lacked many things: a girls' elementary school, a doctor, drainage or sewerage (everything was dumped into a pool of ran cid water outside the community center), telephone connections, paved roads. The poor sanitary conditions and lack of access to medical care in villages like Gulvera may help explain why a hun dred out of every thousand babies die before their first birthday in Pakistan. I asked Deenu if we could see a house. He walked with us over to his brother's house. It was an adobe-walled dirt-floor compound, which had two small rooms where they lived, stalls for the cattle, an outside dung-fired oven built into a wall, piles of cattle dung stacked up to dry, and a hand pump hooked up to a well. Children were everywhere, including a few girls finally, staring curiously at us. Deenu said his brother had seven children. Deenu himself had six brothers and seven sisters. The brothers all lived in the village; the sisters had married into other villages. The women in the household hung back near the two small rooms. We were not introduced to them. Women's rights have not yet come to rural Pakistan, a fact reflected in some grim statistics: there are 108 men for every 100 women in Pakistan. In rich countries, women slightly outnumber men because of their greater longevity. In Pakistan, there are what Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen called "missing women," reflecting some combination of discrimination against girls in nutrition, medi cal care, or even female infanticide. Oppression of women sometimes takes an even more violent turn. There was a story in the Lahore newspaper of a brother who had killed his sister to preserve the family honor; he had suspected her of an illicit affair.

To Help the Poor

Violence in the countryside is widespread in Pakistan, despite the peaceful appearance of Gulvera. Another story in the Lahore paper described a village feud in which one family killed seven members of another family. Bandits and kidnappers prey on travelers in parts of the countryside in Pakistan. We walked back to the community center, passing a group of boys playing a game, where they threw four walnuts on the ground and then tried to hit one of the walnuts with another one. Deenu asked us if we would like to stay for lunch, but we politely declined (I didn't want to take any of their scarce food), said our good-byes, and drove away. One of the villagers rode away with us, just to have an adven ture. He told us that they had arranged for two cooks to prepare our lunch. I felt bad about having declined the lunch invitation. We drove across the fields to where four brothers had grouped their compounds into a sort of a village and went through the same routine: the men greeting us warmly with two hands and seating us on rattan benches outside. No women were to be seen. The chil dren were even more numerous and uninhibited than in Gulvera; they were mostly boys but this time also a few girls. They crowded around us watching everything we did, frequently breaking into laughter at some unknown faux pas by one of us. The men served us some very good milky sweet tea. I saw a woman peeking out from inside the house, but when I looked in her direction, she pulled back out of sight. We walked into one of the brothers' compounds. Many women stood at the doors into their rooms, hanging back but watching us. The men showed us a churn that they used to make butter and yogurt. One of the men tried to show us how to use it, but he himself didn't know; this was woman's work. The children nearly passed out from laughing. The men brought us some butter to taste. They said they melted the butter to make ghee-clarified butter-which was an important ingredient in their cooking. They said if you ate a lot of ghee, it made you stronger. Then they gave us some ghee to taste. Most of their food seemed to consist of dairy products. I asked what problems they faced. They had gotten electricity just one month before. They otherwise had the same unfulfilled needs as Gulvera: no telephone, no running water, no doctor, no sewerage, no roads. This was only a kilometer off the main road just outside Lahore, so we weren't in the middle of nowhere. They were poor,

Chapter 1

but these were relatively well-off villagers compared to more remote villages in Pakistan. The road leading to their minivillage was a half lane track constructed of bricks that they had made themselves. The majority of people in Pakistan are poor: 85 percent live on less than two dollars a day and 31 percent live in extreme poverty at less than one dollar a day. The majority of the world's people live in poor nations like Pakistan, where people live in isolated poverty even close to a major city. The majority of the world's people live in poor nations where women are oppressed, far too many babies die, and far too many people don't have enough to eat. We care about eco nomic growth for the poor nations because it makes the lives of poor people like those in Gulvera better. Economic growth frees the poor from hunger and disease. Economy-wide GDP growth per capita translates into rising incomes for the poorest of the poor, lifting them out of poverty. The Deaths of the Innocents

The typical rate of infant mortality in the richest fifth of countries is 4 out of every 1,000 births; in the poorest fifth of countries, it is 200 out of every 1,000 births. Parents in the poorest countries are fifty times more likely than in the richest countries to know grief rather than joy from the birth of a child. Researchers have found that a 10 percent decrease in income is associated with about a 6 percent higher infant mortality rate.l The higher rates of babies dying in the poorest countries reflect in part the higher rates of communicable and often easily preventable diseases such as tuberculosis, syphillis, diarrhea, polio, measles, tet anus, meningitis, hepatitis, sleeping sickness, schistosomiasis, river blindness, leprosy, trachoma, intestinal worms, and lower respira tory infections.2 At low incomes, disease is more dangerous because of lower medical knowledge, lower nutrition, and lower access to medical care. Two million children die every year of dehydration from diar rhea.3 Another 2 million children die annually from pertussis, polio, diphtheria, tetanus, and measles.4 Three million children die annually from bacterial pneumonia. Overcrowding of housing and indoor wood or cigarette smoke make pneumonia among children more likely. Malnourished children are

To Help the Poor

also more likely to develop pneumonia than well-fed children.5 Bac terial pneumonia can be cured by a five-day course of antibiotics, like cotrimoxazole, that costs about twenty-five cents.6 Between 1 70 million and 400 million children annually are infected with intestinal parasites like hookworm and roundworm, which impair cognition and cause anemia and failure to thrive? Deficiency of iodine causes goiters-swelling of the thyroid gland at the throat-and lowered mental capacity. About 1 20,000 children born each year suffer from mental retardation and physical paralysis caused by iodine deficiency. About 10 percent of the world's popu lation, adults and children both, suffer from goiter.8 Vitamin A deficiency causes blindness in about half a million chil dren and contributes to the deaths of about 8 million children each year.9 It is not independent of the other diseases discussed here; it makes death more likely from diarrhea, measles, and pneumonia. Medicines that would alleviate these diseases are sometimes sur prisingly inexpensive, a fact that UNICEF often uses to dramatize the depths of poverty of these suffering people. Oral rehydration therapy, at a cost of less than ten cents for each dose, can alleviate dehydration.10 Vaccination against pertussis, polio, diphtheria, mea sles, and tetanus costs about fifteen dollars per child. 1 1 Vitamin A can be added to diets through processing of salt or sugar or admin istered directly through vitamin A capsules every six months. Vita min A capsules cost about two cents each . 1 2 Iodizing salt supplies, which costs about five cents per affected person per year, alleviates iodine deficiency. 1 3 Intestinal parasites can be cured with inexpen sive drugs like albendazole and prazi quantel.14 Wealthier and Healthier

Lant Pritchett, from Harvard's Kennedy School of G overnment, and Larry Summers, the former U.S. secretary of the treasury, found a strong association between economic growth and changes in infant mortality. They pointed out that a third factor that was unchanging over time for each country, like "culture" or "institutions," could not be explaining the simultaneous change in income and change in infant mortality. Going further, they argued that the rise in income was causing the fall in mortality rather than the other way around. They used a statistical argument that we will see more of later in

Chapter 1

this book. They observed some income increases that were probably unrelated to mortality, like income increases due to rises in a coun try's export prices. They traced through the effect of such an income increase, finding that it still did result in a fall in infant mortality. If an income increase that has nothing to do with mortality changes is still associated with a fall in mortality, this suggests that income increases are causing reduced mortality. Pritchett and Summers's findings, if we can take them literally, imply huge effects of income growth on the death of children. The deaths of about half a million children in 1990 would have been averted if Africa's growth in the 1980s had been 1 .5 percentage points higher. The Poorest of the Poor

The statistics presented so far are national averages. Behind the averages of even the poorest nation, there is still regional variation. Mali is one of the poorest nations on earth. The countryside along the Niger River around the city of Tombouctou (Timbuktu) is one of the poorest regions in Mali and thus one of the poorest places on earth. At the time of a survey in 1987, over a third of the children under age five had had diarrhea in the preceding two weeks. Very few of them were on simple and cheap oral rehydration therapy. None had been vaccinated for diphtheria, pertussis, or typhoid. Forty-one percent of children born do not live to the age of five, three times the mortality rate in the capital of Bamako and one of the highest child mortality rates ever recorded. 1 5 As in Tomboctou, there are some regions or peoples at the very bottom of the economic pyramid, despised even by other poor. "In Egypt they were madfoun-the buried or buried alive; in Ghana, ohiabrubro-the miserably poor, with no work, sick with no one to care for them; in Indonesia, endek arak tadah; in Brazil, miseraveis -the deprived; in Russia, bomzhi-the homeless; in Bangladesh ghrino gorib-the despised/hated poor." In Zambia the balandana sana or bapina were described in these terms: "Lack food, eat once or twice; poor hygiene, flies fall over them, cannot afford school and health costs, lead miserable lives, poor dirty clothing, poor sanita tion, access to water, look like made people, live on vegetables and sweet potatoes." In Malawi, the bottom poor were osaukitsitsa, "mainly households headed by the aged, the sick, disabled, orphans

To Help the Poor

and widows." Some were described a s onyentchera, "the stunted poor, with thin bodies, short stature and thin hairs, bodies that did not shine even after bathing, and who experience frequent illnesses and a severe lack of food." 1 6 Eating

High mortality in the poorest countries also reflects the continuing problem of hunger. Daily calorie intake is one-third lower in the poorest fifth of countries than in the richest fifth. A quarter of the poorest countries had famines in the past three decades; none of the richest countries faced a famine. In the poorest nations like Burundi, Madagascar, and Uganda, nearly half of all children under the age of three are abnormally short because of nutritional deficiency. 17 An Indian family housed in a thatched hut seldom "could have two square meals a day. The lunch would be finished munching some sugarcane. Once in a while they would taste 'sattu' (made of flour), pulses [dried beans], potatoes etc. but for occasions only." 18 In Malawi, the poorest families "stay without food for 2-3 days or even the whole week . . . and may simply cook vegetables for a meal . . . some households literally eat bitter maize bran (gaga/deya owawa) and gmelina sawdust mixed with a little maize flour especially during the hunger months of January and February." 19 Oppression of the Poor

Poor societies sometimes have some form of debt bondage. To take one example, observers of India report "a vicious cycle of indebted ness in which a debtor may work in a moneylender's house as a servant, on his farm as a laborer . . . . The debt may accumulate sub stantially due to high interest rates, absence due to illness, and ex penses incurred for food or accommodations."2 D Ethnic minorities are particularly prone to oppression. In Pakis tan in 1993, the Bengali community of Rehmanabad in Karachi "had been subject to evictions and bulldozing, and on returning to the settlement and constructing temporary housing of reeds and sacks, have faced on-going harassment by land speculators, the police and political movements."2 1

Chapter 1

Poor children are particularly vulnerable to oppression. Forty-two percent of children aged ten to fourteen are workers in the poorest countries. Less than 2 percent of children aged ten to fourteen are workers in the richest countries. Although most countries have laws forbidding child labor, the U.S. State Department classifies many countries as not enforcing these laws. Eighty-eight percent of the poorest countries are in this no-enforcement category; none of the richest countries is.22 For example, we have this story of Pachawak in western Orissa state in India: "Pachawak dropped out of class 3 when one day his teacher caned him severely. Since then he has been working as child labor with a number of rich households. Pacha wak's father owns 1 .5 acres of land and works as a laborer. His younger brother of 1 1-years-old also became a bonded laborer when the family had to take a loan for the marriage of the eldest son. The system is closely linked to credit, as many families take loans from landlords, who in lieu of that obligation keep the children as 'kuthia.' Pachawak worked as a cattle grazer from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M. and got paid two to four sacks of paddy a year, two meals a day, and one lungi [wrap-around clothing]." One particularly unsavory kind of child labor is prostitution. In Benin, for example, "the girls have no choice but to prostitute them selves, starting at 14, even at 12. They do it for 50 francs, or just for dinner. "23 Another occupation in which children work in poor countries is particularly dangerous: war. As many as 200,000 child soldiers from the ages of six to sixteen fought wars in poor countries like Myan mar, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Uganda, and Mozambique.24 Women are also vulnerable to oppression in poor countries. Over four-fifths of the richest fifth of countries have social and economic equality for women most of the time, according to the World Human Rights Guide by Charles Humana. None of the poorest fifth of coun tries has social and economic equality for women.25 In Cameroon, "Women in some regions require a husband's, father's, or brother's permission to go out. In addition, a woman's husband or brother has access to her bank accounts, but not vice versa." A 1997 survey in Jamaica found that "in all communities, wife-beating was perceived as a common experience in daily life." In Georgia in the Caucasus, "women confessed that frequent household arguments resulted in being beaten." In Uganda in 1998, when women were asked, "What

To Help the Poor

kind of work do men in your area do?" they laughed and said, "Eat and sleep then wake up and go drinking again."26 Growth and Poverty

My World Bank colleagues Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen collected data on spells of economic growth and changes in poverty covering the years 1981 to 1 999. They get their data from national surveys of household income or expenditure. They require that the methodology of the survey be unchanged over the period that they are examining so as to exclude spurious changes due to changing definitions. They found 154 periods of change in 65 developing countries with data that met this requirement. Ravallion and Chen defined poverty as an absolute concept within each country: the poor were defined as the part of the population that had incomes below $1 a day at the beginning of each period they were examining. Ravallion and Chen keep this poverty line fixed So the question within each country during the period they was, How did aggregate economic growth change the share of people below this poverty line? The answer was quite clear: fast growth went with fast poverty reduction, and overall economic contraction went with increased poverty. Here I summarize Ravallion and Chen's data by dividing the number of episodes into four equally sized groups from the fast est growing to the fastest declining. I compare the change in poverty in countries with the fastest growth to the poverty change in coun tries with the fastest decline:27

Strong contraction Moderate contraction Moderate expansion Strong expansion

Percentage change in average incomes per year

Percent change in poverty rate per year

-9.8 - 1 .9 1.6 8.2

23.9 1 .5 -0.6 -6.1

The increases in poverty were extremely acute in the economies with severe economic declines-most of them in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These were economies that declined with the death of the old communist system and kept declining while awaiting the

Chapter 1

birth of a new system. Several of these poverty-increasing declines also occurred in Africa. Poverty shot up during severe recessions in Zambia, Mali, and Cote d'Ivoire, for example. Countries with positive income growth had a decline in the pro portion of people below the poverty line. The fastest average growth was associated with the fastest poverty reductions. Growth was reaching the poor in Indonesia, for example, which had average income growth of 76 percent from 1984 to 1 996. The proportion of Indonesians beneath the poverty line in 1993 was one-quarter of what it was in 1984. (A bad reversal came with Indonesia's crisis over 1997-1999, with average income falling by 12 percent and the poverty rate shooting up 65 percent, again confirming that income and poverty move together.) All of this in retrospect seems unsurprising. For poverty to get worse with economic growth, the distribution of income would have to get much more unequal as incomes increased. There is no evidence for such disastrous deteriorations in income inequality as income rises. In Ravallion and Chen's data set, for example, measures of inequality show no tendency to get either better or worse with eco nomic growth. If the degree of inequality stays about the same, then income of the poor and the rich must be rising together or falling together. This is indeed what my World Bank colleagues David Dollar and Aart Kraay have found. A 1 percent increase in average income of the society translates one for one into a 1 percent increase in the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population. Again using statistical techniques to isolate direction of causation, they found that an additional one percentage point per capita growth causes a 1 percent rise in the poor's incomes.28 There are two ways the poor could become better off: income could be redistributed from the rich to the poor, and the income of both the poor and the rich could rise with overall economic growth. Ravallion and Chen's and Dollar and Kraay's findings suggest that on average, growth has been much more of a lifesaver to the poor than redistribution. To Begin the Quest

The improvement in hunger, mortality, and poverty as GOP per capita rises over time motivates us on our quest for growth. Poverty

To Help the Poor

is not just low GDP; it is dying babies, starving children, and oppres sion of women and the downtrodden. The well-being of the next generation in poor countries depends on whether our quest to make poor countries rich is successful. I think again back to the woman I saw peering out at me from a house in a village in Pakistan. To that unknown woman I dedicate the elusive quest for growth as we economists, from rich countries and from poor countries, trek the tropics trying to make poor countries rich.

Intermezzo: In Search of a River

In 1 71 0, a fifteen-year-old English boy named Thomas Cresap got off a boat at Havre de Grace, Maryland. Thomas was emigrating to America from Yorkshire in northern England.l Thomas knew what he wanted in America: some land on a river. Riverside land was fertile for growing crops, and the river provided transportation to get the crops to market. He settled on the Susquehanna River that ran through Havre de Grace. We next hear of Thomas a decade and a half later. In 1 727, when he married Hannah Johnson, he had just defaulted on a debt of nine pounds sterling. 2 Thomas struggled to support Hannah and their first child, Daniel, born in 1 728. Thomas and Hannah experienced early America's health crisis firsthand as two of their children died in infancy. Trying to escape his debtors, Thomas decided to move. In his next attempt at getting land on a river, he rented some land from George Washington's father on the Virginia side of the Potomac, not far from what is today Washington, D.C., and began building a log cabin. But he was an outsider, and as he was chopping down trees, a posse of armed neighbors suggested he might want to investigate housing opportunities elsewhere. Thomas turned his ax on his attackers, killed a man in the ensuing battle, then went back home to Maryland to pack up for the move to Virginia and tell Hannah about their new neighbors. "For some reason," the record reports, "she refused to go. "3 They decided to move to Pennsylvania instead, settling in March 1 730 upriver on the Susquehanna near what is now Wrightsville, Pennsylvania. Thomas thought he had finally found his riverside homeplace. But he once again got into trouble with the neighbors in Pennsylvania. Lord Baltimore, the owner of Maryland, and William Penn, the proprietor of Pennsylvania, were disputing the border between their colonies, and Thomas was loyal to what turned out to be the losing side. He got a grant of two hundred acres of Pennsylvania riverfront land from Lord Baltimore, for which he paid two dollars a year. It appeared to be good deal, except that the land turned out not to belong to Baltimore, and the Pennsylvanians resolved to drive off these Marylanders. In October 1730, two Pennsylvanians ambushed Thomas, hit him on the head, and threw him into the Susquehanna. Thomas somehow managed to swim ashore. He appealed for justice to the nearest Pennsylvania judge, who told him that Marylanders were ineligible for justice from Pennsylvania courts.4

Intermezzo: In Search of a River

A couple of hours after dark on January 29, 1 733, a mob of twenty Pennsylvanians surrounded Thomas's house and asked him to surrender so they could hang him. Thomas was inside with several other Maryland loyalists, son Daniel, and Hannah, who was eight months pregnant with Thomas Jr. When the mob broke down the door, Thomas opened fire, wounding one Pennsylvanian. The Pennsylvanians wounded one of the children of the Maryland loyalists. Finally, the Pennsylvanians retreated. The next battle came a year later, in January 1 734, when the sherif of Lancaster County and sent an armed posse to arrest Thomas. The posse again broke down the door, and Thomas again opened fire. One of Thomas's men shot one of the attackers, Knoles Daunt. The Pennsylvanians begged Hannah for a candle to attend to Daunt's wound in the leg. The gentle Hannah said she had rather the wound "had been his heart. "5 Knoles Daunt later died of his wounds. The posse again Jailed to capture Thomas. Finally in November 1 736, a new sherif of Lancaster Country decided to resolve the Thomas Cresap problem. At midnight on November 23, the sherif took a well-armed posse of twenty-four men to serve Thomas with an arrest warrant for the murder of Knoles Daunt. They knocked at the door of the Cresaps'. Inside was the usual assortment of Maryland supporters and the family-Hannah again very pregnant, now with their third child. Thomas asked those peaceable Pennsylvania Quakers what the "Damn'd Quakeing Sons of Bitches" wanted.6 They wanted to burn down Thomas's house. The Marylanders fled the burning house, and the Pennsylvanians finally captured Thomas. 7 They put Thomas in irons and marched him off to jail in Philadelphia (a city Thomas called "one of the prettiest towns in Maryland"), where he spent a year in jail. The guards occasionally took him out for fresh air, like the time they exhibited him to a jeering Philadelphia mob as the "Maryland monster. " Finally Thomas's supporters got the Maryland monster released by petitioning the king in London. Having had enough of Pennsylvania, Thomas loaded his family on a wagon and moved back to Maryland, to the western frontier in what is now Oldtown, Maryland, on the banks of the Potomac. They arrived just in time for Hannah to give birth to their fifth, and last, child, Michael. Thomas kept quarreling with his neighbors, one of whom noted that "Cresap is a person of hot Resentm't and great Acrimony. "8 But this time the quarreling stopped short of battle, and Oldtown finally became his home for the rest of his life. 9 He built his house on a rise overlooking the

Intermezzo: In Search of a River

Potomac river floodplain, which made for good farmland. Unfortunately this particular riverside property lacked transportation because the Potomac was not navigable until Georgetown, 150 miles downstream. The nonnavigable Potomac was fuel to Thomas's continued transportation obsession. Thomas in the 1 740s participated in a group of land and transportation investors, including the Washington family, who explored the idea of building a canal along the unnavigable parts of the Potomac, but the project ran afoul of the threat of war with the French. The canal would eventually be built early in the next century. Canals and rivers were in hot demand because colonial roads were often choked by mud, and when they were dry, they were deeply rutted. To cope with the suffering, whiskey was passed around frequently to both driver and passengers during the journey. "The horses," said a passenger gratefully, "were sober. "10 Thwarted by the river, Thomas turned to building his own roads. His road building standards, however, were quite low; his idea of making a road was simply to remove some of the "most difficult obstructions. "11 A son of Thomas's old landlords and investment partners, George Washington, passed through in 1 747 on a surveying trip. He described the road leading up to Thomas Cresap's as "ye worst road that ever was trod by Man or Beast."12 If Thomas thought he had escaped border wars by moving to the remote frontier, he was wrong. He was now in the midst of the biggest war of his life-the war between the French and the English that lasted from 1754 to 1763. The war started in part because Thomas (and other English settlers) was not satisfied with his riverside land and looked to the west, where there was much more fertile land along the navigable Ohio River. So Thomas joined the Washingtons and other Virginians in an Ohio River land grab known as the Ohio Company, which gave short shrift to the actual owners of the land, the Shawnees and the Mingoes. And when the Ohio Company tried to build a trading post and fort at the forks of the Ohio (today's Pittsburgh), they ran smack into another enemy, the French from Quebec, who also wanted to steal the Ohio River land. The French chased away the Ohio Company's local military commander, twenty-one year-old George Washington, after a brief battle in 1 754, which started what became known as the French and Indian War. Thomas and his sons Daniel and Thomas, Jr., volunteered to fight against the French as part of the colonial militia, a collection of rural hoodlums known more for their

Intermezzo: In Search of a River

"unruly licentiousness" than for any military skills.13 Thomas also commanded one of his African-American slaves, Nemesis, to join the militia. On April 23, 1 757, in a battle near what is now Frostburg, Maryland, Thomas, Jr., was killed. A few weeks later, Nemesis was also killed in battle.14 But i n the end, with a lot of help from the British, the colonials defeated the French and their Indian allies. That was not the end of Thomas's wartime suffering, however. In 1 775, the Revolutionary War broke out. Thomas's youngest son, Michael, was killed early in the war. Thomas and Hannah had lost two of their children to war and two to infant diseases. Thomas's life had been filled with violence! heartbreak, and the struggle to make a living. Yet in the end, Thomas's quest for a river was successful. Before Michael died, he had staked out land on the Ohio River. Thomas' heirs would farm fertile lands and later work in manufacturing plants along the Ohio River. The growing A merican economy, throwing out its tentacles along rivers, canals, and railroads, pulled the Cresaps along out of poverty into prosperity. Life has changed since the days of Thomas, who was my great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfather. The majority of the world's population have not yet said goodbye to the bad old days before development. The majority of the world's population is not as fortunate as I to be borne along on rivers of prosperity. When those of us from rich countries look at poor countries today, we see our own past poverty. We are all the descendants of poverty. In the long run, we all come from the lower class. We embarked on the quest for growth to try to make poor countries grow out of poverty into riches.

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Panaceas That Failed

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Many times over the past fifty years, we economists thought we had found the right answer to economic growth. It started with foreign aid to fill the gap between "necessary" investment and saving. Even after some of us abandoned the rigidity of the "necessary" invest ment idea, we still thought investment in machines was the key to growth. Supplementing this idea was the notion that education was a form of accumulating "human machinery" that would bring growth. Next, concerned about how "excess" population might overwhelm the productive capacity of the economy, we promoted population control. Then, when we realized that government policies hindered growth, we promoted official loans to induce countries to do policy reforms. Finally, when countries had trouble repaying the loans they incurred to do policy reforms, we offered debt forgiveness. None of these elixirs has worked as promised, because not all the participants in the creation of economic growth had the right incentives. In this part, we look at these failed panaceas. In part III, we examine how to go about the hard work of getting everybody to buy in to economic growth.

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Aid for Investment

How use doth breed a habit in a man! Two Gentleman of Verona

On March 6, 1957, the Gold Coast, a small British colony, became the first nation of sub-Saharan Africa to gain its independence. It renamed itself Ghana. Delegations from both sides of the iron cur tain, including from Moscow and Washington, vied to be the first to extend loans and technical assistance to the new nation. Vice Presi dent Richard Nixon led the American delegation. (According to one source, Nixon asked a group of black journalists, 11What does it like to be free?11 //We don't know," they replied, 11We're from Alabama.11) 1 A later writer commented about Ghana's independence day, "Few former colonies can have had a more auspicious start."2 Ghana sup plied two-thirds of the world's cocoa. It had the best schools in Africa, and economists thought education was one of the keys to growth. It had a good amount of investment, and economists thought investment was another of the keys to growth. Under limited self government in the 1950s, the Nkrumah government and the British had built new roads, health clinics, and schools. American, British, and German companies expressed interest in investing in the new nation.3 The whole nation seemed to share an excitement about economic development. As one Ghanaian wrote at the time, "Let us now seek the economic kingdom."4 Nkrumah had the services of many of the world's economists Arthur Lewis, Nicholas Kaldor, Dudley Seers, Albert Hirschman, and Tony Killick-who shared the optimism that Dudley Seers had already expressed in a report in 1952: that assistance to Ghana would

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yield very high returns. As Seers put it in 1952, "Surfacing the road from Tarkwa to Takoradi would increase total output" by much more "than applying the same materials to almost any road in the United Kingdom."S Miracle on the Volta

Nkrumah had bigger goals than paving a few roads. He had already begun plans to build a large hydroelectric dam on the Volta River, which would provide enough electricity to build an aluminum smelter.6 Nkrumah anticipated that once the smelter was opera tional, an integrated aluminum industry would develop. The new smelter would process alumina, which would come from a new alu mina refinery, which would process bauxite from new bauxite mines. Railways and a caustic soda plant would complete this dynamic industrial complex. A report prepared by expatriate advisers was enthusiastic that the lake created by damming the Volta would also provide a water transportation link between north and south in Ghana. The project would lead to "a major new fishing industry in the lake." Large-scale irrigated agriculture using lake water would make the loss due to flooding of 3,500 square miles of agricultural land "small in comparison."7 The Ghanaians indeed built Akosombo Dam within a few years, with support from the American and British governments and the World Bank. The dam created the world's largest man-made lake, Lake Volta. They built an aluminum smelter quickly as well, owned 90 percent by the multinational giant Kaiser Aluminum. Nkrumah ceremonially lowered the dam gates to start filling the great Volta Lake on May 19, 1964. 8 I remember visiting Akosombo Dam when I lived in Ghana for a year in 1969-1970. The big pile blocking the Volta River was indeed a stunning achievement. I was optimistic in 1969 about the prospects of Ghana, but my projections did not receive a great deal of public notice, perhaps because I had just finished elementary school. Other more mature observers shared my precocious optimism. The head of the World Bank's Economics Department in 1967, Andrew Kamarck, thought that Ghana's Volta project gave it the potential to reach growth of 7 percent per annum.9

Aid for Investment

Back to the Volta

In April 1982, a Ghanaian student at the University of Pittsburgh named Agyei Frempong handed in his Ph.D. dissertation, which compared the performance of the Volta River project to the high hopes held by Nkrumah and his foreign and domestic advisers for industrialization, transport, agriculture, and overall economic devel opment. Lake Volta was there, an electricity generator was there, and an aluminum smelter was there. Production of aluminum in the smelter had fluctuated up and down, but did grow on average about 1.5 percent a year from 1969 to 1992. But that was it for the project's benefits. Frempong noted in 1982, "There is no bauxite mine nor alumina refinery nor caustic soda plant nor railways." The efforts to create a lake fishery were "plagued by poor administration and mechanical equipment failures. " People living next to the lake, including the 80,000 whose old homes had been submerged, suffered from waterborne illnesses like river blind ness, hookworm, malaria, and schistosomiasis. The large-scale irri gation projects that the planners had envisioned never worked. The lake transport from north to south that was going to solve "the nation's transport difficulties" had "ended up in complete failure." 10 The saddest part was that the Volta River project was the most successful investment project in Ghanaian history. Frempong agreed with other analysts like Tony Killick that the core part of the project had been a success. The electricity generator and aluminum smelter continue to operate today, the latter with subsidized electricity and imported alumina. The real disaster is that the Ghanaians are still about as poor as they were in the early 1950s. Ghana had a half-century of stagnation in growth. How did this happen? Just about everything went wrong. The military overthrew Nkrumah in a coup in 1966, the first of five successful military coups over the next decade and a half. His over throw set off street celebrations in Accra, because Nkrumah's devel opment ambitions had brought little but food shortages and high inflation. Ghanaians would have celebrated less if they had known how much worse their situation would get over the next two decades. The military briefly restored democracy between 1969 and 1971 under the presidency of Kofi Busia. After the army overthrew Busia in 1971,

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economics and politics alike fell apart. Ghana even had a famine in the 1970s.U The nadir came in 1 983 during the new military government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. In 1983, the income of the average Ghanaian was two-thirds of what it had been in 1971. A drought lowered Lake Volta so much that the hydro plant had to cut off electricity to the Volta Aluminum Company for a year. Ghanaians in 1983 were getting only two-thirds of their recommended daily calo rie supply.l2 In 1983, even relatively well-off Ghanaian civil servants made macabre jokes about their "Rawlings necklaces"-the collar bones protruding from their underfed bodies.13 Malnutrition caused nearly half of all child deaths in 1983.14 Per capita income in 1983 was below that at independence in 1957. The crisis in 1983 provoked the Rawlings government to new efforts to bring Ghana back, and economic growth did recover, but it was a long and slow road after a quarter-century of decline. The Harrod-Domar Model, 1946-2000

The idea that aid-financed investment in dams, roads, and machines would yield growth goes back a long way. In April 1946, economics professor Evsey Damar published an article on economic growth, "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment," which dis cussed the relationship between short-term recessions and invest ment in the United States. Although Damar assumed that production capacity was proportional to the stock of machinery, he admitted the assumption was unrealistic and eleven years later, in 1 957, com plaining of an "ever-guilty conscience," he disavowed the theory.15 He said his earlier purpose was to comment on an esoteric debate on business cycles, not to derive "an empirically meaningful rate of growth." He said his theory made no sense for long-run growth, and instead he endorsed the new growth theory of Robert Solow (which I discuss in the next chapter). To sum up, Damar's model was not intended as a growth model, made no sense as a growth model, and was repudiated as a growth model over forty years ago by its creator. So it was ironic that Damar's growth model became, and continues to be today, the most widely applied growth model in economic history. How did Damar's model survive its supposed demise in the 1950s? We economists applied it (and still do) to poor countries from

Aid for Investment

Albania to Zimbabwe to determine a "required" investment rate for a target growth rate. The difference between the required investment and the country's own savings is called the

financing gap. Private

financing is assumed to be unavailable to fill the gap, so donors fill the financing gap with foreign aid to attain target growth. This is a model that promised poor countries growth right away through aid financed investment. It was aid to investment to growth. With the benefit of hindsight, the use of Domar's model for deter mining aid requirements and growth projections was (and still is) a big mistake. But let's not be too unkind to the proponents of the model (I was one, earlier in my career), who did not have the benefit of hindsight. The experiences we observed at the time of the model's heyday seemed to support a rigid link from aid to investment to growth. It was only as more data became available that the model's failings became ghastly apparent. Domar' s approach to growth became popular because it had a wonderfully simple prediction:

GDP growth will be proportional to the share of investment spending in GDP. Domar assumed that output (GOP) is proportional to machines, so the change in output will be proportional to the change in machines, that is, last year's invest ment. Divide both sides by last year's output. So GOP growth this year is just proportional to last year's investment/ GOP ratio.16 How did Domar get the idea that production was proportional to machines? Did not labor play some role in production? Domar was writing in the aftermath of the Great Depression, in which many peo ple running the machines lost jobs. Domar and many other econo mists expected a repeat of the depression after World War II unless the government did something to avoid it. Domar took high unem ployment as a given, so there were always people available to run any additional machines that were built. Domar's theory became known as the Harrod-Domar model. (A British economist named Roy Harrod had published in 1939 a similar but more convoluted article.) Clearly Domar's interest was the short-run business cycle in rich countries. So how did Domar's fixed ratio of production to machines make it into the analysis of poor countries' growth? The Invention of Development

The quest for a theory of growth and development has tormented us economists as long as there have been economists. In 1 776, eco-

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nomics' founding father, Adam Smith, asked what determined the wealth of nations. In 1890, the great English economist Alfred Mar shall said the quest for growth "gives to economic studies their chief and their highest interest."17 Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas con fessed in a 1988 article that once one starts to think about economic growth, "It is hard to think about anything else." But this constant interest in a theory of growth was focused on the rich countries only. No economists paid much attention to the problems of poor coun tries. The League of Nations's 1938 World Economic Survey, prepared by the future Nobel Prize winner James Meade, included one para graph on South America. Poor areas in Asia and Africa received no coverage at a11.1s Suddenly after World War II, we policy experts, having ignored poor countries for centuries, now called for attention to their "urgent problems."19 Economists had many theories as to how the newly independent poor countries could grow and catch up to the rich. It was the bad luck of poor countries that the first generation of the development experts was influenced by two simultaneous historical events: the Great Depression and the industrialization of the Soviet Union through forced saving and investment. The depression and the large number of underemployed rural people in poor countries motivated development economist Sir Arthur Lewis to suggest a "surplus labor" model, in which only machinery was a constraint. Lewis suggested that building factories would soak up this labor without causing a decline in rural production. Lewis and other development economists in the 1950s assumed a fixed ratio between people and machines, like one person per each machine. Because of surplus labor, machines (not labor) were the binding constraint on production. Production was proportional to machines, just as in Damar's theory. Lewis suggested that the supply of available workers was "unlimited" and cited a particular example of an economy that had grown through pulling in excess labor from the countryside: the Soviet Union. Lewis said that "the central fact of economic development is rapid capital accumulation."20 Since growth was proportional to invest ment, you could estimate that proportion and get a required amount of investment for a given growth target. For example, suppose that you got one percentage point of growth for every four percentage points of investment. A country that wanted to triple growth from 1 percent to 4 percent had to raise its investment rate from 4 percent

Aid for Investment

of GDP to 16 percent of GDP. The 4 percent GDP growth would give a per capita growth rate of 2 percent if population growth was 2 percent. At a 2 percent per year rate of growth, income per capita would double every thirty-six years. Investment had to keep ahead of population growth. Development was a race between machines and motherhood. How do you get investment high enough? Say that current national saving is 4 percent of GDP. The early development econo mists thought that poor countries were so poor they had little hope of increasing their saving. There was thus a "financing gap" of 12 percent of GDP between the "required investment" (16 percent of GDP) and the current 4 percent of GDP level of national savings. So Western donors should fill the "financing gap" with foreign aid, which will make the required investment happen, which in turn will make the target output growth happen. (I will henceforth use fnancing gap approach as equivalent nomenclature to Harrod-Damar model.) The early development economists were hazy about how long it took for aid to increase investment and in turn increase growth, but in practice they expected quick payoff: this year's aid will go into this year's investment, which will go into next year's GDP growth. The idea that growth was proportional to investment was not new. Damar ruefully mentioned in his 1957 book that an earlier set of economists very concerned about growth, Soviet economists of the 1920s, had already used the same idea. N. A. Kovalevskii, the editor of Planned Economy, in March 1 930 used the growth-proportional-to investment idea to project Soviet growth, exactly the way that econ omists were going to use it from the 1950s through the 1990s.21 Not only had the Soviet experience inspired the Harrod-Damar model, but the Soviets themselves should get some of the credit (or debit, as it turned out) for the invention of the model. The Stages of Rostow

The next step in the evolution of the financing gap was to persuade rich nations to fill the gap with aid. In 1960, W. W. Rostow published his best-selling book, The S tages of Economic Growth. Of the five stages he projected, the that stuck in peoples' minds was the "takeoff into self-sustained growth." Yet the only determinant of output take off that Rostow cited was investment increasing from 5 to 10 percent

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of income. Since this was almost exactly what Sir Arthur Lewis had said six years earlier, "takeoff" just reasserted Domar and Lewis with vivid images of planes swooping off runways. Rostow tried to show that the investment-led takeoff fit the stylized facts. Stalin's Russia influenced Rostow a great deal, as it had everyone else; it fit the takeoff story. Then Rostow considered a number of historical and Third World cases. His own evidence was weak, however: only three of fifteen cases he cited fit the story of an investment-led takeoff. Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets in 1963 found his own independent historical evidence even less supportive of Rostow's story: "In no case do we find during the takeoff periods the acceleration in the rate of growth of total national product implied in Professor Rostow's assumptions of a doubling (or more) in the net capital formation proportion."22 (But stylized facts never die. Three decades later, a leading economist would write: "One of the impor tant stylized facts of world history is that massive increases in saving precede significant takeoffs in economic growth.")23 The Soviet Scare and Foreign Aid

Regardless of the evidence, Rostow's Stages drew a lot of attention to the poor nations. Rostow was not the only or even the most impor tant advocate for foreign aid, but his arguments are illustrative. Rostow played on cold war fears in Stages. (The subtitle was A Non-Communist Manifesto). Rostow saw in Russia "a nation surging, under Communism, into a long-delayed status as an industrial power of the first order," a common view of that time. Hard as it is to imagine today, many American opinion makers thought that the Soviet system was superior for sheer output production, even if inferior in individual freedoms. In issues of Foreign Affairs in the 1950s, writers noted the Soviet willingness to "extract large forced savings," the advantage of which "it is difficult to overemphasize." In "economic power," they will "grow faster than we do." Observers warned that the competitor derived "certain advantages" from the "centralized character of the operation." There was danger that the Third World, attracted by "certain advantages," would go communist. 24 It is too easy today in hindsight to mock these fears. When I first visited the Soviet Union in August 1990, almost everyone by then had belatedly realized that the Soviet Union was still a poor country,

Aid for Investment

not "an industrial power of the first order:" As I sat sweating in a tiny lntourist hotel room with sealed windows, with air-conditioning that had broken down under Khruschev and hadn't been fixed yet, with less than irresistible prostitutes trying to break down my door ("Hello I Natasha, I lonely"), I wondered how the Soviets managed to fool us for so long. Today Russian per capita income is estimated to be less than one-sixth of American per capita income. (With an economist's gift for prophecy, I said to my companions in 1 990, "This place will be booming in no time!" Actually growth has been negative every year since 1990.) Nevertheless, at the time Rostow felt the need to demonstrate to the Third World that communism was not "the only form of effective state organization that can . . . launch a take-off " and offered in its place a noncommunist way: Western nations could provide Third World nations with aid to fill the "financing gap" between the nec essary investment for takeoff and actual national saving. Rostow used the financing gap approach to figure out the necessary invest ment for "takeoff."25 The role of private financing was ignored, since international capital flows to the poor countries were minuscule. The Soviet scare worked. U.S. foreign aid had already increased a lot under Eisenhower in the late 1950s, to whom Rostow was an adviser. Rostow had also caught the eye of an ambitious senator named John F. Kennedy, who, with advice from Rostow, successfully got the Senate to pass a foreign aid resolution in 1959. After Kennedy became president, he sent a message to Congress in 1 961 calling for increased foreign aid: "In our time these new nations need help . . . to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth . . . for a special reason. Without exception, they are all under Communist pressure." Rostow was in government throughout the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson. Under Kennedy, foreign aid increased by 25 percent in constant dollars. Under Johnson, American foreign aid reached its historical maximum of $14 billion in 1985 dollars, equiv alent to 0.6 percent of American GOP. Rostow and other like-minded economists had triumphed on aid. The United States decreased its foreign aid after that peak under Johnson, but other rich countries more than compensated. Between 1950 and 1995, Western countries gave $1 trillion (measured in 1985 dollars) in aid.26 Since virtually all o f the aid advocates used the financing gap approach, this was one of the largest policy experi ments ever based on a single economic theory.

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Don't Forget to Save

There was a remarkable degree of consensus that the aid to invest ment to growth dogma "was substantially valid," as a popular text by Jagdish Bhagwati in 1966 put it. But there were warnings about excessive indebtedness to donors on the low-interest loans that made up part of the aid. Turkey had already developed debt servicing problems on its past aid loans, this early text noted. One early aid critic, P. T. Bauer, sarcastically (but presciently) noted in 1972 that "foreign aid is necessary to enable underdeveloped countries to ser vice the subsidized loans . . . under earlier foreign aid agreements. "27 The obvious way to avoid a debt problem with official donors was to increase national saving. Bhagwati said this was a job for the state: the state had to raise taxes to generate public savings.28 Rostow pre dicted the recipient country would naturally increase its savings as it took off, so that after "ten or fifteen years" the donors could antici pate that aid would be "discontinued." (We are still waiting for that apotheosis forty years later.) Hollis Chenery stressed the need for national saving even more heavily in his application of the financing gap approach. Chenery and Alan Strout in 1966 started off in the usual way with a model in which aid will "fill the temporary gap between investment ability and saving ability. "29 Investment then goes into growth. But they also assumed a high rate of saving out of the increase in income. This saving rate had to be high enough for the country eventually to move into "self-sustained" growth, in which it financed its invest ment needs out of its own savings. They suggested that donors relate "the amount of aid supplied to the recipient's effectiveness in increasing the rate of domestic saving." (Donors have yet to follow this suggestion thirty-four years later.) The Financing Gap Meets the Computer

Economists computerized Chenery's version of the financing gap at the World Bank in 1971, where Chenery was now the chief economic adviser to Bank president Robert McNamara, who was delighted to get a tool that gave precise aid requirements for each country. A Bank economist, John Holsen, developed over a long weekend what .he called the minimum standard model (MSM). Holsen expected the "minimum" model to have a useful life of about six weeks.30

Aid for Investment

He expected country economists to build more elaborate country specific models to supplant it. (As it turned out, it is still being used today, twenty-nine years later. I was part of a unsuccessful attempt to revise it fundamentally eleven years ago, so it's partly my fault.) World Bank economists revised the MSM a couple of years later and renamed it the revised minimum standard model (RMSM).31 The growth part of the RMSM was Harrod-Damar: the growth rate of GOP was proportional to last year's investment/GOP. Foreign aid and private finance were to fill the financing gap between saving and the necessary investment to get high growth. The financing gap informed discussions with other donors over how much aid or other financing that country needed. Following Chenery-and equally unheeded-the RMSM creators cautioned that saving out of the additional income had to be high to avoid unsustainable debt. (Much Latin American and African debt indeed turned out to be unsustainable in the 1980s and 1990s.) The failure of growth to respond to aid-financed investment did give economists pause, but there was a logical fallback for defenders of the financing gap approach. One leading development textbook (both recently and in earlier versions) gave what quickly became a new dogma: "Although physical capital accumulation may be con sidered a necessary condition of development, it has not proved suffi cient. "32 Another leading development textbook echoed, "The basic reason why [the investment-led takeoff] didn't work was not because more saving and investment isn't a necessary condition-it is-but rather because it is not a sufficient condition."33 We will see how the idea that investment is necessary but not sufficient works out in the data. The Financing Gap Forever

The financing gap approach had a curious fate after its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s. It died out of the academic literature altogether, yet the ghost of it lives on. We economists in the international financial institutions (IFis) today still use it to make aid, investment, and growth projections. We IFI economists used the financing gap approach even when it clearly wasn't working. Total GOP in Guyana fell sharply from 1980 to 1990, as investment was increasing from 30 percent to 42 percent of GDP,34 and while foreign aid every year was 8 percent

Chapter 2

of Guyana's GDP.35 This was no triumph for the financing gap approach. Yet another World Bank report in 1993 argued that Guyana "will continue to need substantial levels of foreign capital inflows . . . to provide sufficient resources to sustain economic growth."36 The idea seems to be, "That didn't work, so let's try it again." We IFI economists used the financing gap approach amid recovery from civil war. We World Bank economists programmed the Ugandan economy in 1996 to grow rapidly (at the ubiquitous growth target of 7 percent). With little savings and substantial investment require ments, this implied high foreign aid inflows. The report argued for the high aid because anything less "could be harmful for medium term growth in Uganda, which requires external inflows."37 We IFI economists used the financing gap approach in the after math of macroeconomic crises. A World Bank report in 1995 told Latin Americans that "enhancing savings and investment by 8 per centage points of GDP would raise the annual growth figure by around 2 percentage points."38 An Inter-American Bank report in 1995 worried about the Latin American "challenge of sustaining the level of investment necessary for continued output growth."39 A World Bank report on Thailand in 2000 told the country that was the epicenter of the East Asian crisis that "private investment is the key to the resumption of growth."40 We IFI economists used the financing gap approach to train devel oping country officials. Courses still given today at the International Monetary Fund (IMP) and World Bank train developing-country offi cials to project investment requirements as proportional to the growth rate."41 We IFI economists used the financing gap approach amid the chaotic transition from communism to capitalism. A 1993 World Bank report on Lithuania said that "large amounts of external assis tance will be required" in order to "provide the resources for critical investments" to stem the output dedine.42 A 1998 World Bank on Lithuania was still using the assumption that growth was propor tional to investment. A 1997 report on war-ravaged Croatia said that "to achieve sustainable growth of 5-6 percent . . . within the next three years . . . [it] must achieve investment levels of 21-22 percent of GDP."43 How much aid and investment is needed to reach a growth target? A report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1995 adroitly notes that these are central

Aid

for Investment

planners' questions-and then goes on to answer them anyway. The EBRD announced it was using the "Harrod-Damar growth equa tion" to project investment requirements. This equation warned the ex-communist countries that "investment finance of the order of 20 percent or more of GDP will be required" to reach "growth rates of 5 percent" The report noted that "conditional official assis tance . . . contributes to cover the gap between domestic savings and investment.''44 So the circle of irony closes. The communist economies had inspired the financing gap approach, the cold war inspired the filling of the gap with aid, and now the capitalist economies strove to fill the financing gap for the ex-communist economies.45 Aid to Investment in the Light of Experience

As far as I know, nobody has checked the financing gap approach against actual experience. By the time that sufficient cross-country data became available, the model had already fallen out of favor in the academic literature. Yet as we have seen, the ghost of the model lives on in the determination of aid requirements and growth pros pects of poor countries. Let's now test this model. When we financing gap users calculated aid requirements as the excess of "required" investment over actual saving, our presump tion was that aid would go one for one into investment. Moreover, aid givers talked about conditions that would require countries to increase their rate of national saving at the same time, which some like Rostow thought would even happen naturally. So aid combined with savings conditions should increase investment by even more than one to one. Let's see what actually happened. We have eighty-eight countries on which data are available span ning the period 1 965 to 1995.46 The aid to investment link has to pass two tests for us to take it seriously. First, there should be a positive statistical association between aid and investment. Second, aid should pass into investment at least one for one: an additional 1 percent of GDP in aid should cause an increase of 1 percent of GDP in invest ment. (Rostow predicted investment would rise by even more than one for one because of increased saving by the aid recipient.) How did the aid to investment do on these tests? On the first test, only seventeen of eighty-eight countries show a positive statistical asso ciation between aid and investment.

Chapter 2

Just six of these seventeen countries also pass the test of invest ment increasing at least one for one with aid. The magic six include two economies with trivial amounts of aid: Hong Kong (which got an average of 0.07 percent of GDP in aid, 1965-1995) and China (average of 0.2 percent of GDP). The other four-Tunisia, Morocco, Malta, and Sri Lanka-did have nontrivial amounts of aid. The other eighty-two countries fail the two tests. These country-by-country results are reminiscent of the results of a 1994 study that found no relationship between aid and investment across countries. Unlike this study, I do not intend here to make a general statement about whether foreign aid is effective. There are many problems in doing such an evaluation, most of all the possi bility that both aid and investment could be responding to some third factor. It could be that in any given country there was bad luck like a drought that caused investment to fall and aid to increase. I am only asking whether investment and aid jointly evolved the way that the users of the financing gap model expected. We financing gap advocates anticipated that aid would go into investment, not into tiding countries over droughts. According to my results, investment and aid did not evolve the way we expected. The financing gap approach failed badly as a panacea because it violated this book's official motto: People respond to incentives. Think of the incentives facing the recipients of foreign aid. They invest in the future when they get a high return to their investments. They do not invest in the future when they do not get a high return to their investments. There is no reason to think that aid given just because the recipient is poor changes the incentives to invest in the future. Aid will not cause its recipients to increase their investment; they will use aid to buy more consumption goods. This is exactly what we found when we checked the aid-investment relationship: on balance there is no relationship. Aid could have promoted investment instead of all going into con sumption. As many aid advocates suggested, aid should have been made conditional on matching increases in a country's savings rate. That would have given the governments in poor countries incentives to increase their own savings (for example, cutting government con sumption so as to increase government saving) and to promote pri vate savings. The latter can be done by a combination of tax breaks for income that is devoted to saving and taxes on consumption. The increase in saving would have kept the aid recipients out of debt

Aid for Investment

troubles and would have promoted as increase in investment. Having aid increase with country saving is the opposite of the current system, where a country with lower saving has a higher financing gap and so gets more aid. Investment to Growth

The second link in the financing gap approach is the link from invest ment to growth. Does investment have a quick growth payoff, as the financing gap model assumed? I start assuming the same short-run investment-growth relation ship across all countries. I tried using four-year averages to assess the growth-investment relationship. (Five years is a common forecast horizon on country desks in the IFis. Country economists usually project the first year from current business conditions, so four years is de facto the common horizon for projections.) The results with four-year averages do not bode well for the financing gap approach: there is no statistical association between growth in one four-year period and investment in the previous four-year period.47 Let's now allow the investment-growth relationship to vary across countries by examining the link from investment to growth individ ually for each country. We have 1 38 countries with at least ten obser vations on growth and investment. Again there are two tests of the investment-to-growth link. First, countries should display a positive statistical association between growth and last year's investment. Second, the investment-growth relationships should be in the "usual" range to give reasonable "financing gaps." The four economies that pass both tests are an unusual assortment: Israel, Liberia, Reunion (a tiny French colony), and Tunisia.48 Remembering the few countries where the aid-to-investment link worked as expected, I can now say that the financing gap approach fits one country: Tunisia. Before Tunisians throw a national celebra tion, I should point out that 1 success out of 1 38 countries is likely to have occurred by chance even if the model made no sense, which so far the evidence says it doesn't. Is Investment Necessary in the Short Run?

For the other 137 countries, the ritual incantation of us practitioners at this point is that investment is necessary but not sufficient. I can

Chapter 2

test this idea by checking how many four-year-long high-growth episodes (7 percent and above) were accompanied by the necessary investment rates in the previous four years. Nine-tenths of the coun tries violate the "necessary" condition. At the short-run horizons at which we IFI economists work, there is no evidence that investment is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for high growth. In the longer run, accumulation of machines does go along with growth, but I will discuss in the next chapter how investment is not the causal force; instead it is technology. Using the four-year averages for both growth and investment, let's also look at episodes where growth increased and see how often investment increased by the "required amount." During episodes of increased growth with four-year periods, investment increased by the "required amount" only 6 percent of the time. The other 94 percent of the episodes violated the "necessary condition." Empiri cally, increases in investment are neither necessary nor sufficient for increases in growth over the short to medium run. To understand why the idea that growth is proportional to last period's investment doesn't work out in practice, remember that such a relationship assumed that machines were the constraint on production, because it assumed that laborers were perpetually in excess supply. Nobel laureate Robert Solow, whose model of growth I discuss in the next chapter, pointed out the problem with this assumption as long ago as 1956 (although his insight went unheeded by those of us in the IFis for the succeeding four decades). If there is an abundant supply of laborers and a limited supply of machines, then companies will have a strong incentive to use technology that uses a lot of workers and few machines. For example, road construc tion projects in the labor-scarce United States use many jackhammers and relatively few workers. By contrast, road construction projects in labor-abundant India use many workers with picks breaking up rocks. The idea that investment is a rigid constraint on growth is incompatible with "people respond to incentives." The surplus labor idea led to another cause for urgency to fill the gap for the "necessary" investment-if the investment is not forthcoming to generate enough output growth to absorb more of this excess labor, unemployment will increase. For example, a 1998 World Bank report on Egypt used the usual growth-proportional-to investment idea, and then noted the alarming possibility that unem ployment would shoot up to 20 percent of the labor force in 2002 (as

Aid for Investment

opposed to 9.5 percent in 1998) if growth was only 2 percent. If on the other hand, growth were 6.5 percent (with the accompanying higher investment), unemployment in 2002 would be only 6.4 per cent of the labor force.49 The idea of low investment mechanically increasing unemployment is silly-it ignores again the possibility of substituting labor for machinery. If machines increase slowly because of low investment, then the presumably abundant workers will be substituted for the scarce machines. The surplus labor idea suggests that additional people have no effect on production at a given rate of investment, an idea strongly rejected by the evidence. How could we have gotten more of a growth response from in vestment? It is true that as an economy grows, it will need more machines. But the reason that the rigid investment-and-growth rela tionship has not worked is that machinery investment is just one of many forms of increasing future production, and all the forms are responsive to incentives. If incentives to invest in the future are strong, then there will be more investment in machines, but also more adaptation of new technology (an important component of growth, as we will see in the next chapter). There will be more investment in machines, but also more investment in education and training. There will be more investment in machines, but also more investment in organizational capital (designing efficient institutions). The multiple factors that affect growth cause the relationship between growth and investment to be loose and unstable. Growth fluctuates around an average for each country, while investment rates drift all over the place. Nevertheless, it is common in the IFis to use the ratio of investment to growth (called the jaw-breaking name of Incremental Capital to Output Ratio, or ICOR) as an inverse mea sure of the "productivity" of investment. For example, the World Bank in a 2000 report on Thailand saw that one of the harbingers of the 1997-98 financial crisis was that the ICOR "was almost at its historical high in 1996."50 Likewise a World Bank 2000 report on Africa attributed Africa's low and declining growth over 1970 to 1997 to low and declining investment productivity "as measured by the incremental capital-output ratio."51 The ICOR is reified to the extent that it is seen as an independent causal factor, when it really is just the ratio of two things only loosely related. Even if growth declined for reasons totally unrelated to investment (like misman aged banking systems in Thailand or kleptocratic governments in Africa), we could still tautologically say growth fell for an unchanged

Chapter 2

investment rate because the ICOR rose-that is, the ratio of growth to investment fell. We could equally say the price of apples fell be cause the price of oranges was unchanged and the price ratio of ap ples to oranges fell! Rather than worrying about how much investment is "needed" to sustain a given growth rate, we should concentrate on strengthening incentives to invest in the future and let the various forms of invest ment play out how they may. (I talk more about how to do this at the end of this chapter and in future chapters.) Jointly Checking the Aid-to-Investment and Investment-to Growth Links

I can construct a scenario of what income a country would have achieved if the predictions of the financing gap approach had been correct and then compare the prediction to the actual outcome. The financing gap model predicts that aid goes into investment one to one, or more. I stick to the one-to-one prediction to be conserva tive. So investment to GDP will increase over the initial year by the amount that aid to GDP increases over the initial year. Then this investment will increase growth in the next period. This predicts total GDP growth. To get per capita growth, I subtract actual popu lation growth. I start with a comparison of what Zambians' actual average income to what would have been, $2 billion of aid later, if filling the financ ing gap had worked as predicted (figure 2.1). Zambia today would be an industrialized country with a per capita income of $20,000, instead of its actual condition as one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of $600 (which is one-third lower than at independence). Zambia is one of the worst cases for the financing gap approach, because it already had a high investment rate before aid and it got a lot of aid. But Zambia's investment rate went down, not up, as the aid increased, and the investment in any case did not yield growth. 52 What about the financing gap approach's predicted growth for all of the aid recipients? First, the countries' actual growth was more often than not lower than predicted growth. Second, the financing gap model did not successfully pick out the growth superstars. The most notable examples are the predicted superstars like Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Zambia, Guyana, Comoros, Chad, Mauritania,

Aid for Investment

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Governments Can Kill Growth

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create poor incentives for growth: high inflation, high black market premiums, high budget deficits, strongly negative real interest rates, restrictions on free trade, excessive red tape, and inadequate public services. The tragedy is that governments so often cause lost growth. We will look at how governments come to follow such irrational policies in the succeeding chapters. Before anointing macroeconomic policy reforms as the elixir of growth, however, note that we still have the possibility of poverty traps-as discussed in earlier chapters. Indeed, all poor countries' growth in the '90s was below what their macroeconomic policy reforms would have predicted. And institutional reform is also very important. We look at one type of institutional failure-corruption in the next chapter.

Intermezzo: Florence and Veronica

Florence and Veronica Phiri once lived with their parents in a small but comfortable house in Lusaka, Zambia. Their father was an electrician. But both their parents died when the girls were eight and six. Their father's family took all of the Phiris's possessions, including the house, and sent the girls to live in a rural village with an aunt. The children worked hard there fetching water and collecting wood. Often they were beaten for not working hard enough. After two years, their mother's relatives brought Florence and Veronica back to Lusaka to live with their maternal grandmother in a dilapidated house. Their grandmother earns a precarious living by selling vegetables at a market stand. When she has a bad day, the family goes without food. Four other orphans also live with the grandmother, in a country full of orphans because of deaths from AIDS. Florence and Veronica play in streets full of dust with their four cousins. A community group donated money for Florence to pay school fees, buy a school uniform, and buy shoes. There wasn't enough money to do the same for Veronica.1

Corruption and Growth

There is no distinctly American criminal class, except Congress. Mark Twain

The urge to steal everything not bolted to the floor is the most obvious growth-killing incentive that government officials face. Requiring private businesspeople to pay bribes is a direct tax on production, and so we would expect it to lower growth. Corruption is one of the problems most likely to be mentioned by casual visitors to poor countries or by investors in those countries. In a poll commis sioned by the agency Roper Starch International in nineteen devel oping countries, corruption was the fourth out of fifteen top national concerns of citizens, after crime, inflation, and recession. 1 Despite the obvious importance of corruption in economic devel opment, it has not attracted much attention from economists until recently. The prestigious four-volume

Handbook of Development Eco nomics, published from 1988 to 1995, does not mention corruption anywhere in 3,047 pages of text. A recent leading textbook on devel opment economics does not mention corruption (or politics for that matter) anywhere.2 Moreover, the international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund paid virtually no attention to corruption for decades. Only recently has corruption become a hot issue for these institutions. Even then we are often reluctant to utter the word

corruption; problems with governance is the bureaucratic

jargon we use instead. Once we acknowledge the importance of corruption to growth, there are unresolved questions. Why do some governments face

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stronger incentives to steal than other governments? Why is corrup tion more damaging in some countries than in others? In this chapter, I discuss the scale of corruption, its effect on growth, its determi nants, and some possible solutions . Life on the Run

When I lived in Mexico City for a year, I played a constant cat and mouse game with the Mexican police. I was the mouse, and the very corrupt Mexican police were the cats. Driving my car with its American license plate in Mexico City was like having a sign, "I'm an American tourist. Please extort bribes from me. " Before I caught on to how corrupt the police were, I actually stopped and asked a policeman for directions. When I told my Mexican friends that I had done this, they exploded in laughter. As they surmised, the policeman whom I asked for directions immediately shouted,

"Alto" (halt) and ran to get several fellow officers to share in the booty. I used the time-honored technique of pretending not to under stand the language. I pretended that I thought alto meant "proceed in your car at a high rate of speed away from the corrupt policemen, who are fortunately on foot." I wasn't so lucky in my next encounter with the police. This time a motorized policeman pulled me over. Asking him what my infrac tion had been, he told me I had committed the serious offense of

transporting books without a license. The offending cargo was a box of books in my trunk. I had the nerve to carry these in my Volkswagen Rabbit. What did I think I was? A professional moving company? This serious offense required a trip to the station house (my Mexican friends told me, "Never let them get you to the station house"). I offered to pay the fine for my outrageous offense on the spot, and that resolved matters. (I'm embarrassed to tell you how much I paid for the bribe. I got caught with only large denomination notes on me.) After that I developed several techniques for evading police sting operations. I continued to act like an idiot as far as comprehension of Spanish went whenever the policeman was on foot. The next time I encountered a motorized policeman, I simply refused to pull over and kept driving until I got to the private university I was going to. Private property was apparently safe refuge, and the policemen gave up the chase at the gates.

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Things were not so amusing for poorer inhabitants of Mexico City, whom the police regularly shook down for bribes. Supposedly each precinct had a quota of bribes to collect every month, from which the higher-ups would get a cut. Everyone knew about this corruption, but attempts to deal with it proved futile. This phenomenon of venal police is not limited to Mexico; in countries ranging from Jamaica, Uganda, India, to Moldova, the poor report police brutality and cor ruption as one of their main worries.3 The All-World Corruption Tour

Corruption occurs in rich countries and poor countries, tiny coun tries and gigantic countries, Christian countries and Islamic coun tries, African countries and Asian countries, Old World countries and New World countries . Although it appears everywhere, there are some careful measures of the severity of corruption across coun tries that we can use. I will first give some anecdotes to illustrate the ubiquity of corruption and then present some measures to distin guish corruption across countries. Denver brewery owner Joseph Coors was a big financial backer of Ronald Reagan. When his beer can manufacturing plant had to dis pose of some hazardous waste, Reagan appointed several members of the Coors clan to the Environmental Protection Agency, which then lifted restrictions on dumping of toxic waste in Colorado. There was a public outcry against Coors for his b uying the right to dump toxic waste, if not for his watery beer.4 The psychologist Dr. Don Soeken alleged in 1988 that he had been asked to declare as mentally unbalanced American civil servants who had uncovered corruption in the State and Defense Depart ments. Their superiors were trying to discredit them by claiming they were insane (the civil servants, not the superiors).5 In Japan, a government prosecutor uncovered a scheme where businessmen who needed a government favor would provide ex pensive free entertainment for the officials concerned. Showing their determination to stamp out corruption, the Japanese government re assigned the prosecutor in August 1998 to a remote coastal city. 6 In Ecuador in February 1997, agents for President Abdala Bucaram allegedly walked off with $3 million in Ecuadorian currency from the Central Bank. They delivered the loot to his office shortly before his term of public service was to expire?

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The brother of Mexican president Carlos Salinas was implicated in payoffs for drug running, which may explain the $132 million in his Swiss bank account. Meanwhile, the personal secretary of President Salinas, Justo Ceja Martinez, was unable to explain how he accumu lated $3 million from 1 988 to 1994 on an annual salary of $32,400.8 In a South Indian state in the late 1970s, corruption permeated the system of official irrigation. Among the many types of corrupt pay offs, there was one euphemistically called "savings on the ground." A government contractor would do less work than called for in his contract-like removing only 1 inch of silt from the irrigation canal instead of 3 inches of silt. The contractor would split the "savings on the ground" with the government's executive engineer, who had already gotten a kickback of 2.5 percent of the contract for awarding the contract to that particular contractor. The savings on the ground and kickbacks ranged from 25 to 50 percent of the value of what was supposed to be put on the ground. The executive engineer's earnings from corruption were as much as nine times his official salary. Little wonder that these lucrative posts were bought and sold within the irrigation bureaucracy. The executive engineer in this example might pay a lump sum of five times his annual salary for a two-year post ing, still leaving him an attractive net income. The rampant corrup tion had more than a little to do with the poor performance of the irrigation system.9 In Korea, four unqualified bone setters paid the equivalent of $11,000 to the Bureau of Health and Social Affairs in one province for fake licenses. There has been no word on how their patients survived amateur bone setting. 1 0 On a more spectacular scale, the former mayor of Beijing and member of the Politburo, Chen Xitong, was sentenced to sixteen years in prison for corruption. He allegedly diverted as much as $2.2 billion in Beijing city funds during his time of public service, using kickbacks on construction contracts and many other devices. Chinese television showed some of the trappings of the high-living Chen: "a gold ring, a gold tortoise, a silver carriage and horses, a house in the countryside equipped with massage chairs and an extensive bedroom complex. " 11 One government agency in the Philippines was said to be so cor rupt that even the janitors were receiving payoffs. 1 2 Marcos initially promised to clean up corruption. His lack of success can be mea sured in the zillions of dollars that he himself stole. To give one

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example, Westinghouse allegedly paid Marcos $80 million to get the contract to build a new nuclear plant. A presidential commission approved General Electric's much lower bid, but President Marcos overruled them. His secretary of industry complained that the country was getting "one reactor for the price of two."13 (Nor has democracy been a panacea for corruption: the current democratically elected president is facing impeachment on corruption charges.) Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha allegedly accumulated billions of dollars from kickbacks on construction contracts and from diverting oil revenues to his personal account. He also diverted $2 billion from state oil refineries, leaving them unable to produce gasoline, and then, with real chutzpah, pocketed commissions on imported gaso line. Only his sudden death in June 1998 put an end to his imagina tive plunder.l4 In Zimbabwe, the cabinet awarded the contract for the airport at Harare to Air Harbout Technologies from Cyprus. In a startling coincidence, the local agent of Air Harbout Technologies was Presi dent Mugabe's nephew. The cabinet overruled the tender board that placed this company fourth. Two other facilitators allegedly received $1 million.15 President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, not satisfied with his personal fortune of billions of dollars, stole the entire gold-mining region of Kilo-moto. Kilo-moto covers 32,000 square miles and has reserves of 100 tons of gold. In another transaction Mobutu, who never seemed to think small, gave the West German rocket company OTRAG the rights to an area of southeast Zaire as large as West Germany itself.l6 Rating Corruption and Its Consequences

This selection of anecdotes may suggest that government officials everywhere are no better than highwaymen on the road to growth. All countries can furnish anecdotes, but some countries are more corrupt than others. The International Credit Risk Guide surveys businesspeople for their perception of corruption in countries around the world on a rating between 0 (most corrupt) and 6 (least corrupt). In 1990, the countries that distinguished themselves with a 0 for exceptional graft in the line of duty were: the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Liberia, Paraguay, and Zaire. (The Philippines under Marcos had earned a 0, but by 1990 the country under a reformist government had climbed

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all the way t o 2 . ) The countries with a 6 are all industrial countries, although not all industrial countries have a 6 (the United States and Japan, for example, are both Ss). The data show that corruption and growth are inversely related. (This sample includes growth in the 1980s aga inst corruption in 1982 and growth in the 1990s against corruption in 1990.) Similarly cor ruption and the investment ratio to GOP are inversely related. (This sample is investment to GOP in 1982 on corruption in 1982 and investment to GOP in 1990 on corruption in 1990.) Nobody wants to invest in a corrupt economy, and nobody wants to do all the other things that make for a growing economyP C orruption not only has a direct effect on growth; it also has an indirect effect because it makes other policies that affect growth worse. For example, many of the corruption anecdotes describe diversions of funds from public revenues or blowing up public expenditures through kickbacks. It's not a surprise, then, that more corruption is a ssociated with larger budget deficits. The average budget deficit in the quarter of the sample that is least corrupt is 3 . 1 percent of GOP; the average deficit in the most corrupt quarter of the sample i s 6.7 percent of GOP. Still, the relationship of corruption with growth is not a simple one. Notice that the list of most corrupt in 1990 includes both growth disasters (Zaire) and growth miracles (at least a miracle until recently, Indonesia). Could the effect of corruption be different in different countries? The effect of corruption could even be different over time in the same country. The 1990 survey by the

Internation Credit Risk Guide

did not include much data on the postcommunist countries, since communism was not yet post- everywhere in 1990. A World Bank survey of sixty-nine countries in 1996 did include many post communist countries. Firms in the sixty-nine countries were asked whether "irregular payments" were a common practice in their industry. The possible answers ranged from 1 (always) to 6 (never). While the communist countries had always had some corruption (the Soviet Union got a 4 on the 0-6 scale of the Credit

Risk Guide in 1990),

it was clear from this new survey that corruption had become more pervasive in the postcommunist countries. The two most corrupt countries were Azerbaijan and Bulgaria. Postcommunist countries accounted for 10 of the top 20 most corrupt in the 1996 survey, although they accounted for less than 30 percent of the sample. The

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disastrous output decline occurring in the postcommunist countries, while having many other causes, is another hint that corruption is not good for growth. Varieties of Corruption

Two different kinds of corruption could affect growth: decentralized corruption and centralized corruption. Under decentralized corrup tion, there are many bribe takers, and their imposition of bribes is not coordinated among them. Under centralized corruption, a gov ernment leader organizes all corruption activity in the economy and determines the shares of each official in the ill-gotten proceeds. Decentralized corruption is like the multiple roadblocks by sol diers that one would encounter in traveling in, say, Zaire. Each sol dier at a roadblock is an individual predator, without taking into account the effect of his actions on other predators. The wealth of the travelers is a common resource that all of the independent thieves try to appropriate. We have the classic common pool problem. The bribes demanded will be higher as each soldier thief tries to get as much revenue from the hapless traveler as possible before other thieves get it. The total "theft rate" implied by decentralized bribes will be higher than under centralized corruption. Indeed, the theft rate under decentralized corruption may be so high that total corruption revenues are lower than they would be with a lower theft rate. As the tax rate climbs, individuals put more effort into avoiding bribe opportunities for the military thieves. They travel by roads with fewer roadblocks, carry less money with them, and conceal the wealth of goods they are shipping. Decentralized corruption ironically results in lower total bribe revenues than centralized corruption even though it has a higher bribe "tax rate" on private activity. Decentralized corruption creates the worst incentives for growth. There is yet one more reason that decentralized corruption is damaging. The likelihood that someone will be punished for corrupt behavior is positively related to the strength of state enforcement and negatively related to the number of corrupt officials. With decen tralized corruption, the state is weak and many officials are corrupt. Even if the state prosecutes some corrupt officials, the likelihood of being caught is low because there are so many corrupt officials from whom to choose when the state prosecutes. There are thus virtuous

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and vicious circles in corruption. The virtuous circle occurs when, for whatever reason, decentralized corruption is low and so anyone who does steal will likely get caught. Thus, corruption stays low. The vicious circle occurs when decentralized corruption is high, and so the likelihood of being caught is low. Thus, corruption stays high. Under centralized corruption, one leader seeks to maximize the take from the corruption network as a whole. This leader is more solicitous of his victims' prosperity, because he knows that stealing too much will cause the victims to take evasive action that will lower bribe collections. So the centralized corruption mafioso, like Suharto in Indonesia, will set the bribe "tax rate" at all of the roadblocks at lower levels that maximize the total take of the system. Under cen tralized corruption, there is monitoring of the size of the rake-off at each level; anyone trying to rake off more than the center prescribes will be punished. Because of this supervision, there are no vicious circles. Centralized corruption is less damaging than decentralized corruption.1 8 More generally, a strong dictator will choose a level of corruption that does not harm growth too badly, because he knows his rake-off depends on the size of the economy. A weak state with decentralized corruption doesn't have this incentive to preserve growth. Each indi vidual bribe taker is too small to affect the overall size of the econ omy, so he feels little restraint on getting the most out of his victim. This tale us insight into why corruption was more damaging to growth in Zaire than in Indonesia. Zaire is a weak state with many independent official entrepreneurs. Indonesia under Suharto was a strong state that imposed bribes from the top down. Zaire had neg ative per capita growth, while Indonesia had exceptional per capita growth (until recently). There was also a shift in the type of corruption in the post communist countries. The communist countries had always had some corruption, but under the centralized party dictatorship, it was mostly top down. The postcommunist countries, by contrast, have many independent power centers and so have shifted to decentralized corruption. This helps us to understand why corruption has been much more damaging after communism than during communism. Determinants of Corruption

It is clear that the incentives for corruption are stronger in a decen tralized government than in a centralized one. In a decentralized

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government, such as a coalition government among interest groups, the theft rate will be higher. Moreover, any piles of money that become available through commodity windfalls or foreign aid are more likely to be stolen in a decentralized weak government than in a strong centralized government. I will discuss in the next chapter one circ*mstance that leads to multiple interest groups: a high degree of ethnic diversity. Stock holm University's Jakob Svensson has indeed found that corruption is higher with more ethnic diversity, as Paolo Mauro of the IMF also did in earlier work. Svensson also found that corruption increases with more for eign aid in an ethnically divided society though not in an ethnically hom*ogeneous one. Foreign aid is a common resource that each ethnic interest group will try to divert to its own pockets. Svensson too found that countries that were both commodity (like cocoa or oil) producers and ethnically divided were more likely to be corrupt. Multiple ethnic interest groups will each try to steal as much as they can from the common pool of commodity revenues.l9 I already hinted in the previous chapter that one motivation for many bad policies is to create opportunities for graft. This is most obvious for a policy like the black market premium, where any gov ernment official with a license to get dollars at the official rate can make a corrupt profit by reselling the dollars at the black market rate. It's not a big surprise, then, that corruption and the black market rate are associated.2° Causality in this association likely goes both ways: there is incentive among the already corrupt to create a high black market premium and an incentive to be corrupt if there already is a high black market premium. In the same vein, restrictions on trade create opportunities for corruption. If there is a high tariff on an imported good, there is an incentive to bribe customs officials to import the good at a lower tariff. And, if a license is needed to import the good and the good is in great demand, the license seeker w1ll have to pay a bribe. One study has found that countries that restrict the freedom of inter national trade are indeed more corrupt.21 The quality of institutions in a country also affects corruption. A high-quality civil service organized on meritocratic lines will provide some checks on corruption. A government that itself obeys the laws rather than putting itself above the law will create a poor eco system for corruption. The International Credit Risk Guide measures four aspects of the quality of the institutional environment for busi-

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ness: rule o f law, quality of bureaucracy, freedom from government repudiation of contracts, and freedom from expropriation. Each of these captures a different aspect of the institutional environment that will a fect corruption. To stamp out corruption and create good incentives for government officials to promote growth, each of these institutional aspects must be strong. The rule of law measure captures the ability of government official to enforce or ignore the law selectively so as to get payoffs. Govern ment officials take corrupt payoffs to have the law interpreted crea tively in the bribe payer's favor. The

Guide measures both it and

freedom corruption on a 0 to 6 scale. For example, Haiti in 1982 was a place where the law meant about a s much as the king's dictates in

Alice in Wonderland. Haiti had a 0 for rule of law and a 0 for freedom from corruption. Those with a 6 for rule of law are all industrial countries (except Taiwan). All of them except Portugal get either a 5 or a 6 for freedom from corruption. A low-quality bureaucracy is one where reams of red tape slow business to a crawl. The opportunities for decentralized corruption in such circ*mstances are obvious. The

Credit Risk Guide measures

this on a 0 to 6 scale, but no country in 1 990 got a zero. Bangladesh got a 1 on the quality of bureacracy in 1990 and a 0 on corruption. In Dhaka, you can wait for a cold front in hell to get your business permit, or you can pay a bribe. The countries with a 6 for high quality bureaucracy are all industrial economies, except for Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Africa. The United States, for example, gets a 6 on high-quality bureaucracy, which may come as a surprise to those who have stood in interminable lines at federal agencies. Still, everything is relative. Standing in line is not as bad as having to go to fourteen different departments to complete paperwork. All countries with a 6 for bureaucratic quality had either a 5 or a 6 for freedom from corruption (except Portugal again). Freedom from repudiation of contracts measures a different aspect of business and government relationships. A high expected rate of repudiation makes corruption more possible, as private individuals feel the need to bribe officials in order to have their contract honored. (And they will include the cost of this bribe in their contract, so the government winds up overpaying because it threatens not to pay.) Freedom from repudiation of contracts is measured on a 1 to 10 scale. The worst countries on this measure in 1990, with a 1 or a 2, are Myanmar, Liberia, Lebanon, Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, Zambia, and

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Somalia-not exactly honest economies, as it turns out, with an average freedom from corruption score of 1 . 67 on the 0 to 6 scale. The countries with a 10 are all industrial countries, again with the exception of newly industrializing Taiwan. All of the lOs have a 5 or 6 on freedom from corruption, with the exception of Taiwan and Italy. Finally, freedom from expropriation strikes right at the heart of business-government relations. With a high risk of expropriation, corruption will flourish as businesspeople make protection payments to those who might expropriate them. The worst countries on this measure in 1990, with a 1 or a 2 on a 1 to 10 scale, were New Cale donia, Iraq, and Namibia. Those with a 1 or a 2 in 1982 were Iran, Libya, Syria, Iraq (again), and Lebanon. The average freedom from corruption score of these economies was 1 .9. All countries with a 10 on the freedom from expropriation measure are industrial countries, and all industrial countries have a 10 except for Australia, which has only a 9. All of these industrial countries have a freedom from corruption rating of 5 or 6, except for Spain and Italy. In general, the data show a strong association between institu tional quality and corruption. (This sample includes corruption in 1982 against institutional quality in 1982, and corruption in 1990 against institutional quality in 1990.) Countries with the worst insti tutions have corruption that is between 2 and 4 ratings below coun tries with the best institutions. Corruption is high in countries with any of the four kinds of poor institutional quality. It is low in coun tries with any of the four kinds of the best institutional quality. These strong relationships need to be interpreted cautiously. They are subjective ratings, and so the businesspeople surveyed may simply perceive a worse bureaucracy in a corrupt economy than in an honest economy. There may be some third factor, like bad gov ernment policies or low per capita income, that causes countries to have both corruption and poor institutions. Still, the strong associa tion between institutions and corruption is at least consistent with the view that institutions can influence corruption.22 Policies to Control Corruption

Institutional reform is difficult but not impossible. Ghana, for exam ple, increased its quality of bureaucracy from 1982 to 1990 from 1 to 4 (on a 0 to 6 scale). It increased its rule of law from 1 to 3 (also on a

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0-6 scale). The government reduced the black market premium all the way from 4,264 percent in 1982 to 10 percent in 1990. So it was probably no accident that Ghanaian freedom from corruption in creased from 1 in 1982 to 4 in 1990 on a 0-6 scale. The findings in this chapter point to a way out of corruption and its growth-killing effects. First, set up quality institutions. Eliminate red tape, establish rules that government honors contracts and does not expropriate the private sector, and create a meritocratic civil ser vice. These institutions create checks and balances on officials instead of opportunities for payoffs. Second, establish policies that eliminate incentives for corruption. A high black market premium or a highly negative real interest rate practically guarantees massive graft. Eliminating both is not only good for growth, as we saw in the previous chapter; it is also good for controlling corruption. Too often we have treated government as if it were some benefi cent agent that we could advise on how to benefit the public weal. The knowledge that governments are often corrupt gives pause to such an attitude. Knowing that governments are corrupt, we should be cautious about relying on them to do interventions on behalf of growth. For example, we wouldn't want to recommend industrial policies that subsidize certain sunrise industries, because govern ments are likely to take payments when they decide whose sunrise to subsidize. The best course would be to eliminate government's discretionary power over households and businesses as much as possible and set up hard and fast rules of the game for government operation. Too long we have ignored corruption on the quest for growth.

Intermezzo: Discrimination in Palanpur

Palanpur is a small village in Uttar Pradesh state in northern India. It is unusual in that it has been studied by development economists at several distinct periods over the past five decades: in 1 957-1 958, 1 962-1 963, 1 974-1 975, 1 983-1984, and 1 993. Peter Lanjouw and Nicholas S tern published a book about these five decades of studies of Palanpur in 1 998. The following description of life there is based on the first chapter, by Jean Dreze and Naresh Sharma, which describes features that have remained relatively unchanged over the period. 1 Palanpur had a population of 1,133 in mid-1993. Palanpur is a poor village, with 1 60 babies out of 1 ,000 births dying before their first birthday in 1 993. The literacy rate is only 37 percent for men and just 9 percent for women. There are 1 1 7 men for every 1 00 women, reflecting systematic discrimination in health care against girls and women. The scholars witnessed "several cases of infant girls who were allowed to wither away and die in circ*mstances that would undoubtedly have prompted more energetic action in the case of a male child. " The high-caste Thakurs in Palanpur practice child marriage, seclusion of married women from public view (purdah), a ban on women's work outside the home, and in some extreme cases even female infanticide and sati (burning of widows on their husband's funeral pyre). The other group in Palanpur that suffers discrimination is the low-caste Jatabs. All of them live in a group of "shabby mud houses" on the edge of the village. Jatabs own little land and most frequently work as day laborers or on their own subsistence plots. Only 1 2 percent of the Jatab men and none of the Jatab women are literate. The school teacher in Palanpur was a Thakur, who considered any contact with a Jatab pupil to be repulsive. The urban managers of the local credit cooperative frequently try to extort money from Jatabs. The Jatabs have great difculty borrowing money in any case. They try to avoid the higher castes and behave with deference when they do encounter them.

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Polarized Peo ples

So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 1 0

I was once on an airline flight that was canceled owing to mechanical failure. There was another flight immediately following to the same destination. Both the original flight and the next flight were close to being full. These circ*mstances instantly created two polarized fac tions: the canceled £lighters and the later £lighters, both competing for a fixed number of seats on the later flight. The canceled £lighters argued that they should have priority on these seats, since they had been on an earlier flight whose cancellation was the airline's fault. The later £lighters argued that they should have the seats, since their right to a seat should not be affected by what happened to some other flight. It was amazing how quickly animosity developed between these two factions, just as solidarity developed within each faction even though these were complete strangers. The canceled £lighters exchanged remarks with each other about how unfair, aggressive, and arrogant were the later £lighters. The later £lighters grumbled to each other equally uncomplimentary remarks about the canceled £lighters. The situation almost got violent. In the end, the airline favored the later £lighters. Meanwhile both groups lost because the later flight was also delayed while this heated argument was going on. Factions seem to spring out of nowhere in human society. Factions help explain the part of poor growth that is attributable to government policies. Why would governments ever have the

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incentive to choose policies that kill off growth? Why would they kill off growth through corruption, when their take from a growing economy would be greater? And if the poor need to have their investments in future income subsidized to participate in growth, then why don't governments always provide those subsidies? We will see that divided societies' governments face incentives to redis tribute existing income. In more cohesive societies, governments face incentives to promote development. The fundamental difference be tween redistributionist and developmentalist governments is social polarization. Societies divided into factions fight over division of the spoils; societies unified by a common culture and a strong middle class create a consensus for growth-growth that includes the poor. Going After Cocoa

Let's go back to the story of Ghana's main export crop, cocoa. Pro duction of cocoa is concentrated in the region of the Ashanti group, who make up 13 percent of the population. The Ashanti Empire was dominant in precolonial times, to the resentment of other groups such as the coastal Akan groups (30 percent of population). Begin ning with the run-up to independence in the 1950s, cocoa replaced historical resentments as a bone of contention between ethnic groups.1 In the early 1950s Kwame Nkrumah, from one of the coastal Akan groups, split off from the traditional Ashanti-based independence party. He pushed a bill through the colonial legislature in 1954 to freeze the producer price of cocoa. An Ashanti-based opposition party to Nkrumah ran against him in the 1956 elections with the less than-subtle slogan, "Vote Cocoa." The Ashanti region even tried to secede prior to independence. With most of the other ethnic groups favoring Nkrumah, these efforts failed. Nkrumah continued to tax cocoa heavily into the 1960s. The state run Cocoa Marketing Board bought low from the cocoa farmers and sold high at the world price. The high black market premium on foreign exchange meant the price paid to farmers was worth little in dollars. Farmers were forced to sell their dollars at the official exchange rate, but could buy dollars only at the black market rate. Between 1969 and 1971, Kofi Busia led the only Ashanti-based government in modern Ghanaian history, having co-opted some of the coastal Akan groups as allies. One of Busia's first acts was to raise the producer price of cocoa. In 1971, he instituted a large devaluation

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that raised the domestic currency price of cocoa at a time when the world cocoa price was falling. The military overthrew him three days later and partially reversed the devaluation. That was the last chance the Ashantis had at getting market prices for their cocoa. Although ethnic coalitions rotated with dizzying speed through the 1970s and early 1980s in Ghana, they all seemed to concur on punitive taxation of Ashanti cocoa exports through the ludicrously overvalued official exchange rate, reflected in a high black market premium on dollars. The government handed out its cocoa profits to political and ethnic supporters by giving out licenses to import goods at the official exchange rate. These goods could then be resold at an enormous profit on the black market. The black market pre mium reached its historical peak in 1982, with the black market exchange rate at twenty-two times the official exchange rate.2 The cocoa producers had received 89 percent of the world price of cocoa in 1949.3 By 1983, they received 6 percent of the world price. Cocoa exports were 19 percent of GDP in 1955; by 1983 they were only 3 percent of GDP.4 Ghanaian cocoa is one of the classic exam ples of killing the goose that laid the golden egg. The story of Ghana suggests that the interest groups' struggle to get profits from a com modity like cocoa has something to do with the choice of growth killing policies-like an overvalued exchange rate resulting in a high black market premium.5 Politicians Are People Too

Hard as it may be to believe, there was a time when economists' analysis of tropical countries left out politics. They ignored the poli tics of the growth disaster in, say, Ghana. Looking back through the time capsule left by the National Bureau of Economic Research case studies of the 1970s, we find works like a 1974 analysis of trade restrictions in Ghana.6 The work is amazingly silent about politics, recommending policies to the Ghanaian leaders as if they were the beneficent philosopher-kings of Plato. Nowhere in this work do we find a clue that Ghana was run by corrupt military bosses and its politics were torn apart by ethnic divisions. Nowhere do we find a clue that trade restrictions in Ghana were pretexts for thievery through the buying and selling of import licenses, licenses that were sometimes awarded to the girlfriends of the military strongmen.

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It was only later that we economists realized that government officials are people too. Like other people, they respond to incentives. If government leaders feel the incentive to follow growth-creating policies, then they will follow them. If they don't, they won't. Only after admitting that government leaders must respond to incentives like anyone else could we face the hard question. If gov ernment policies like high inflation, high deficits, high black market premiums, and negative real interest rates are so destructive to growth, why would any government have the incentive to pursue them? In this chapter we will look at why politicians sometimes face perverse incentives to destroy growth. The Wrong Answer

The casual answer to why politicians destroy growth is that they are stealing the public blind during their time of community service. High inflation and high deficits could result from government offi cials' high spending, spending that winds up in the officials' own bank account. High black market premiums and negative real inter est rates certainly make corruption possible. The leader gets foreign exchange at the official rate and sells it at the black market rate. He finances his purchase of foreign exchange using loans at the negative real interest rate and invests the money in foreign assets with a posi tive real interest rate. It is plausible that these policies breed corruption, but this is not an adequate explanation of why politicians choose growth-killing policies. The politicians' opportunity for graft is greater the higher is the average income of the economy. You can steal much more from a rich economy than from a poor economy. So politicians' use of growth-killing policies to steal is self-defeating. Even politicians who are stealing want their economy to grow faster, so they can steal more. So if politicians are also people who respond to incentives, why do they choose growth-killing policies? Many Out of One

The key insight we are missing is that government is not a single, all knowing actor. Government instead is a coalition of politicians rep resenting different factions. It is this multiplicity that leads to the choice of growth-killing policies.

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Think of the following analogy. Suppose there is an underground pool of oil that crosses the boundaries of my property and your property. The law says that whoever owns the land above the pool of oil has the right to withdraw oil from the pool. So both of us have the right to withdraw oil from the single pool. It is also a characteristic of oil field technology that the faster the oil is withdrawn from a field, the lower is the total yield of the field. So do you and I refrain from rapidly extracting oil to preserve the potential of the field? Of course not. You and I engage in a scramble to get as much oil as possible before the other one gets it. The field yields less than its potential because we extract the oil so fast. Pundits will pontificate about our self-defeating greed as we are consuming too fast a nonrenewable resource, but we are acting perfectly rationally. This situation has been called "the tragedy of the commons. " Contrast this with the case where the oil field lies below m y prop erty alone. I will carefully withdraw the oil at a rate that preserves the total potential of the field. It was the existence of multiple claim ants to the field in the previous example that caused self-defeating behavior that left both of us worse off. This is the key insight of the field of political economy. The exis tence of polarized interest groups that each act in their own interest is responsible for bad government policies. Societies that are more polarized have worse government policies than societies that are more unified. Any factor that breeds polarization will worsen policy, and thus cause lower growth. For example, interest groups in multi ethnic coalitions in Ghana may have reached the following compro mise: each interest group representative will be in charge of one policy. One will determine the black market exchange rate, another will determine the rate of money creation and inflation, a third will determine the budget deficit, and a fourth will determine the nega tive real interest rate. Under this compromise, each interest group representative will choose its policy so as to maximize its own take, without considering how its choice will affect the take of the others. For example, the highly negative real interest rate chosen by official 4 creates incen tives to keep money outside the country. Ghanaian exporters, for example, will understate their true sales and deposit the difference in a bank account outside the country. This lowers the take of official 1, in charge of the black market premium, because his revenue base comes from exporters forced to deliver their sales at the official ex-

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change rate. Official 1 resells the proceeds at the black market ex change rate to get his profits. If less money is being brought into the country from exporters, he will get less of a profit. Official 2 also has a lower take, because there is more revenue from money creation the higher the amount of money kept in the country. With money kept outside the country, official 2 gets less revenue from the "inflation tax." And official 3 is not able to set as high a budget deficit, because domestic financing of the budget deficit also comes from financial assets kept inside the country. Official 4 set the real interest rate at a level to yield the maximum profits to him from cheap loans, not taking into account the effect of his actions on offi cials 1, 2, and 3. So official 4 makes the real interest rate more nega tive than he would have if he had considered how his actions affect the other officials. We could turn the story around and say that official 1 also does not take into account the effect of his black market premium on official 4. At a high black market premium, the incentive is strong again for exporters to sell part of their products under the table and deposit the proceeds in a foreign bank account. This means less money in domestic banking accounts, which means less is available for official 4 to get in cheap loans to reinvest in higher-yield assets. Official 1 makes the black market premium higher than he would have if he had considered how his actions affect official 4. All officials are drawing from a common pool, without taking into account the effect of their withdrawals on the others' withdrawals. Compare this result to what would have happened if the Ghanaian leader had been powerful and interest groups weak. He would have controlled the black market premium, the rate of money creation and inflation, the budget deficit, and the real interest rate in Ghana. He would take into account the effects of one on the take from the others, because he gets revenue from all. He will choose a lower real interest rate, a lower inflation rate, a lower budget deficit, and a lower black market premium than those in the four-official case. Polarization be tween distinct interest groups creates multiple actors. These multiple actors choose more growth-destroying policies than a single actor would. Don't jump to the conclusion that autocracy is the best system for economic development. Autocrats may be placating multiple interest groups just as much as democracies do. The crucial distinction is not between autocracy and democracy (anyway there's no evidence that

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one is better for growth than the other). It is between a weak central government made up of a coalition of polarized factions and a strong central government made up of supporters in consensus. Polarization in weak governments explains why governments so often appear to defeat themselves by killing the goose that lays the golden egg. Such polarization could explain how cocoa exports in Ghana were killed off, going from 19 percent of GDP in the 1950s to 3 percent of GDP in the 1980s. Each government interest group got its take from taxing cocoa exporters without taking into account its effect on other groups. Perhaps one group set up the marketing board on cocoa and determined the price that the cocoa producers would get. Suppose that another faction controlled the black market premium and so determined how much the producer price meant in hard currency. If these two factions operated independently, they would tax cocoa producers more heavily than if a single official had determined the tax on cocoa. Each faction tried to get the most out of cocoa. Killing off cocoa is the Ghanaian analogy to extracting oil as fast as possible from a common pool. Time for Lunch A similar story can explain how budget deficits get out of hand in

polarized economies. I will throw out another analogy. Suppose six of us go out to lunch and decide beforehand that we will split the check equally. When we order lunch, I know that I am going to bear only one-sixth of the cost of any dish that I order. If I get the $24 lobster instead of the $12 ravioli, I'm only out two dollars. Each of us does a similar calculation, with the result that our total spending is higher than it would have been if we had each paid for our own order. This is a variation on the common oil pool problem. I take into account the effects of my actions on my own budget, not on the group budget. A similar situation exists with multiple interest group representa tives determining a national budget. If there are six interest groups of equal size, then I will bear only one-sixth of the cost of any pet project that I propose for my interest group. Each of the other five representatives thinks the same way. So we have a larger budget and budget deficit than we would have had with a single actor deter mining the budget. Each of us representatives is just responding to incentives, but the result for the nation is none too good.

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Wars of Attrition

Alberto Alesina of Harvard and Allan Drazen of the University of Maryland pointed out another way that multiple actors can lead to the persistence of bad policies. Their insight was that there were wars of attrition between multiple interest groups. Suppose the economy has high inflation, which is destroying growth. Suppose that there are two distinct interest groups. You and I each head interest groups. Either of us could bring down the infla tion by giving up some of our own pet projects financed by money creation. Will one of us do so? Not necessarily. Each of us hopes that the other will give up pet projects and bring inflation to an end. That way, the one of us that didn't give in will gain the benefits of lower inflation while holding onto his pet projects. The two of us are in a war of attrition, hoping that the other will run out of soldiers first. To see how this works, think about a real war of attrition: the Vietnam War. At first, the war was popular with the U.S. voters, while the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were equally determined to persevere. As time wore on and the measure of success in the war became the ratio of enemy KIAs (killed in action) to our KIAs (the notorious body counts), more about the political weaknesses and strengths of the two opponents was revealed. Even with a lot of KIAs, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong d rew on a large and nationalistic population to keep sending in fresh soldiers . The U . S . KIAs generated discontent at home, with the public very unwilling to send soldiers to the killing fields endlessly. Ho Chi Minh caught on to this sooner than did Lyndon Johnson. Eventually after these gentlemen left public service, it became clear to both parties that the North Vietnamese could outlast the United States in a war of attri tion. Both parties came to the peace table and concluded an agree ment for U.S. withdrawal. In policy wars of attrition, we also gain knowledge about each other as the war of attrition goes on. If the war of attrition has already lasted two years, then we know that both of us are suffi ciently unwilling to give in that we will wait two years. Finally either you or I reach a point where we realize that the other is going to wait longer than we are willing to wait. You or I, whoever suffers more from inflation or places the lower value on its pet projects, will give in first, and the war of attrition will come to an end .

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Note, however, that the economy went through a long period of growth-destroying inflation before the war of attrition ended. The war of attrition came about because of polarized interest groups. A single government actor on inflation will bring it down as soon as its cost to society exceeds its benefits. The war of attrition story with multiple interest groups gives an explanation for why bad policies last so long even when their costs in forgone economic growth are obvious to everyone. In Defense of the S tatus Quo

Raquel Fernandez of New York University and Dani Rodrik of Harvard tell another clever story of how, with multiple interest groups, a bad policy might persist even though a majority would benefit from reform. Suppose again there are two interest groups. My interest group, accounting for 40 percent of the population, benefits for sure from the change in the bad policy. In your interest group, accounting for 60 percent of the population, one-third of the group will benefit. If the reform is decided by majority voting, there is a winning coalition of all of my group and one-third of your group. We will have 60 percent of the vote in favor of reform. But suppose that each member of your group is unsure whether he or she will be in the one-third that benefits. Suppose each member of your group is equally unsure about his or her chance of being in the lucky one-third. So each member of your group will face odds of two to one against benefiting from reform. All of the members of your group will vote against reform. Reform will go down to defeat 60 percent to 40 percent, even though a 60 percent majority of the population would have benefited from the reform. A bad status quo persists because of uncertainty about who w ill benefit from reform. This uncertainty was fatal because of multiple interest groups with different benefits from reforms. Ine quality and Growth

Incentives go awry for government policymakers when there are multiple interest groups. What circ*mstances tend to create multiple interest groups? Looking around the world, we see societies torn apart by two kinds of polarization: class warfare and ethnic conflict.

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The first culprit is high inequality. Suppose that the population consists of a poor majority who own only their own labor and a rich minority who own the other inputs to production: capital and land. Suppose there is democratic voting on policy, or at least effective in terest group representation in a nondemocracy. In a near-democratic setting, the poor workers are going to determine policy since they are in the majority. A tax on the rich may be an attractive proposition to this poor majority. What determines how attractive the proposition is? There are two offsetting effects. First, the tax on the rich lowers the growth rate of the economy, which hurts both workers and capitalists. (We have seen that statutory tax rates do not determine growth, but I am using tax here as shorthand for any redistributive device, like a high black market premium.) Second, the tax on the rich redistributes income from the rich to the poor. The potential for redistribution is greater, the higher the cliff between the income of the land-owning capitalists and the income of the workers. A big difference in income-high inequality-means more potential for redistribution from a tax on capital, which offsets the loss of growth potential. So poor majorities in highly unequal societies will vote for a high tax, sacrificing some growth in favor of redistribution. Even in undemocratic societies, the government and its supporters will try to get their hands on loot from the upper class instead of favoring future growth. We have some direct evidence for this: countries that have higher inequality also have a higher black market premium, higher repression of the financial system, higher inflation, and a less favorable exchange rate for exporters than countries with less inequality. A contemporary example is Venezuela. As of late 2000 a democrat ically elected populist named Hugo Chavez has explicitly promised his poor majority followers to redistribute the wealth from the oli garchy. Caracas, Venezuela, is the poster child for inequality, with skyscrapers built by the elite with the huge oil riches, yet surrounded by shantytowns precariously poised on steep hills, some of them washed away by the recent floods. Despite $266 billion in oil profits over the last three decades and the continual discovery of new oil reserves, the average Venezuelan has 22 percent lower income today than in 1970. Inequality may also have been the story in Ghana, where ethnic coalitions taxed the relatively rich Ashanti cocoa farmers. In more equal societies, the poor majority will vote for a low tax on capital

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because the potential for gains from redistribution is not as great as the potential for gains from growth. This story predicts that high inequality goes with low growth. This is indeed what researchers have found: higher inequality in income or land is associated with lower growth. Let's look at the relationship between land inequality and economic growth. I am measuring inequality with the Gini coefficient, which goes from 0 (everyone has equal land) to 1 (1 person has all the land). The fourth of the sample with the lowest inequality (average Gini coefficient of .45) had the highest average growth. This fourth includes such growth superstars as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. (Korea had the highest growth rate and the most equal land distribution in the sample.) The fourth of the sample with the highest land inequality (average Gini coefficient of .85) had the lowest growth. This highly unequal fourth includes such growth disasters as Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela? In Argentina, for example, it was the policies of Juan and Eva Peron to redistribute income toward the descamisados (shirtless ones) that sent the Argentine economy spiraling downward until recently. Hugo Chavez may be the Juan Peron of Venezuela today. Note that this redistribution is different from the subsidies to the poor that I've argued are necessary to wipe out poverty traps. The subsidy to the poor should be on their future income creation. The redistribution that happens under high inequality would be of current consumption. This is because under high inequality, there is little incentive to invest in the future, including the future of the poor. One of the explanations of the growth difference between East Asia and Latin America is that East Asian land was distributed much more equally than Latin American land. How did the unequal dis tribution in Latin America come about? The Choices of the Oligarchy

There are more subtle dynamics among growth, democracy, educa tion, and inequality. Suppose a rich elite holds exclusive power and restricts voting to those big landowners. Such an arrangement was common in the United States in the early nineteenth century, in many European countries through the late nineteenth century, and in Latin American countries into the twentieth century. Now the ques-

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tion becomes, Does the oligarchy vote for free mass education? How does the degree of inequality affect the answer? The voting elite faces some trade-offs. On the one hand, implement ing mass education will raise growth, because education will raise the productive potential of the poor majority. On the other hand, mass education breeds mass political participation. The newly educated poor will agitate for the right to vote. And then the poor majority may vote for redistribution of land away from the elite toward the majority, which would lower growth. The outcome depends on the degree of initial inequality. In a highly unequal society, the oligarchy will vote against mass education. Outside the rich elite, the average level of income remains low. So a highly unequal society remains highly unequal and un democratic. The data confirm this prediction: more unequal societies are indeed likely to be less democratic and to have less civil liberty.8 In a relatively equal society, on the other hand, the elite would vote for mass education. They are confident that the newly educated masses, even if they agitate for the right to vote, will not vote for redistribution because the gains from redistribution are low in a rel atively equal society compared to the gains from growth. Everyone will benefit from the greater productivity of the masses with more education. Indeed, we find that countries that have a large middle class also have more schooling compared to countries with a small middle class. Economic historians Ken Sokoloff and Stanley Engerman have argued that a story like this explains the very different development of North America compared to South America. In the United States and Canada, the endless supply of land supported a large popula tion of family farmers. The large middle class of family farmers guaranteed relatively low inequality in North America. (Growing up among farmers in Ohio, little did I suspect that those guys in feed caps were part of our secret to prosperity.) In South America, on the other hand, the money was in mining and sugar plantations. The oligarchy staffed their mines and sugar plantations with slaves and illiterate peasants. The ownership of mines and plantations was con centrated in the hands of the elite few from the beginning-as was inevitable with such large-scale operations combined with favors from the crown. (It remains true today that economies made up of mines and p lantations are more unequal than other societies.) So North America developed into a rich land with mass education and a voting franchise for all. South America remained poor outside

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the confines of the elite few, inequality remained higher, there was no mass education until recently, and political power was long restricted to the elite. The story of South America is not unique in the Third World. In rural Pakistan, the literacy rates-in particular, female literacy rates-are among the lowest in the world. As one author put it, "The ruling elites found it convenient to perpetuate low literacy rates. The lower the proportion of literate people, the lower the probability that the ruling elite could be displaced."9 To sum up, polarization because of inequality is a recipe for con tinuing underdevelopment. Either populist governments will seek to redistribute income to their supporters, or the elites will suppress democracy and mass education. In the worst of all worlds, govern ment will alternate between populist democracies and oligarchic dictatorships, destroying the predictability of policy altogether (which itself hurts growth). The data confirm that countries that are more unequal are also more politically unstable; they have more revolutions and coups.l0 Societies with a large middle class, on the other hand, have incentives favorably aligned for growth, political stability, and democracy. Ethnic Hatreds and Growth

Polarization by income is not the only kind of social division that can split society up into warring interest groups. Another common phe nomenon is ethnic polarization. The Ghana story already highlighted the role of ethnically based interest groups in creating bad policies. Although ethnic conflict is an obvious theme in history, economists have paid remarkably little attention to it. This omission became even stranger when the theory of political economy began to coalesce around the idea of conflict between polarized interest groups. Who better suits the definition of polarized interests than ethnic groups that hate each other? The most obvious sign of ethnic polarization is bloodshed. Ethnic groups killing other ethnic groups is a staple of today's headlines, from Rwanda to Bosnia to Kosovo. Ethnic cleansing is at least as old as the Romans, who were both cleansers and cleansed. In 146 B.C., the Romans captured Corinth in Greece. They razed it to the ground, killing many of the inhabitants, raped many women, and then sold all surviving Corinthians into slavery. What goes around comes around. In 88 B . c . , King Mithradates VI of Pontus invaded Roman

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territory in Asia Minor. He encouraged Asian debtors to kill their Roman creditors. The Asians massacred 80,000 Romans.11 The list of ethnic massacres is a long one. A nonexclusive list of victims of ethnic massacres since the Romans includes: the Danes in Anglo-Saxon England in 1002; the Jews in Europe during the First Crusade, 1096-1099; the French in Sicily in 1282; the French in Bruges in 1302; the Flemings in England in 1381; the Jews in Iberia in 1391; converted Jews in Portugal in 1507; the Huguenots in France in 1572; Protestants in Magdeburg in 1631; Jews and Poles in the Ukraine, 1648-1954; indigenous populations in the United States, Australia, and Tasmania in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; Jews in Russia in the nineteenth century; the French in Haiti in 1804; Arab Christians in Lebanon in 1841; Turkish Armenians in 18951896 and 1915-1916; Nestorian, Jacobite, and Maronite Christians in the Turkish empire in 1915-1916; Greeks in Smyrna in 1922; Haitians in the Dominican Republic in 1936; the Jewish Holocaust in German occupied territory, 1933-1945; Serbians in Croatia in 1941; Muslims and Hindus in British India in 1946-1947; the Chinese in 1965 and the Timorese in 1974 and 1998 in Indonesia; Igbos in Nigeria in 1967-1970; the Vietnamese in Cambodia in 1970-1978; the Bengalis in Pakistan in 1971; the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1956-1965; 1972, and 1993-1994; Tamils in Sri Lanka in 1958, 1971, 1977, 1981, and 1983; Armenians in Azerbaijan in 1990; Muslims in Bosnia in 1992; Kosovars and Serbians in Kosovo in 1998-2000. 1 2 To show how far from exhaustive this list is, the political scientist Ted Gurr counted fifty ethnically based conflicts in 1993-1994 alone. 1 3 The new millennium has already brought its first ethnic wars. The February 16, 2000, Washington Post reports on the Congo: In this country where much of Africa has come to fight and no one seems to govern, the consequences of chaos are emerging in the starkest possible terms. As many as 7,000 people have been killed and 150,000 forced from their homes in the remote forest villages above Lake Albert in northeastern Congo since June, when residents and aid workers say brutal ethnic war fare erupted over who owns a particular hill. Lendu tribesmen armed with machetes and arrows have moved from village to village, killing and maim ing. Miles of burned out huts line the roads. The conflict between the agrar Ian Lendu and the herding Hema reflects the combative atmosphere that plagues Congo, which is sinking further into a civil war that began in 1996.

Meanwhile, the February 22,2000, New York Times reported dozens killed in riots between Muslims and Christians in northern Nigeria.14

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The Muslims from the north are demanding Islamic law for northern states; the Christians from the south living in the north protest. The north-south division has bedeviled Nigeria since independence, with the Muslim north in power most of the time. Southern Christians tried unsuccessfully to secede as Biafra in 1967. Now a southern Christian is president after a democratic election in February 1999, and the ethnic violence continues: thousands have been killed since the election. Muslims and Christians are killing each other as of April 2000 in the Moluccas in Indonesia. Muslim youth in Jakarta are organizing a jihad to go fight on behalf of Muslims. Historians and journalists pay attention to ethnic conflict only when it erupts into bloodshed. But there is pervasive ethnic antago nism and discrimination virtually everywhere that different ethnic groups share a common nation. Take the economic discrimination against gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria. The city of Dimitrovgrad has a more or less excellent infrastructure-which, however, does not apply to the poor quarters and, in particular, the gypsy ghetto. The latter has nothing to do with "official" Dimitrovgrad. There are neither roads nor telephones, the plumbing is disastrous, many houses have no electricity, and there's a bus only every three hours. The situation is the same in Sofia. The Roma quarters there are entirely different from other Sofia quarters. There is no sewage, the shafts are clogged, drinking water is dirty and stinks, and there is no garbage collection or other communal services. The thus segregated Roma feel truly stigmatized, victims of discrimination, "treated like dogs." The predominantly Orthodox Christian community of Dibdibe Watju, Ethiopia, does not mix with the Protestants in the village. They do not allow the Protestants to bury their dead in the Orthodox Christian church yards. The dead have to be carried to town, where they have a separate burial site. Even the Orthodox Christian mem bers of the same idir (funeral association) do not attend a Protestant member's funeral. In Ecuador, an indigenous man complained that teachers dis criminated against his children. They would tell children who strug gled with schoolwork, "You are an ass, this is why you can't. You are an animal." The indigenous children struggled with a nonnative language, hindering their scholastic success and future prospects.15 Other ethnic groups that complain of discrimination range from Hindus in Bangladesh to lower castes in India to Pomaks in Bulgaria

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t o Tajiks i n Uzbekistan t o Khmer speakers i n Vietnam. This list i s far from exhaustive. A s Scien tific American said i n September 1 998, "Many of the world's problems stem from the fact that it has 5,000 ethnic groups but only 190 countries. " Social scientists have documented extensive problems i n economic policymaking when there is ethnic diversity. First, we need to mea sure the tricky concept of ethnic diversity. Different languages is one possible measure of ethnic differences. A language-based measure of ethnic diversity that social scientists use is the probability that two individuals from the same country will speak different languages. This probability is higher the more distinct linguistic groups there are and the more equal the size of the groups. To calculate this mea sure of diversity, we need data on the number of language speakers within each nation of the hundreds of languages spoken worldwide. One determined group of scholars collected such data from census reports in the early 1960s. This group of scholars belonged to a research institute in the former Soviet Union. For whatever obscure purpose, cold war or otherwise, they roamed the globe collecting data on language speakers by nation. We can use their data to cal culate the probability that two individuals in a nation will speak different languages. This measure of ethnic diversity is highest in sub-Saharan Africa, with its many small tribes in each nation. It is lowest in East Asian nations like Korea and Japan, where everyone speaks the national language except visiting American college students. Ethnic (linguistic) diversity does not automatically imply ethnic conflict, violent or otherwise. It merely reflects the potential for such conflict, if opportunistic politicians try to exploit ethnic divisions to gain an ethnic power base. Apparently such opportunism is common. As shown in table 1 3 . 1 , high ethnic diversity is a good predictor of civil war and genocide. The risk of civil war is two and a half times higher in the most ethnically diverse quarter of the sample compared to the least ethnically diverse quarter. The risk of genocide is three times higher in the same comparison. Ethnically diverse societies also have fewer public services. Table 1 3 . 1 shows that the most ethnically diverse societies have half the schooling, one-thirteenth of the telephones per worker, nearly twice the electric power losses, and less than half of the share of roads that are paved compared to the most ethnically hom*ogeneous societies. All of these outcomes depend in good part on provision of public

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Table 13.1 Ethnic diversity, violence, and public services, 1960 1 989 Average, quarter

Average, quarter

of sample least

of sample most

ethnically diverse

80%

Probability of civil war

1 8%

Probability of genocide

1 6%

5.3

2.6

Percentage of roads paved

53.9

24.2

Percentage of power system losses

12.4

22.8

Telephones per 1 ,000 workers

92.8

7.4

Ethnic diversity (probability of two people speaking different languages)

Violence

Public services Average years of schooling of labor force

services. Why would public services provision be low in ethnically polarized societies? For the government to supply a public service, interest groups have to agree on what kind of public service they want. Even for such an innocuous public service like roads, ethnic groups that are in different regions will want roads in their region and will place little benefit on roads in the other groups' regions. And if ethnic groups do not associate much with each other, this means that there would be little interregional travel. Since all groups place a low value on a national road network, politicians will not invest as much in roads as they would in a more ethnically hom*ogeneous society. For a public service like mass schooling, different linguistic groups would each prefer that schooling be conducted in their language. A compromise may be reached where schooling is given in a lingua franca like the language of the former colonial master. But each group is less satisfied with the compromise than it would have been with schooling in its own language. They are less ready to support mass schooling than they would be in a more hom*ogeneous society. The new views of economic growth might reinforce this lack of support for mass schooling. Suppose that people in linguistic groups associate primarily with people from their group and not with people from other groups. Then the knowledge creation coming from highly educated people is valuable to you only if those people consist of your own group . Knowledge leaks within ethnic groups and not

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across ethnic groups. S o you support schooling for your own ethnic group because of the beneficial knowledge leaks you will get, but you do not support education for the other groups. Each group feels the same way. E veryone places less value on universal education in a heterogeneous society than in a hom*ogeneous one. A study of rural western Kenya confirms this result. Districts with more ethnic diver sity, measured by language, had sharply lower primary school fund ing and worse school facilities than more hom*ogeneous areas.16 Similar arguments can be made with the other public services, and so public services are restricted in ethnically polarized economies. As perhaps an indirect reflection of this, infant mortality, life expec tancy, birthweight of infants, access to sanitation, and access to clean water are all worse in more ethnically heterogeneous societiesP That's not the end to the damage. We saw that distinct interest groups may get into a war of attrition over a beneficial reform. Ethni cally based interest groups make such destructive wars of attrition more likely. Ironically, with all the attention paid to ethnically based violence, it is the ethnically based policy wars that may be more rel evant for most countries. If one group is richer than the others, then redistributive policies will also be tempting. We saw in a previous chapter that ethnically based business elites are common throughout the world. There would be the same trade-off in policymaking that we saw with general inequality. On the one hand, policies like negative real interest rates and high black market premiums redistribute income from the busi ness elite to the party or parties in power. On the other hand, these policies lower growth because they lower the incentive to invest in the future. Which way the party in power goes depends on the extent of the income gap between the ethnic coalition in power and the ethnic business elite. A combination of ethnic diversity and large income gaps between ethnic groups could lead to growth-killing economic policies. For example, governments in East Africa, domi nated by Africans, chose bad policies to tax the Indian business elite. Table 1 3 . 2 shows the association between ethnic diversity and two measures of policy: the black market premium and the ratio of broad money to GDP (reflecting whether there are negative real interest rates that will depress the holding of money). This, together with higher violence and fewer public services, may help explain why growth is two p ercentage points lower in the more ethnically diverse countries than in the least ethnically diverse countries.

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Table 13.2

Ethnic diversity and its consequences for policies, 1960-1989 Average, quarter of sample least ethnically diverse (%) Ethnic diversity (probability of two people speaking different languages)

Per capita growth rate per annum

3.0

Average, quarter of sample most ethnically diverse (%) 80 0.9

Policies Black market premium

Financial depth (broad money•/GDP)

a. Total assets of the banking system

The association of lower public services with ethnic polarization is a problem even in rich economies like the United States. In the United States, let's define distinct ethnic groups the way that the census does: white, black, Asian, Native American, and Hispanic. Ethnic diversity is measured by the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a county will belong to different ethnic groups. We find that U.S. counties that are more ethnically diverse spend a lower share of their budgets on core public services like roads and education. The differences are statistically significant.l 8 Since whites constitute a voting majority in virtually all counties, the logical inter pretation is that racist whites were unwilling to spend as much on public goods like schools when they were shared with other races. What about those subsidies to the income of the poor that are so necessary for eliminating poverty traps? Unfortunately, higher ethnic diversity is also associated with a lower share of spending on welfare in U.S. counties and metropolitan areas.l9 Another study has found lower support for public schooling among the elderly when the elderly and school-age population are from different ethnic groups.20 A like minded study found that the expansion in high school education that happened early this century in the United States happened more in areas with "more ethnic and religious hom*ogeneity."21 An earlier study compared U.S. social services unfavorably to Western Europe's and attributed the difference to "historic racial antagonisms."22 The big failure to lift African Americans out of poverty has everything to do with ethnic conflict. As the noted sociologist William Julius Wilson puts it, "Many white Americans have turned against a strategy that emphasizes programs

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they perceive as benefiting only racial minorities . . . . Public services became identified mainly with blacks, private services mainly with whites . . . . White tax payers saw themselves as being forced, through taxes, to pay for medical and legal services that many of them could not afford."23 Foreign Assistance and Ethnic Conflict

Aid donors have been remarkably oblivious to ethnic polarization. They don't sufficiently monitor how aid resources might dispropor tionately benefit a particular ethnic group, worsening ethnic tension. A case study of a project in Sri Lanka makes this point. There is a long history of tensions between minority Tamils and majority Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. In 1977, a new Sinhalese-dominated govern ment initiated a massive irrigation and power project called the Mahaweli Project. The World Bank and bilateral donors gave huge amounts of foreign aid to help finance the project; aid per year increased sixfold over the 1978 to 1980 period compared to the period 1970 to 1977.24 Unheeded by the donors, Mahaweli took place mainly in the Sinhala area and had mainly Sinhalese beneficiaries. Foreign aid utilization in the Tamil city of Jaffna was zero between 1977 and 1982. The feeder canal that was going to serve the Tamil North was canceled early in the project's history. Even worse, the project was going to resettle Sinhalese farmers into Tamil majority areas, diluting the Tamil majority and weakening their ability to articulate their interests at the local government level. The Mahaweli project was ethnically symbolic; it promised the resurrection of the hydraulic civilization of the Sinhalese Buddhist kings, which had been destroyed by medieval Tamil invaders. There were many other triggers to the ethnic tensions that esca lated into a civil war after 1983. However, the ethnic polarization caused by the project didn't help the delicate process of reaching an interethnic compromise. Civil war and terrorism has continued intermittently ever since. The March 11, 2000, Washington Post reports that a suicide bomber in Colombo, Sri Lanka, killed twenty people and injured sixty-four. The Post says, "Military officials blamed Tamil separatists for the blast, which came as Parliament discussed extending emergency rule in northern Sri Lanka, a measure that gives broad powers to the army and police fighting Tamil rebels there."

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Polarized by B oth Class and Race

The worst case for good policymaking and political freedom is to have both high inequality and high ethnic diversity. In the Mexican state of Chiapas, the Zapatista rebellion broke out on January 1, 1994. The rebels, most of them indigenous inhabitants of the area, took seven municipalities, including the famous indigenous city of San Cristobal de las Casas. The Mexican (nonindigenous) army responded in force, with 25,000 troops, and the Zapatistas retreated on January 2. The army executed some of the rebels it captured and bombed the mountains south of San Cristobal. In February 1 995, the Mexican government ordered a new military offensive against the Zapatistas. There were widespread reports of rape and murder committed by Mexican troops . The government finally halted the offensive in response to the outcry within Mexico. In the years since the rebellion, there has been a low-level "dirty war" between the Zapatistas, on one side, and the Mexican military and paramilitary bands, on the other. On December 22, 1997, in Acteal, Chiapas, paramilitary bands allied with the white land owners attacked and massacred a band of forty-five unarmed indig enous people, including many women and children. The national police were nearby but did not intervene. There have been numerous unsuccessful peace attempts in Chiapas. In January 2000, in response to peace efforts, the Mexican government initiated deportation proceedings against forty-three international human rights observers in Chiapas.25 The Zapatista rebellion was only the latest installment in a long running conflict between (generally white) landowners and (generally Indian) peasants in Chiapas. Chiapas governor Absalon Castellanos Dominguez noted in 1982 that "we have no middle class; there are the rich, who are very rich, and the poor, who are very poor." This statement was all the more poignant since Castellanos himself belonged to an old and wealthy landowning family and, as a mili tary man, was involved in an army massacre of Indians in 1 980.26 Many observers have noted the "sordid association" among land owners and their

pistoleras, party bosses, the army, and the police, all

of whom agree on the use of force to repress Indian peasant rights (for example, depriving Indians of land to which they are legally entitled). Amnesty International noted "a pattern of apparently de liberate political killings" of supporters and leaders of independent

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peasant organizations. At one point, four successive leaders of the peasant organization Casa del Pueblo were assassinated.27 Chiapas is not an isolated case of oppression of the poor by the rich. In Bihar state, India, upper-caste landowners "are terrorizing through selective murder and rape-the families of laborers 'tied' to their lands." In Samalankulam Village, Sri Lanka, the poor get into the same kind of debt peonage: "The poor borrow money from wealthy people and as a means of repayment work gratis for them. " The countryside o f Pakistan "is marked b y uneven feudal power relationships."28 Development failures like Chiapas, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and Zambia are examples of the fatal mixture of ethnic and class hatreds. In contrast, development successes like Denmark, Japan, and South Korea (recent crises notwithstanding) have benefited from high social consensus associated with low inequality and ethnic hom*ogeneity. The American Race Tragedy

The United States is no stranger to ethnic and class hatreds. It is telling that the region most polarized by black-white income and ethnic differences-the South-has historically been the most back ward economically. The horrible tradition of lynching in the South for decades violated the most basic human rights. One description of a lynching goes, "In April 1899, black laborer Sam Hose killed his white boss in self defense. Wrongly accused of raping the man's wife, Hose was muti lated, stabbed, and burned alive in front of 2,000 cheering whites. His body was sold piecemeal to souvenir seekers; an Atlanta grocery displayed his knuckles in its front window for a week."29 During the Jim Crow era in the South, blacks endured not only the risk of lynchings but countless daily humiliations. They had separate and inferior schools, drinking fountains, swimming pools, train car riages, lunch counters, and hotels. A black had to make way for a white on the sidewalk. In shops that served both races, blacks had to wait until all the whites were served. White bullies would humiliate blacks by forcing them to drink whiskey and dance minstrel style.30 As the Jim Crow laws were overturned by the civil rights movement in the 1960s, it is probably not coincidental that the "new South" has begun to catch up to the North.

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The United States as a whole is a paradox in that it has managed to prosper despite the sad history of ethnic hatreds. This may be due to its success at creating a middle-class society within the majority of the population, even though i t marginalized minorities. In the famous opening words of de Tocqueville's

Democracy in America, who was

obviously thinking only about the white population:

Amongst the

novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions." The evidence within the United States shows that where groups are more polarized by race and class, prosperity is slower to arrive. The overall success of the United States despite its racial polarization may be because of institutional stability. Countering Polarization

There is no magic balm that can heal polarized societies. It takes time-maybe decades-for interest groups to overcome their differ ences and form a consensus for growth. For example, in Argentina the war of attrition over high infl ation lasted for two decades, until the government finally brought down inflation in the 1990s. In Africa, the interest group deadlock has still not been broken in many coun tries, as countries enter into their fourth decade after independence. Still, never at a loss for words, economists have proposed some institutional arrangements that will create incentives for the govern ment to pursue better policies. One, which is most relevant for countries struggling with high inflation, is central bank independence. Recall that a war of attrition between interest groups prolongs high inflation. A central bank that does not belong to either group is more likely to stand up to interest group pressure for the credit creation that fuels inflation. An inde pendent central bank is more likely to share the burden of stabiliza tion among interest groups. Laws that limit credit to the government and create an inde pendent board of governors are one way to define independence of the central bank. Another definition, more pragmatic, is how often the governor of the central bank i s changed. Rapid turnover of the governor implies little scope for him or her to defy the government. Researchers have indeed found that independent central banks are

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associated with lower inflation and higher growth. The results are based on the legal definition of independence for industrial and ex communist economies and on the pragmatic definition for develop ing countries.31 An independent budget-setting authority can resolve the common pool problem that leads to high government deficits and debt. Having a strong executive finance minister dictate the size of the budget short circuits the process of each group's ordering a lavish lunch at the other groups' expense. The process of budget setting is also impor tant here. The best arrangement is to have the executive first set the total budget and then have the legislature (the representatives of the interest groups) fight it out over budget composition.32 Good Institutions

More generally, institutional restraints make it less likely that class or ethnically based interest groups will unrestrainedly milk the public cow. Good institutions like those described in the previous chapter (measured by the International Credit Risk Guide) directly mitigate polarization between factions. Ethnically diverse countries with good institutions tend to escape the violence, poverty, and redistribution usually associated with ethnic diversity. Democracy also helps neu tralize ethnic differences; ethnically diverse democracies don't seem to be at an economic disadvantage relative to ethnically hom*oge neous democracies. 33 Specifically, societies with the highest-quality institutions do not have high black market premiums, low financial development, or low schooling regardless of their level of ethnic heterogeneity. Societies with the highest-quality institutions do not have wars, regardless of their level of ethnic heterogeneity. Good institutions also eliminate the most extreme form of ethnic violence: genocide. There have been no genocides among countries ranked in the top third of insti tutional quality. In contrast, a number of countries ranked in the bottom third of institutional quality and in the top third of ethnic heterogeneity have had state-sponsored genocidal killings over the past few decades. Examples include Angola, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire.34 The institutional solutions leave us a good way short of defini tively resolving the polarized politics that kills off growth. After all, a

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society polarized by class or race will be less likely to create an inde pendent central bank, an independent finance minister, and high quality institutions in the first place. But at least we have identified the incentives that government officials face in polarized societies as the root of bad policies. This is a big improvement over endless preaching at poor countries to change their policies. We know some institutional remedies that help matters, even if they are no pan aceas. If only rule of law, democracy, independent central banks, independent finance ministers, and other good-quality institutions can be put in place, the endless cycle of bad policies and poor growth can come to an end. The Middle-Class Consensus

Aristotle said it best in 306 B . c . : "Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large . . . . Where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissension." One way to summarize the conditions favorable for growth is that progrowth policies are more likely when the two most common forms of social polarization, class conflict and ethnic tensions, are absent. Let's call a situation of a high share of income for the middle class and a high degree of ethnic harmony a middle-class consensus. Societies with a middle-class consensus are more likely to have good economic policies, good institutions, and high economic growth. Examples of countries with a middle-class consensus and high growth are Korea, Japan, and Portugal. Countries polarized by both race and class include Bolivia, Guatemala, and Zambia-all with low economic growth. Figure 13.1 shows the general pattern: countries with a high middle class share and low ethnic heterogeneity (as measured by language) are rich; those with a low middle class share and high ethnic hetero geneity are poor. When we examine the data across countries, societies with a middle-class consensus are more likely to have high schooling, high immunization rates, low infant mortality, denser telephone net works, more access to sanitation, better macroeconomic policies, more democracy, and more stable governments. All of these conditions lend themselves to higher economic growth and development. Just

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18000 1 6000 14000

1 2000

.�

1 0000

�

8000

i £

6000

Share in income of middle class

Ethnic heterogeneity

Figure 13.1

Economic development and social polarization

as a middle-class consensus explained the difference in North and South America's development, it helps explain development suc cesses and failures around the world. The output collapse in Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union has been linked to destruction of the old middle class before a new middle class could be established. Milanovic describes the "hollowing out" of the old state-sector middle class. Moreover, the presence of sizable ethnic minorities in these new states complicates the achievement of consensus for growth. We could speculatively blame the lack of middle-class consensus for the failure of societies like ancient Rome, Ming dynasty China ( 1368-1 644), and the Mughal empire in India (1526-1 707) to indus trialize despite promising beginnings. The Romans were capable of formidable engineering projects like roads, but it was all for the sake of the elite and the military; remember that one-third of the Roman population were slaves.35 The Ming dynasty spent 200 years reno vating the Great Wall. The Mughals gave us the Taj Majal, built for the elite.36 This is just like the diversion of state revenues to monu-

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ments for the elite in many modern economies that lack a middle class consensus-for example, the late president of Cote d'lvoire building the largest cathedral in the world in his home town of Yamassoukro. Preindustrial empires were authoritarian and had little human capital accumulation outside the elite, who were often ethnically distinct from the majority. There is a common misconception that preindustrial societies were more egalitarian than industrializing ones (this became the basis of the famous Kuznets curve hypothesis that inequality first worsens and then improves with industrializa tion). Casual observation of preindustrial empires suggests otherwise, and in fact more recent evidence suggests that inequality steadily declines with industrialization.37 More generally, as Marx famously noted, the industrial revolution began as social revolutions abolished slavery, feudalism, and rigid class systems, creating a middle-class bourgeoisie for the first time in world history. Regions in which slavery or feudalism lingered longer were slower to industrialize. In some backward regions of the developing world, like Chiapas, Mexico, parts of rural Pakistan, and Bihar state, India, a form of feudalism is still alive today. Conclusion

I'm walking with my friend Manny through the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. We are stunned by the masterful three-millennia-year-old gold work of King Tut's tomb, just as a visit to the pyramids erected nearly 5 millennia ago had overwhelmed me earlier. We are here at a conference to bring together researchers from developing countries to study the wealth and poverty of nations. Cairo itself is throwing a big question at us: Why is Egypt still so poor four millennia after building the pyramids? Why didn't an industrial revolution happen under the pharaohs? Some quick back-of-the-envelope analysis pro vides an answer: income distribution. The pharaohs had everything, and the oppressed masses had nothing. Rich elites can do a fine job erecting monuments to themselves, with the help of labor from the masses. As in other oligarchical societies, the rich elite in Egypt chose to keep the masses poor and uneducated. So prosperity for the few has lasted for millennia, but prosperity for the many remains elusive in Cairo today.

Intermezzo: Violent for Centuries

Tanio, age thirty-eight, lives in the village of Tulungatung, Mindanao, in the Philippines. The village is on the coast, with stilt houses garnished with bougainvillea. The village has no electricity or paved roads, and during the rainy season everything becomes mud. The hills used to be forested with mahogany, but slash-and-burn agriculture has left many gashes in the forest. Tanio graws rice on two and a half acres rented from a teacher in the big city. His wife, Maria Elena, teaches at the village school. Paying rent to the absentee landowner and feeding their three children uses mast of Tanio's rice crop. Tonia's rice crop is not only barely adequate, it fluctuates a lot from year to year. His first crop used the new "miracle rice," and he harvested six tons on his rented plot. But the new rice was also more susceptible to insects, and Tanio could not afford the necessary pesticides. In following years, the army worms, stem borers, and green leaf hoppers reduced the crop to three and a half tons. Then a new government program offered loans to buy seeds, insecticide, and fertilizer. Tanio took a loan of $1 72 and bought the new miracle seeds, insecticide, and fertilizer. Once again he harvested a crop of six tons and also benefited from a 50 percent increase in the price of rice. He could pay off his loan, buy a mechanical thresher and three pigs, and marry Maria Elena. But his temporary prosperity was again short-lived. The price offertilizer and insecticide soan rose faster than the price of rice, and Tanio felt compelled to cut back on their use. Once again his harvest fell back to three and a half tons. Rice is not the only uncertainty facing Tonio. Mindanao has a divided population of Muslims and Christians. Bands of Muslim and Christian terrorists fight each other in a vicious guerrilla war in the countryside around Tulungatung. Muslims and Christians have been killing each other around Tulungatung for hundreds of years. Although Tulungatung has so far escaped the violence, Tonia fears that peace could be broken any time. Tonia's religion, a mixture of Catholicism and pagan beliefs, comforts him during bad times and sometimes explains why bad times come. When Tonia developed a fever, he felt haunted by a dwarf in the shape of a beautiful woman. While he was bewitched, he went amok. Finally, Tanio went to an old woman in the village for help. She tied him down and cured him with the help of herbs and a magic fire. 1 Tonio's life in Tulungatung is a mixture of the modern and the traditional in many ways. The stilt houses give the village a look that

Intermezzo: Violent for Centuries

283

hasn't changed in centuries. Yet transistor radios blast forth American style pop music without end. Tanio enthusiastically pursues a traditional Filipino hobby: co*ckfighting. He once owned a rooster imported from Texas. It won eight times as Tonia placed bets using money borrowed from his father and uncles. The ninth time, the valuable rooster got its throat cut. Tanio nevertheless was grateful that the rooster had gained him honor among the macho co*ckfighting crowd. The vicissitudes of life in the village eventually got to Tanio. "Everything is getting worse again in the barrio. I don't know what you have to do to have a good life here. What is God doing up there ? "

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Conclusion: The View from Lahore

I'm homesick for a country To which I've never been before. American folk song

Here I am again in Lahore, capital of Punjab province, Pakistan. I am here in April 2000 on an analysis of public spending in Punjab province for the World Bank. The provincial government depends for more than three-quarters of its revenues on a national govern ment that has a debt of 94 percent of GDP and large expenditures on things like nuclear weapons and national expressways that nobody uses. The national government hence is squeezing all noninterest, nondefense spending, non-show project spending like transfers to the provinces. With no previous experience of Pakistan besides the scary statistics I have read in World Bank reports, I feel like the clueless advising the helpless. Lahore has so much vitality, it's overwhelming. Traffic on the roads is a stream of donkey carts, bicycles with two or three people on each one, pedestrians walking in the road, motor-scooters with two to five people on each one (often with a toddler clinging to the handlebars), cars, hand-pushed carts, trucks, motor rickshaws, taxis, tractors pulling overloaded wagons, garishly painted buses packed with people clinging to their sides, all weaving in and out at their respective maximum speeds. People throng the markets in the old city, where the lanes are so narrow that the crowds swallow the car. People buying, people selling, people eating, people cooking. Every street, every lane crammed with shops, each shop crammed with people. This is a private economy with a lot of dynamism.

Chapter 1 4

286

The Old Fort in Lahore is a reflection of its rich history. Lahore's successive conquerors include the Hindus, the Mughals, the Sikhs, the British, and the Pakistanis. I admire the beautiful mosque and the touching devotion of the believers. I am invited to attend a wedding in Lahore. The ceremony prior to the wedding, called a

mehndi, is like a window into another world. In

the backyard of a house, there are carpets laid everywhere, with a long red carpet where the groom and then the bride are to enter. The red carpet is flanked by candles and flowers, illuminated by bright lights strung overhead. The groom greets his guests wearing a long white robe with a yellow sash around it. The bride then enters, her face covered with a cloth, another cloth held above her head by four attendants. Her attendants lead her to a hanging swing completely covered with orange flowers, where the groom sits with her. The parents of the bride and the groom take turns feeding sweets to their new in-law. Throbbing drums start up, and the guests of the groom and those of the bride take turns in wild dancing, each trying to outdo the other. I do my best to participate with my own jerky dancing, like a John Cleese routine. There is a power outage, and things go dark, but a generator they keep for such emergencies quickly restores the action. There is a lavish meal of Pakistani specialties. I talk to the guests, many of them with Ph.D.s and M.B.A.s from the United States, making money in Lahore. They are elegant, witty, courteous. They only reinforce my image from previous contacts with the Pakistani diaspora of a well spoken, well-educated, courtly people. This is a beautiful, wonderful culture, with so much potential for creativity and prosperity. Lahore Amiss

And yet so much has gone wrong in Lahore, Punjab, and Pakistan. Wonderful people, terrible government. The maj ority of the popula tion is illiterate, ill housed, and ill fed. The government alternates between military dictators and corrupt democrats, each more inter ested in keeping power at all costs than in bringing prosperity to the masses. The government cannot bring off a simple and cheap mea sles vaccination program, and yet it can build nuclear weapons. The powerful military endlessly obsesses about disputed territory in Kashmir held since 1947 by their bitter enemy India. Every day the

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headline in the local paper has something about Kashmir. Yet they make no assault on their own unoccupied territory of prosperity for the masses. I'm here to lead a fifteen-member team reviewing public services provided by the government of Punjab. I'm fortunate to have a team of field-hardened, well-informed, hard-thinking World Bank staff. It quickly becomes apparent that a corrupt, hierarchical, autocratic bureaucracy has done a miserable job providing public services. The bureaucracy has little incentive to provide services as opposed to filling its own wallets. For example, there were only 102 convictions for irregularities of all kinds in anticorruption courts during the entire period 1985 to 1999, a rather unusual number for a 1-million-strong provincial civil service universally agreed to be corrupt. Despite decades of foreign aid to improve the lot of the masses, Punjab has some of the poorest social indicators in the world. Al though most health problems in the Punjab are easily preventable and despite a major effort to increase services under a donor supported eight-year-long campaign called the Social Action Pro gram, the province is spending only $1 .50 per capita on health. Only half of children are immunized. Only 27 percent of pregnant women receive prenatal care. Tuberculosis is not under control. Half of pri mary health care facilities reported stock-outs of more than two essential drugs during the last quarter of 1999. The achievements of the elementary education system of the Punjab are disappointing, even after eight years of intensive efforts to improve the coverage and quality of services under the Social Action Program. The total amounts being spent on education have not risen significantly in inflation-adjusted terms since the program began in 1992: a classic example of reducing domestic spending as aid-supported spending increases. The adult literacy rate remains at about 40 percent in the Punjab, and the rate for women remains at only about 27 percent. The definition of literacy employed almost certainly falls far short of the level of literacy skills required in modern life. Only 41 percent of the highly selective group that made it to the tenth grade passed the matriculation exam in 1 999. The annual per student direct spending on elementary education was the equivalent of $27 per student in 1997-1998, which is on the low side even for poor countries. There is an allocation for teaching materials of about $0.36 per student and $0.36 for operations and maintenance per student. Only 3 percent of the budget goes for

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nonsalary costs in both elementary and secondary schools. High dropout rates imply that approximately a third of resources devoted to basic education are not contributing to the development of sus tained literacy and numeracy skills and thus are being squandered. Much of the population depends on agriculture, which is also suf fering from decrepit public services. The Punjab is blessed with abundant water supplies from the Indus River basin, which it has tapped for over a century with the world's largest irrigation system. Yet highly centralized public sector management of the irrigation system had led to inadequate funds for routine and preventive maintenance and major repairs. As a result, only 35 percent of the water gets from the canal head to the root zone. Inadequate invest ment in drainage has led to waterlogging and salinity in the soils, lowering crop yields. The price of water is kept artificially low for rich and poor alike, leaving few funds for maintenance. The gap between operations and maintenance requirements and actual expenditure is between 30 and 40 percent. Powerful landlords are assured of getting water, while poor farmers often can irrigate only part of their lands. The government officials we meet seem genuinely well meaning. The panacea offered by the government is decentralization: let local beneficiaries of public services determine how money should be spent on improving those services. Let mayors be elected by the local people, and so be democratically accountable for their performance. It certainly sounds like an improvement on the overcentralized, top down bureaucracy that micromanages over 4,000 projects like "canal bridge near village Abbianwala Nankana Sahib." Maybe incentives could improve with decentralization. And yet decentralization is no panacea without more fundamental reforms to the civil service and the system of semifeudal land ownership. The wily civil servants could provide the show of local participation while retaining their all-powerful fiefdoms. Powerful feudal landlords could capture the local governments through their well-honed skills of dominating the peasants. Once again, it is devilishly difficult to get incentives right for creating growth. I went on an officially sponsored visit of a primary school for girls in Sheikhupura district near Lahore. The school was in a village at the end of a one-lane dirt road. As we arrived, a preschool girl and boy gave each one of us a bouquet of flowers. The older girls were lined up in two columns, each holding a paper plate full of colorful flowers. As we walked between the two columns, they pelted us joyfully with the flowers. Flower covered, we walked into the school.

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289

Other children were sitting politely quiet in their classrooms as we entered the school. Each room was used for two different grades. They were short a room even then, so the first grade held their class outside. Each class stood up as we carne into the room. They had no textbooks and no paper or pencil. The headmistress told us that their parents couldn't buy the textbooks and paper until the end of the month, when they get paid. And this was the school the district shows off for visitors! Incentives for the Players

The rich are different from the poor: they have more money. Trekking through the tropics trying to make poor nations rich has raised more questions than it has answered. Why if I jet to Geneva do I encounter a shiny prosperity, while a few hours more by plane brings me to Lahore and its poor masses? How did some people (about 900 million of them) in Western Europe, North America, and parts of the Pacific Rim find prosperity, while 5 billion people live in poor nations? Why do 1.2 billion people live in extreme poverty on less than one dollar per day? We have learned once and for all that there are no magical elixirs to bring a happy ending to our quest for growth. Prosperity happens when all the players in the development game have the right incen tives. It happens when government incentives induce technological adaptation, high-quality investment in machines, and high-quality schooling. It happens when donors face incentives that induce them to give aid to countries with good policies where aid will have high payoffs, not to countries with poor policies where aid is wasted. It happens when the poor get good opportunities and incentives, which requires government welfare programs that reward rather than penalize earning income. It happens when politics is not polar ized between antagonistic interest groups, but there is a common consensus to invest in the future. Broad and deep development happens when a government that is held accountable for its actions energetically takes up the task of investing in collective goods like health, education, and the rule of law. To explain development failures, I have told a sequential story of failed incentives. Private firms and families did not invest in the future because government policies such as high black market pre miums or high inflation penalized such investments. The poor within each society did not invest in the future because they were matched

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with other low-productivity people; they require subsidies to their income in order to grow. Governments failed to provide subsidies to the poor and chose policies that penalized growth because polarized factions fought over redistribution of existing income rather than in vesting in future incomes. Donors weakened government incentives to reform by propping up nonreformist governments with politically motivated aid. Faction-ridden governments faced inadequate incen tives to provide subsidies to the poor and to provide public health, education, communications, and transportation services, all of which are crucial for quality of life. The solutions are a lot more difficult to describe than the problems. The way forward must be to create incentives for growth for the trinity of governments, donors, and individuals. First, the government. Does the government of each nation face incentives to create private sector growth, or does it face incentives to steal from-and thus repress-private business? In a polarized and undemocratic society, where class-based or ethnically based interest groups are in a vicious competition for loot, the answer is probably the latter. It may not show up as outright corruption; i t may mean a n interest rate below the inflation rate that implicitly steals the savings of the populace, or it may mean a black market exchange rate many times the officially controlled rate that steals the profits of exporters. In a democratic society with institutions that protect the right of minority interest groups, institutions that protect the rights of private property and individual economic free doms, governments face the right incentives to create private sector growth. We can envision a world in which governments do not devote themselves to theft, but one in which governments do pro vide national infrastructure-health clinics, primary schools, well maintained roads, widespread phone and electricity services-and they do provide assistance to the poor within each society. Second, the donors. Does each donor give a vested amount of aid to each country, so as to justify next year's aid budget? Do the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank give loans to the Mobutus of this world, or support aid to governments that can present credible intentions to build national infrastructure and help the poor? If both institutions and the other donor organizations are left to themselves, they will likely revert to internal bureaucratic politics determining loans. The act of making loans will be rewarded rather than the act of helping the poor in each country. The solution is to have publicly visible "aid contests" in which each government

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vies for loans from a common pool on the basis of its track record and its credibly and publicly stated intentions. We can envision a world in which international donors do not give aid just to justify next year's aid budget, but give aid where it will help the poor the most. Third, private individuals. Private households and businesses sometimes face poor incentives because they have bad governments that expropriate their investments in the future. Even when society wide incentives for growth are good, the poor face low incentives to grow because one's productivity depends on one's fellows, and the fellows of the poor are usually other poor people. Aid that offers matching grants to the poor with increases in their own income (as opposed to the penalties on increased income in most welfare systems) can help correct these poor incentives. We can envision a world in which the poor are given the benefit of the doubt that they will respond to incentives just as much as the rich do. I have criticized some actions by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in this book. You will not be surprised if I never theless say there is a need for these institutions. Both institutions include many dedicated, smart, and hard-working people, who spend many arduous days away from home in some tough places around the globe. The World Bank can be a powerful institution to subsidize the world's poor, and the IMF can play a useful role in bailing countries out of the short-run crises that even healthy capitalist economies can encounter. At a minimum, if we learn nothing else from the quest for growth, we economists who work on poor countries should leave aside some of our past arrogance. The problem of making poor countries rich was much more difficult than we thought. It is much easier to describe the problems facing poor countries than it is to come up with work able solutions to their poverty. The recommendations I have just given are themselves no panacea-they will take patient incremental work and further money to implement. Nothing would be sadder than to give up the quest altogether. As I think back to my visit to the Pakistani girls' school, in the middle of the beautiful countryside of ripening wheat fields and rushing canals, I think of the flower-pelting schoolgirls without textbooks-hoping the future would bring them better. May the quest for growth over the next fifty years succeed more than it has for the last fifty years, and may more poor countries finally become rich.

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Notes

Chapter

1. Filmer and Pritchett 1997. 2. This list is from table B.2 of the World Bank; World Development Report, 1993, listing those communicable diseases that have higher disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost for developing countries. 3. UNICEF 1994, p. 6. 4. World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, p. 224. 5. Demographic Data for Development Project 1987, p. 23. 6. UNICEF 1993, p. 4. 7. World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, p. 74. 8. UNICEF 1994, p. 26. 9. World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, p. 77. 10. UNICEF 1994, p. 6. 1 1 . World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, p. 73. 12. UNICEF 1993, p. 12; 1995, p. 13 13. UNICEF, 1994, p. 26. 14. World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, p. 74. 15. Muhuri and Rutstein 1994, table A.6.4, p. 67. 16. Narayan et a!. 2000a. 17. Demographic and Health Services, 1994, p. 55. 18. Narayan et a!. 2000a. 19. Narayan et a!. 2000a. 20. Narayan et a!. 1999, chap. 2, p. 9; chap. 6, p. 10. 21. Narayan et a!. 1999, chapter 6, p. 12.

294

22. Kidron and

Notes

1995.

23. Narayan et al. 1999, chap. 6, p. 24. 24. UNICEF, State of the World's Children, 1996, p. 14. 25. Humana 1992; Dollar and Gatti 1999. Easterly 1999a found educational equality for women improved strongly with higher income in the long run, but did not neces sarily improve with growth in the short run. 26. All of these quotes are from Narayan et al. 2000a, chap. 5. 27. Ravallion and Chen 1997. 28. Dollar and Kraay 2000.

Intermezzo: In Search of a River 1. Jacob 1881. 2. Cresap and

1 987, p. 3 1 .

3. Cresap and

1987, p . 32.

4. Bailey, 1944, p. 34. 5. Bailey, 1994, p. 40. 6. Bailey, 1994, p. 179. 7. Bailey, 1994, p. 5 1 . 8. Cresap and

1987, p . 79.

9. Cresap and

1987, p. 76.

10. Rorabaugh 1981, p. 141. 1 1 . Cresap and

1987, p. 91.

12. Cresap and

1987, p . 87.

13. Fischer 1991, p. 754. 14. Cresap and

1987, p. 100.

Chapter 2 1 . Rooney 1988, p. 133. 2. Rooney 1988, p . 5. 3. Rooney 1988, p. 88. 4. Rooney 1988, p. 137. 5. Seers and Ross 1952. 6. Rooney 1988, pp. 4-6.

Notes

295

7. Frempong 1982, p. 130. 8. Rooney 1988, pp. 154-168. 9. Kamarck 1967, p. 247. 10. Frempong 1982, pp. 84, 85, 87, 126. 1 1 . Ending the Hunger 1985; USAID 2000. 12. Demographic Data for Development Project 1987, table 8, p. 90. 13. Rimmer 1992, p. 4. 14. UNICEF, Progress of Nations 1995, p. 14. 15. Damar 1957, pp. 7-8. 16. Note that the theory says that investment net of depreciation should be the rele vant concept. Most economists who have used the Harrod-Damar model ever since have erroneously used gross rather than net investment. 17. Marshall 1946, p. 4. 18. Arndt 1987, p. 33. 19. Arndt 1987, p. 49. 20. Lewis 1954, p. 139. 21. Damar 1957, p. 255. 22. Kuznets 1963, p. 35. This was a rare example of actually testing the Harrod Domar-Lewis-Rostow ICOR model. There was afterward a curious literature (e.g., Patel 1968; Vanek and Studenmund 1968) noting the strong inverse correlation between growth and the ICOR (investment/growth). Leibenstein (1966) and Boserup (1969) were clear-headed enough to point out that this negative correlation would come about mechanically if there was a low short-run correlation between growth and investment. 23. Edwards 1995, p. 224. 24. Wiles 1953, Thorp 1956. 25. Rostow 1960, p. 37. 26. Defined as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel opment (OECD), which includes Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Data are from OECD. 27. Bauer 1972, p. 127. 28. Bhagwati 1966, pp. 69, 170, 219. 29. Chenery and Strout 1966 called their model the two-gap model. The investment savings gap was one of the two gaps; the other was the trade gap, which ex post is equal to the investment gap but ex ante might be a constraint in a shortage-prone economy with fixed prices. I'll ignore the other gap throughout this chapter, since it was less influential in development practice once market friendly policies came into vogue and made shortage-prone economies less likely.

296

Notes

30. Correspondence with John Holsen, December 17, 1996. 31. Correspondence with Nick Carter and Norman Hicks, December 16, 1996. 32. Meier 1995, p. 153. 33. Todaro 2000. 34. World Bank 1993a. 35. OECD data. 36. World Bank, 1993a, p. 32. 37. World Bank 1996, p. 23. 38. World Bank 1995a, pp. 10, 23. 39. Inter American Development Bank 1995, p. 19 40. World Bank 2000b. 41. IMF 1996a, pp. 228, 239. 42. World Bank 1993b, p. 20. 43. World Bank 1997a, p. 15. 44. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 1995, pp. 5, 66, 71. The EBRD's chief economist, Nicholas Stern, strongly denied any use of the Harrod Damar model in EBRD business, these quotations notwithstanding. 45. The Soviets' own linear growth investment relation fell apart. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, growth rates were falling even though investment rates kept rising. East erly and Fischer 1995. 46. I am using data in domestic prices for investment, since overseas development assistance is not purchasing power adjusted. When I put all the data together I will be forced to mix purchasing power parity and domestic price data. The data on overseas development assistance are from the OECD. 47. These results are like those of Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan 1996, who found with five-year periods that investment was a function of lagged growth, but growth was not a function of lagged investment. 48. These calculations are done with Summers and Heston 1991 data at international prices for both output and investment. However, similar results obtain using World Bank national accounts at domestic prices 49. World Bank 1998, p. 2. 50. World Bank 2000b 51. World Bank 2000c. 52. I used Summers and Heston 1991 GDP and investment rates. For aid to GOP, I used the numbers from the OECD for overseas development assistance in current prices. This is not ideal, since aid to GOP is not PPP adjusted and so how much investment it would buy could be over or underestimated.

Notes

297

Intermezzo: Parmila 1. Quoted and paraphrased from Narayan et al. 2000a.

Chapter 3 1. Hadjmichael et al. 1996, p. 1 . 2. Inter American Development Bank 1995, p. 1 9 3 . Middle Eastern Department, 1996, p. 9 . 4. World Bank 1993d, p. 191. 5. United Nations, 1996, p. 8. 6. Solow 1957. 7. U.S. Statistical Abstract Calculation 1995. 8. The advantages of specialization have been emphasized by economists from Adam Smith to Paul Romer (1992). 9. Groliers on Compuserve, article on Luddites. 10. Baumol 1986 discusses data on long-run unemployment for the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany. 1 1 . United Nations Development Programs Human Development Report, 1996, p. 2; 1993 HDR pp. 35-36 "Growth without employment." 12. Belser 2000. 13. United Nations Development Programs Human Development Report 1996. 14. Lucas 1990. I use a capital share of 0.4 as Lucas did. The ratio of capital stocks would have to be (15)A(1 I .4), which is 871. 15. Pritchett 1997b. 16. Baumol 1986. 17. De Long 1988. 18. See also the study by Pack and Page 1994, which also gave an important role to capital accumulation and showed a fairly low total factor productivity growth esti mate for Singapore. 19. Klenow and Rodriguez Clare 1997. 20. Easterly and Levine 2000. 21. Data from King and Levine 1994. 22. Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack 1999. 23. Hsieh 1999. 24. World Bank, 1995a, p. 35.

298

Notes

Intermezzo: Dry Cornstalks l. Tremblay. and Capon 1988, pp. 197 198.

Chapter 4 1. From Bulletin: The Major Project in the Field of Education in Latin America and the Caribbean 1990, p. 9.

2. Mayor 1990, p. 445. 3. World Bank, World Development Report, 1997, p. 52. 4. 5. The

1990, p. 21. is taken from Pritchett 1999.

6. Pritchett 1999. to 7. One recent (Krueger and Lindahl 1999) attributed Pritchett's measurement error in educational attainment. But Pritchett carefully controls for mea surement error, so his findings are not vulnerable to that charge. 8. Benhabib and Spiegel 1994. 9. Barro and Sala i Martin 1995 and Barro 1991 among others. For a useful survey of findings on education and growth, see Judson 1996, table 1. 10. Barro and Sala i Martin 1995 discuss this effect. 1 1 . Klenow and Rodriguez Clare 1997, p. 94. Note that Barro and Sala-i Martin 1995 also find no rdationship between growth per capita and the change in schooling years. schooling and 12. Bils and Klenow 1998. 13. Bils and Klenow 1998. 14. Mankiw 1995, p. 295. Mankiw drew on earlier work by Barro, Mankiw, and Sala i Martin 1995 and by Mankiw, Romer, and Wei\ 1992. 15. Young 1 992, 1995; World Bank 1993d. 16. Barro and Sala i Martin 1995, p. 431. See also Barro 1991. 17. This point was first made by Klenow and Rodriguez Clare 1997.

18. Romer 1 995. I am reproducing Romer's calculation with slightly different human shares, using the shares assumed by Mankiw. and physical 19. Carrington and Detragiache 1998. 20. Union Bank of Switzerland 1994. 21. Psacharopoulos 1994, p. 1332. 22. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991. 23. Narayan et a!. 2000b.

Notes

299

24. Talbot 1998, p. 339. 25. Husain 1999, pp. 384, 404. 26. Pritchett and Filmer 1999.

Intermezzo: Without a Refuge 1. Burr and Collins 1995, p. 15; see also Deng 1995. 2. UNICEF State of the World's Children, 96, p. 21. 3. http://www.reliefweb.int/irin/cea/weekly /19991119.htm#SUDAN: Refugees flee ethnic clashes to Uganda, Kenya. 4. http: //www .reliefweb.int/ irin/ cea/ countrystories/ sudan/20000315.htm.

Chapter

1. Ehrlich 1968, pp. 74, 88. 2. World Bank World Development Indicators 2000; Simon 1995, p. 397. 3. http: //www.worldbank.org/data/wdi/pdfs/tab6_4.pdf. 4. Ehrlich 1968, p. 44; World Development Indicators 2000, table 3.3. 5. Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990, p. 185. 6. Data from Stars World Tables on CD-ROM; http: //www.worldbank.org/data/ wdi/pdfs/tab2_l.pdf 7. World Bank, World Development Report, 1984, p. 3. 8. http: //www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990408.html. 9. World Watch Institute 2000, p. 5. 10. http://www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990408.html. 11. http: //www.populationaction.org/why_pop/whyfood.htm. 12. http: I/www .populationinstitute.org/ issue.html. 13. http: //www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990902.html. 14. http: //www.un.org/ ecosocdevI geninfo/populatin/icpd.htm#intro. 15. http: //www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990902.html. 16. http: //www.populationinstitute.org/thehague.html. 17. http: I/www.undp.org/ pop in/ unpopcom/32ndsess/ gass/ state/ secgeneral.pdf. 18. http : //www.zpg.org/Reports_Publications/ Reports/report83.html. 19. -UNICEF, S tate of the World's Children, 1992. 20. http: //www.info.usaid.gov I pop_health/ pop I popunmetneed.htm.

300

Notes

21. http:/I www.condoms.net/ cgi bin/SoftCart.cgi/ condoms/ crown.html?L+csense+ hGSb8034+948055430. 22. Pritchett 1994. 23. Kelley and Schmidt, 1995, 1996; Kling and Pritchett 1994. 24. Levine and Renelt 1992. 25. Kling and Pritchett 1994. 26. I regressed per capita growth decade averages from the 1960s through the 1990s on the black market premium, the ratio of M2 to GDP, inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, secondary enrollment, initial income, terms of trade gain as a percent age of GDP, growth of OECD trading partners, and population growth. Population growth had a coefficient of .09 with a t statistic of .4. 27. These facts are taken from Kling and Pritchett 1994. 28. Kremer 1993b pointed out that the Boserup idea is different from the Kuznets Simon idea, in that the Boserup principle would predict that higher income would lower population pressure and thus slow technological change, which is contradicted by historical experience. 29. http://www.census.gov /ipc/www / worldhis.html; Kremer 1993b. 30. Population Action International, 1995. 31. The argument of the preceding paragraphs is based on Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990. However, many other researchers and theories suggest a negative rela tionship between per capita income and fertility. The idea of a low income-high pop ulation growth trap goes back to Nelson 1956. 32. Lucas 1998. My argument does not necessarily follow that of Lucas, so the text here should not be taken as an exposition of Lucas's views. I also draw on Jones 1999.

Intermezzo: Tomb Paintings 1. Critchfield, 1981, pp. 143-161. 2. Critchfield 1994, p. 136. 3. Critchfield 1994, p. 142.

Chapter 6 1. World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, p. 27, and World Development Report 1997, p. 221. I have converted GDP growth projections to per capita growth projections by dividing by the actual population growth rate. 2. World Bank and IMF 1983. 3. Clausen 1986. 4. Corbo, Goldstein, and Khan 1987. 5. Ghosh 1994.

Notes

301

6. Easterly 2000b. 7. Schadler et al. 1995, p. 39. 8. I took a geometric average of inflation across countries for each year, then cumu lated geometrically across years. 9. Grosh 1991, pp. 22, 144ff. 10. p. 43 World Bank 1983. 1 1 . World Bank 1989b, p. 1 1 . 1 2 . International Monetar, Fund 1996c, p. 35. 13. World Bank 1988c, vol. 1, p. 3 14. World Bank 1998b. 15. World Bank 1996, p. 4. 16. World Bank 1994c, p. 27. 17. World Bank 1983, p. 35. 18. World Bank 1979, p. 51; see also p. 17. 19. Mallet 1998. 20. Easterly 1999d. 21. Alesina and Perotti 1995 found that deficit adjustments made by cutting con sumption were more lasting than those reduced in other ways, which is in accordance with the argument of this section. 22. The 1986 Government Finance Statistics Manual (IMP 1986, p. 31) recommended cash rather than accrual accounting. Current practice uses a mixture of cash and accrual accounting. When arrears become a serious problem, the conventional approach to deficits in developing countries will often show them explicitly as a financing item for an accrual based deficit target. The 1996 Government Finance Statistics Manual (IMP 1996d, p. 16) recommended accrual accounting. However, arrears still can be used to temporarily meet a gross public debt target, since they are not included in the gross public debt. 23. Kee 1987, p. 11. 24. Kopits and Craig 1998. 25. White and Wildavsky 1989, p. 514. 26. Luis Serven suggested the state enterprise subsidy to loan conversion idea to me. The Egyptian example is from World Bank 1995a, p. 84. 27. Mackenzie and Stella 1996. 28. Pension reserves are also used to cover health costs of workers covered by social insurance programs. This further depletes the reserves. The Venezuelan government invested between 10 and 30 percent of pension reserves in the hospitals of the social security system. Now the government must face the rising expenditures on both health and pensions as the population ages with a depleted pension reserve fund (World Bank 1994b, p. 47).

302

Notes

29. World Bank 1994b, p. 128. 30. Sargent and Wallace 1985. 31. This section was based on Svensson 1997. 32. Economist, August 19, 1995.

Chapter 7 1. World Bank 1998a, p. 56 2. Dupuy 1988, p. 116; Lundahl 1 992, pp. 39, 41, 244. 3. Dommen 1989; Winkler 1933, p. 22; Wynne 1951, pp. 5-7. 4. International Herald Tribune, June 14, 1999, p. 1; Financial Times, June 21, 1999. 3. See the World Bank web site on the HIPC Initiative: www.worldbank.org/hipc. 5. http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/main.html. 6. The quote is from UNCTAD 1967, p. 3. 7. World Bank 1979, pp. 7 8; UNCTAD 1983, p. 3. 8. World Bank 1981, p. 129. 9. World Bank 1984, p. 46. 10. World Bank 1986, p. 41. 1 1 . World Bank 1988a, p. xix. The general literature started noticing low-income African debt at about the same time. See Lancaster and Williamson 1986; Mistry 1988; Greene 1989; Parfitt and Riley 1989; Humphreys and Underwood 1989; Husain and Underwood 1991; Nafziger 1993. For more recent compilations of analysis, see Iqbal and Kanbur 1997; Brooks et al. 1998. 12. World Bank 199la, p. 176. 13. World Bank 1988b, p. xxxviii. 14. World Bank 1989, p. 31. 15. World Bank 1 990, p . 29. 16. World Bank 199lb, p. 31. 17. World Bank 1993c, p. 6. 18. World Bank 1994a, p. 42. 19. Boote et a!. 1997, pp. 126, 129. 20. World Bank 1999, p. 76, and the web site www.worldbank.org/hipc. The seven countries are Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda. According to the Bank's web site, "Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Mauritania and Tanzania have completed a preliminary review and could qualify for billions more in debt relief."

303

Notes

21. World Bank 1988c, vol 2, p. 78. 22. Charnley and Ghanem, 1994. 23. International Monetary Fund 1998, p. 29. 24. World Bank 1988c, vol 1. 25. site http : //www.worldbank.org/afr/ci2.htm. 26. International Monetary Fund 1999. 27. Economist Intelligence Unit 1999.

Intermezzo: Cardboard House 1. Gonzales de la Rocha 1994, pp. 94-95, 122-123, 236-237, 241, 248.

Chapter

1. I have in mind most directly the AK model of Rebelo 1991. 2. See Romer 1986, 1990, 1992, 1993. 3. Employment in 1978-1979 according to Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 1985, p. 418 (production workers Wearing Apparel except footwear). World Bank 1987 gives the following as averages in millions for Bangladeshi ready made garment exports over 1972-1975 and 1975-1980: respectively, 0.00 and 0.17. 4. Rhee and Belot 1990, p. 8. 5. 1980 exports from International Monetary Fund, International Finance Statistics yearbook, series 77aa d. 6. World Bank 1996b, p. 14: 54 percent of $3.45 billion in exports in 1994 1995. 7. Rhee and Belot 1990, pp. 6-7. 8. Rhee and Belot 1990, p. 12. 9. Rhee and Belot 1990, p. 17. 10. From their web site at http: //www.empire capital.com/maxpages/Back_to_ Back_LCS. 1 1 . The 0 ring metaphor and the accompanying theory are due to Kremer 1993a. Shuttle information from http: //www.ksc.nasa.gov I shuttle/missions/51 l/rnission 51 l.html. 12. Values and rankings of richest and poorest (according to personal income per capita) from U.S. Census Bureau City and County Databook. 13. Lucas 1988, p. 39. 14. Rauch 1993. 15. Grube! and Scott 1977. 16. World Bank, World Development Report, 1995, p. 1 1 .

304

Notes

17. S tatistical Abstract of the United States, 1995, figures for 1992, current dollar GDP 6020 billion, agriculture, forestry and fishing $116 billion. 18. World Bank, World Development Report, 1996, p. 210 (data for 1994). Just to confirm droughts and terrain, see p. 34 World Bank 1987b. 19. World Bank, World Development Report, 1996, p. 88 (data for 1995). 20. This kind of self fulfilling discrimination has long been postulated before by dis tinguished economists like Kenneth Arrow and Glen Loury, but Kremer was the first to apply it more generally to skill matching and economic growth. 21. S tatistical Abstract of the United States, 1995, tables 52, 724. 22. Kosmin and Lachman 1993, p. 260. 23. Lipset 1997, pp. 151 152. 24. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994, p. 6. 25. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994, p. 37. 26. Patrinos 1997. 27. Narayan et a\. 2000a. 28. New York Times, September 18, 1999. 29. Easterly and Levine 2000. 30. Easterly and Levine 2000. See also Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy 1999. 31. Narayan et a\. 2000a. 32. Other stories of poverty traps come from Azariadis and Drazen 1991; Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989.

Intermezzo: War and Memory 1. Critchfield, 1994, pp. 169 189.

Chapter 9 1. http: II econ16l.berkeley.edu/E_Sidebars /E conomy_figures2.html. 2. http : //www.duke.edu/�mccann/ q tech.htm#Death of Distance. 3. http: II econ161 .berkeley.edu/ OpEd/ virtual/ technet/ An_E conomy. 4. World Bank, World Development Report, 1998 1999, pp. 3-5, 57. 5. The following history is taken from Nordhaus 1994. 6. Jovanovic 2000. See also Mokyr 1990, p. 22. 7. Mokyr 1990, pp. 21 22, 29. 8. Mokyr 1990, p. 161.

Notes

305

9. See Jones 1999 for a description of growth in ancient empires. He notes that Sung China apparently had both technical progress and rising per capita income from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, but then stagnation followed in Ming China and its successor to the nineteenth century (see also Young 1993). Mokyr 1990 is the source of the general description of Chinese technological prowess. 10. Hall and Jones 1999. 1 1 . Davis and Haltiwanger 1998, fig. 6. 12. Schumpeter 1942, p. 82. 13. Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1999. 14. http: // www groups.dcs.st and.ac. uk/�history I Quotations /Newton.html. 15. Greenwood and Jovanovic 1998. 16. David 1990. 17. http: // econ161 .berkeley.edu/E_Sidebars/E conomy_figures2.html. 18. http: //www.preservenet.com/endgrowth/EndGrowth.html. 19. Benfield, Raimi, and Chen, 1999. 20. Kennedy 1993, pp. 13, 15. 21. Daly 1992; Zolotas 1981; Douthwaite 1992; Trainer 1989; Wachtel 1983; Mishan 1967. 22. Mokyr 1990, p. 263. 23. Mokyr 1990, pp. 142 143. 24. Mokyr 1990, pp. 263-265. 25. This paragraph is based on Aghion and Howitt 1999, pp. 313-316. 26. Yonekura 1994, p. 207. 27. Mokyr 1990, p. 118. 28. Yonekura 1994, pp. 219 222. 29. Lieberman and Johnson 1999. 30. UNIDO, Industrial statistics at 3-digit level, World Bank on line database. 31. D'Costa 1999, p. 3. 32. Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996. The "advantages of backwardness" is an idea that goes back to Alexander Gerschenkron. 33. Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee 1998; Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan 1994. 34. Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1998. 35. Lee 1995. 36. http: //www .wired.com/ wired/ archive/ 4.02/bangalore_pr.html. 37. Stremlau 1996.

Notes

306

38. Mokyr 1990, p. 162. 39. Mokyr 1990, p. 164. 40. http://www.teleport.com/�samclhdtv I . 4 1 . This possibility was noted b y Young 1993. 42. Brad de Long, http://econ16l.berkeley.edu/E_Sidebars1E conomy_figures2.html.

Intermezzo 1. Quoted and paraphrased from Narayan et al. 2000a.

Chapter 10 1. This and previous

paraphrased from Narayan et al. 2000a. Report, 2000 2001, consultation draft, p. 6.24.

2. World Bank, World

3. http: 1/www .worldbank.org/html/ today I archives/html/ sep13 17 99.htrn#9 14. 4. http://www .wor!dbank.org/ aids econl africa/ fire.htm. 5. http: //www. worldbank.org/ aids econ/ africa/ fire.htm. 6. UNAIDS 1999. 7. Red Cross 1995, pp. 99, 104. 8. Income per capita is from Summers and Heston 1999; growth per capita data are from World Bank on-line data. 9. http: // wb.eiu.com/ search_view.asp ?from_page=composite&doc_id=EI541397& topicid= VE. 10. New York Times, December 20, 1999. 1 1 . Easterly et al. 1993, pp. 468 469. 12. Wanniski, 1998 pp. 255, 260 13. See Slemrod 1995 and Easterly and Rebelo 1993. For the formal sector, see Charnley and Ghanem 1995. 14. Dunn and Pelecchio 1990 still show a top rate of 40 percent in 1986, compared to Wanniski's 37 percent. Gwartney and Lawson 1995 shows 45 percent from 1979 to 1989. 15. Per capita growth 1979 1994 from World Bank national accounts. 16. Quotes from

1995.

17. Peters and Waterman 1982, p. 23. 18. Peters and Waterman 1982, pp. 26, 318. 19. Peters and Waterman 1982, p. xxi. 20. Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1995.

Notes

307

21. The other was Akeem Olajuwon, who did become a star player but has yet to bring his team a championship in contrast to the six championships the Bulls won with Michael Jordan. 22. Lincoln 1989, p. 384. 23. Terms of trade loss is calculated as: (Percentage change in export prices) (exports/GDP) percentage change in import prices x (imports/GDP).

24. Brundtland Commission 1987, pp. 67, 131. 25. Lipsey 1994. 26. Easterly 2000. 27. Rescher 1995, pp. 8 9. 28. Narayan et a!. 2000b.

Intermezzo: Favela Life 1. Critchfield 1981, pp. 13-15.

Chapter 11 1. Bruno 1993, p. 32. 2. Bruno 1993, p. 101. 3. Bruno 1993, p. 32. 4. Bruno 1993, p. 117. 5. Listing all high inflation episodes 1970 1994 for Bruno and Easterly 1998, excluding those with obvious wars. 6. Bruno and Easterly 1998, pp. 8-9. 7. World Currency Yearbook (for 1985, 1990-1993 ); Wood 1988 (filling in missing observations in the entire sample). 8. Little et a!. 1993, p. 195. 9. Reuters, August 9, 1982; World Bank, World Debt Tables 1996, p. 314. 10. Many authors have found a correlation between severely negative real interest rates and growth. See King and Levine 1992; Gelb 1989; Easterly 1993; and Roubini and Sala i Martin 1992. 11. I am following Edwards 1993 in describing this history. 12. This is the median least squares growth from 1960 to 1998 in the terms of trade of sixty three low and middle-income countries that have at least thirty years of observations. 13. Lipsey 1994. 14. See Easterly 1993.

308

Notes

15. Sachs and Warner 1995. 16. Dollar 1992. 1 7. Lee 1993. 18. Lee 1995. 19. Harrison 1996. 20. Edwards 1998. 21. Frankel and Romer 1999. 22. Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000. 23. This was shown by Levine and Renelt 1992. 24. Husain 1999, p. 74. 25. World Bank 1997b. 26. Reinikka and Svensson 1999. 27. Maier 2000. 28. World Bank, World Development Report, Private Sector Survey, 1997. 29. Loayza 1996. 30. World Bank, World Development Report, 1977, pp. 30, 31. 31. World Bank, World Development Report, 1997, p . 3 1 . 32. Jha, Ranson, and Bobadilla 1996. 33. Easterly and Rebelo 1993. 34. Easterly and Levine 1997; Canning 1999. 35. World Bank, World Development Report, 1997, p . 17. 36. Gyamfi 1992.

37. Rebelo and 38. Easterly,

1995. and MontieL 1997; Barro 1997.

39. Easterly and Levine 1997. 40. Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel 1997.

Intermezzo: Florence and Veronica 1. New York Times, September 18, 1998, p. A12.

Chapter 12 1. Easterly and Fischer 2000. 2. Ray 1998.

309

Notes

3. Narayan et al. 2000a, chap. 6, p. 11. 4. Theobald 1990, p. 55. 5. Theobald 1990, p. 68. 6. New York Times, August 14, 1998. 7. Dow Jones International News Service, July 29, 1998. 8. New York Times, July 17, 1998. 9. Wade 1982, pp. 292-293, 305. 10. Alfiler and Concepcion 1986, p. 38. 1 1 . Financial Times,

1, 1998 p. 3; Associated Press, August 2, 1998.

12. Alfiler and 13. Theobald 1990, p. 97. 14. Washington Post, June 9, 1998 p. Al, August 17, 1998 p. A13. 15. Rose-Ackerman 1997b, p. 13. 16. Theobald 1990, p . 97. 17. Mauro (1995, 1996) was the first in the recent literature to document the links between corruption and investment or growth. He found the association between corruption and growth, and between corruption and investment, to be robust to the inclusion of other control variables and to controlling for the possible endogeneity of corruption. 18. This

is based on Shleifer and Vishny 1993.

19. Svensson 2000. 20. Mauro 1996 also notes this link. 21. Ades and Di Iella 1994. 22. The data on institutions are from Knack and Keefer 1995, who found a link between institutional quality and growth.

Intermezzo: Discrimination in Palanpur 1. Dreze and Sharma 1998.

Chapter 13 1 . Mikell 1989. 2. Wetzel 1995, p. 197. 3. Bates 1981. 4. Frimpong-Ansah 1991, p. 95 . ••

310

Notes

5. The source for the Ghana story is Easterly and Levine 1997; consult them for further references. 6. Leith 1974. 7. The measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. The data and results on land inequality and growth are from Deininger and Squire 1998; others who have found a negative relationship between inequality and growth include Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Perotti 1996; and Clarke 1995. A contrarian positive in equality and growth result is found by Forbes 1998, 2000, using fixed effects to remove country averages; however, Deininger and Olinto 2000 find a negative effect of land inequality on growth even using fixed effects. 8. Easterly, 1999b. This result comes from a regression of democracy ( political rights measured by the Gastil index) and civil liberties on the share of the middle class and ethnic heterogeneity. 9. Husain 1999, p. 359. 10. Easterly 1999b, 2000b. 11. Bell Fialkoff 1996, pp. 10 1 1 12. Bell Fialkoff 1996, p p . 10 11. 13. Gurr 1994. 14. New York Times, February 22, 2000. 15. The foregoing paragraphs are paraphrased from Narayan et al. 2000b. 16. Miguel 1999. 17. Easterly, 1999b. 18. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999. Sample of 1,397 counties with populations greater than 25,000. 19. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999. See also Luttmer 1997. 20. Poterba 1998. 21. Goldin and Katz 1998. 22. Gould and Palmer 1988, p. 427. 23. Wilson 1996, pp. 193, 202. 24. Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994. 25. http:// flag.blackened.net/ revolt/ mexico I reports/ five_years.html. 26. Benjamin 1996, pp. 246 247. 27. Benjamin 1996, pp. 223, 242, 249. 28. Talbot 1998, p. 24. 29. Litwack 1999, pp. 281, 286. 30. Litwack 1999.

Notes

311

31. Alesina and Summers 1993; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992. 32. Alesina 1996. 33. Easterly 2000b. 34. Easterly December 1999b. 35. This figure refers to the population of either Rome itself or Italy, at the time of Augustus. See http://www.ucd.ie/%7Edassics/ 96 / Madden96.html. 36. http: //www .sscnet.ucla.edu/ southasia/History / Mughals/ mughals.html http; II pasture.ecn.purdue.edu/-agenhtml/ agenmc/ china/ scengw .html. 37. Anand and Kanbur 1993; Ravallion 1997.

Intermezzo: Violent for Centuries 1. Critchfield, 1981, chap. 5, pp. 51 60.

and

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

References and Further Reading

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References and Further Reading

Bruno, Michael. 1993. Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Reform: Therapy by Consensus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bruno, Michael. 1995. "Does Inflation Really Lower Growth?" Finance and Development 32 (September): 35-38. Bruno, Michael, and William Easterly. 1998. "Inflation Crises and Long Run Growth." Journal of Monetary Economics 41 (February): 3-26 . Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." American Eco nomic Review. Forthcoming. Burr, J. Millard, and Robert 0. Collins. 1995. Requiem for the Sudan: War, Drought, and Disaster Relief on the Nile. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Canning, David. 1999. "Infrastructure's contribution to aggregate output." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2246. Carrington, William J., and Enrica Detragiache. 1998. "How Big Is the Brain Drain?" International Monetary Fund working paper 98/ 102. Center for International Development, Harvard University. 1999. "Implementing Debt Relief for HIPCs." Mimeo. August. Charnley, Christophe, and Hafez Ghanem. 1994. "Cote d'Ivoire: Fiscal Policy with Fixed Nominal Exchange Rates." In W. Easterly, C. Rodriguez, and K. Schmidt Hebbel, eds., Public Sector Deficits and Macroeconomic Performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chenery, Hollis B., and Alan M. Strout. 1966. "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development." American Economic Review 56, no. 4, part I (September). Clarke, George R. G. 1995. "More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth." Journal of Development Economics 47, no. 2 (August): 403-427. Clausen A. W. 1986. Adjustment with Growth in the Developing World: A Challenge for the International Community: Excerpts from Three Addresses. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Cohen, Daniel. 1996. "The Sustainability of African Debt." World Bank policy research paper 1621. Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Catherine Patillo. 1999. "Flight Capital as a Portfolio Choice." World Bank policy research paper 2066, February. Corbo, Vittorio, Morris Goldstein, and Mohsin Khan, eds. 1987. Growth Oriented Adjustment Programs. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Cresap, Bernarr, and Joseph Ord Cresap. 1987. The History of the Cresaps. Rev. ed. Gallatin, Tenn.: Cresap Society. Critchfield, Richard. 1981. Villages. New York: Doubleday. Critchfield, Richard. 1994. The Villagers. New York: Anchor Books. Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. 1992. "Measuring the Indepen dence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes." World Bank Economic Review 6 (September): 353-398. D'Costa, Anthony P. 1999. The Global Restructuring of the Steel Industry: Innovations, Institutions, and Industrial Change. London: Routledge.

References and Further Reading

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Dadush, Uri, Ashok Dhareshwar, a n d Ron Johannes. 1994. "Are Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries Sustainable?" World Bank policy research working paper 1397. Daly, Herman. 1992. "Sustainable Development Is Possible Only If We Forgo Growth." Earth Island Journal 7, no. 2 (spring). David, Paul A. 1990. "The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox." American Economic Review 80, no. 2 (May). Davis Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. 1998. "Measuring Gross Worker and Job Flows." In J. Haltiwanger, M. Manser, and R. Topel, eds., Labor S tatistics Measurement University of Chicago Press. Issues. De Long, J. Bradford. 1988. "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: Com ment." American Economic Review 78, no. 5 (December): 1138-1154. De Long, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1991. "Equipment Investment and Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (May): 445-502. De Long, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1993. "How Strongly Do Developing Economies Benefit from Equipment Investment?" Journal of Monetary Economics 32 (December): 395 415. Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1998. "New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: In equality and Growth." Journal of Development Economics 57, no. 2 (December): 259-287. Deininger, Klaus and Pedro Olinto. 2000. "Asset distribution, inequality, and growth." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2375. Delors, Jacques, ed. 1996. Learning: The Treasure Within. Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century. New York: UNESCO Publishing. Demographic Data for Development Project. 1987. Child Survival: Risks and the Road to Health. Columbia, MD.: Institute for Resource Development/Westinghouse. and Health Services. 1994. Women's Lives and Macro International, Inc.

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Index

Adjustment loans, 102, 1 03, 104, 105, 106, 1 07, 108, 109, 1 10, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 116, 1 18, 120 lending without adjustment, 104 105, 106 112 pretending to adjust, 1 12, 1 1 5 success stories, 103 104 Afghanistan, 210 Africa, 10, 14, 41, 47, 59, 65, 73, 101, 229, 237, 238, 243, 277 Aghlon, Philippe, 178 Agriculture, 26, 27 Aid. See Foreign Assistance Aid-financed investment, 28, 35, 37, 42 44 Albania, 29, 233 Alesina, Alberto, 262 Alice in Wonderland, 1 51 , 250 International, 275 Angola, 12, 74, 278 Annan, Kofi, 89 Apple Computers, 178, 190 Argentina, 92, 104, 1 1 5, 219-220, 265, 277 Armenia, 198, 268 Asia, 163, 1 67, 200, 229, 243 East Asia, 48 East Asian crash, 36, 1 67, 203 204, 206, 225, 237, 265 Gang of Four, 66, 68 growth, 79, 92 Assets, 48, 1 1 3, 129 Atlanta, 276 Australia, 251, 268 Austria, 1 19, 1 63, 207 Vienna, 207 Autocracy, 260

Azerbaijan, 233, 246, 268 Aztecs, 175 Backwardness advantages, 183 185, 186, 191 disadvantages, 189, 191 Bahamas, 245 Bangladesh, 157, 185, 198, 245, 250, 268, 269 garment export industry, 147-150, 151 152, 154 155 Banks, 226 229 Barra, Robert, 66 Bartering, 12 Bauer, P. T., 34 Baumol, William, 65 Becker, Gary, 96 Belarus, 233 Belgium, 163 Belize, 198 Bhagwati, Jagdish, 34 Black market premium, 82, 106, 108, 221-223, 249, 252, 256 261, 264, 278, 289 Bolivia, 219, 279 Borjas, George, 163 Boserup, Ester, 94 Bosnia, 267 268 Boston-Washington corridor, 165 Botswana, 92, 198 Brazil, 83, 1 13, 164, 200, 215, 219 Brown, Lester, 88, 89 Bruno, Michael, 219 Budget deficits. See Deficits Bulgaria, 233, 246, 269 Burundi, 1 1 Business cycle, 29

336

Cairo, 281 Cambodia, 268 Cameroon, 12, 128, 233 Canada, 236, 266 Capital, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49, 53, 68, 69, 150, 152, 157, 167, 267, 203, 264-265 capital flows, 58-59 human capital, 78-81, 151, 157, 167 knowledge capital, 150 physical capital, 56-58, 67-69, 151, 167, 203, 264 Capital Fundamentalism, 47, 48, 50, 69 Capitalism, 178 Causality, 235-237 Central Asia, 13 Chad, 65, 128, 185, 233 Challenger accident, 145, 155 Chavez, Hugo, 264 Chen, Shaohua, 13, 14 Chenery, Hollis, 34, 206 Chicago, 157 Children, 6, 7, 8 10, 11, 12, 15, 28, 73, 78, 82, 85, 90, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 195-197, 269 Chile, 219 China, 38, 74, 114, 148, 164, 175-177, 181, 198, 268, 280 agriculture, 175 Beijing, 244 Ming Dynasty, 175, 181, 280 technology, 176 Christians, 268-269, 282 Circles, 153 virtuous circles, 153-154, 159-160, 166, 169, 201, 248 Clausen, A. W., 102 Cocoa, 25, 134, 135 Coffee, 134, 135 Colombia, 1 72, 198, 210-211 Colombo, Sri Lanka, 274 Colorado, 243 Communism, 32, 33, 183 Comoros, 73 Complements, 156, 188 190 complementary knowledge, 150 153 complementary skills, 160, 165-166 evidence, 156 158 Condoms, 87, 89, 90-91, 98 Congo, Zaire, 128, 233, 268 Consumers, 27, 37, 38,134 Consumption, 11, 33, 51, 145-146, 169

Index

Convergence and Divergence, 44, 59 65, 66 Corruption, 109, 241, 243-249, 250-252, 256, 258, 290 controlling corruption, 251-252 determinants, 248 251 examples, 243-245 varieties, 247-248 Cote d'Ivoire. See Ivory Coast Costa Rica, 1 76-177, 219, 233, 243, 269 Coups, 27 Creative Destruction, 178-179, 181 185 Crises crisis prevention, 1 1 5 short-term crisis loans, 114 Croatia, 36 Cross-country income differences, 56, 57, 67, 80, 81, 133 Currency, 106, 114, 130, 134 Cyprus, 245 Daewoo Corp. of Korea, 147-149, 151 152, 154, 185, 201 Dalai Lama, 123, 124 Darwin, Charles, 201 David, Paul, 179 Debt, 35, 123 Debt bondage, 1 1 Debt relief, 123 137 and growth, 129-130 history, 124-127 and new borrowing, 128 129 Deficits, budget, 1 1 1, 130, 134, 223 226 Delors, Jacques, 71 Democracy, 260, 267, 269, 279 Denmark, 276 Desh Garments Ltd., 146 149, 151-154 Diminishing Returns, 146, 150, 156, 158, 166 Divergence. See Convergence and Divergence Dividends, 50 Dollar, David, 14, 230 Domar, Evsey, 28, 31, 32 Dominican Republic, 219, 268 Drazen, Allan, 262 Dreze, Jean, 253 East Africa, 164, 271 East Asia, 168, 169, 237, 238 Economic policies, 148 149, 208, 272

Index

Ecuador, 1 15, 1 19, 176-177, 219, 233, 243, 269 Edison, Thomas, 173, 1 79, 195 Education, 47, 69, 71-84, 265-67 Edwards, Sebastian, 231 Egypt, 90, 167, 218, 281 Ehrlich, Paul, 87, 88 Eisenhower, Dwight, 33 El Salvador, 90 Engerman, Stanley, 266 England, 182, 188, 268 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 125 Environmental concerns, 90 Environmental Protection Agency, 243 Equilibrium, 5 1 Ethiopia, 145, 161, 198, 210, 269 Ethnic conflict, 263, 268-278 foreign assistance and, 274 Europe, 148, 175, 188, 265 Eastern Europe, 13, 183, 280 Jews in, 268 Western Europe, 211, 289 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 36 European Union, 136 Exports, 1 15, 123 Export Commodities, 229 oil, 229, 245, 259, 264 Factions, 255, 258, 260, 262, 263, 267, 271, 277. See also Interest groups Factors of production, 146, 1 50-151, 155, 157, 161, 1 75-176, 179, 182, 184, 186, 188-189, 264 Fernandez, Raquel, 263 Fiji, 233 Filmer, Dean, 83 Financing gap, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 131, 133 Financial repression, 228 Finished goods, 52 Firms, 147, 1 84, 186, 232 Food and nutrition. See Hunger Foreign Assistance, 9, 25, 26, 28, 31-35, 37, 38, 43, 58, 79, 101, 109, 1 1 0, 1 1 8, 274 aid contests, 1 1 9 Foreign direct investment, 1 3 1 Foreign exchange, 82, 106, 1 14, 129, 130 France, 1 10, 15� 268

337

Frankel, Jeffrey, 231 Freedom from expropriation, 250 Freedom from government repudiation of contracts, 250 Free market, 152, 178 Free trade, 230-231, 239 Gabon, 201 Gambia, 73, 164 Gates, Bill, 185 Geneva, 289 Georgia, 12, 233 Germany, 54, 65, 268 Ghana, 214, 219, 222-223, 229, 251-252, 256-257, 259-261, 264, 267 adjustment loans, 103, 104 Ashanti Empire, 256-257, 264 cocoa, 222, 256-257, 261, 264 famine, 28 growth and aid, 5, 26, 27, 44, 74, 1 1 9 infrastructure, 7 , 107, 108, 1 1 1 , 1 12, 1 13 Rawlings government, 28 Gini coefficient, 265 Government, 148, 154, 168, 177, 179, 181, 217-219, 221, 234, 241, 249, 252, 255258, 261, 277, 279, 285-286, 290-291 budget deficits, 218-219, 239, 260 leaders (officials}, 181, 241, 247, 250, 258, 263 policies, 158, 168, 169, 213, 218, 234235, 251, 259 programs, 169 welfare payments, 168 Gramm-Rudman, 1 1 3 Great Depression, 30, 95 Greece, 267-268 Growth disasters, 42, 59, 60, 74 Growth theories Harrod-Domar Model, 28, 29, 36 minimum standard model (revised), 34, 35 population pressure principle, 94 Solow model with diminishing returns to investment, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 68, 69, 78 surplus labor model, 30, 31, 40, 4 1 Growth Oriented Adjustment Programs, 102. See also IMF Guatemala, 164, 276, 278-279 Guinea, 233 Guinea-Bissau, 73, 128, 219, 233-234

Index

338

Gurr, Ted, 268 Guyana, 35, 36, 80, 128, 201

Bangalore, 186 187, 189, 192 Bombay, 158

Gypsies, 269

Indonesia, 14, 74, 245, 268 269, 278

Haiti, 123, 250, 268

Industrialization, 27

Harrison, Ann, 231

Inequality, 14, 59, 60, 161 162, 166, 237,

Industrial country growth, 2 1 1

HDTV, 188 Health. See Sickness and disease

263 267, 275 277, 279 Infant industry, 230

Herzog, Jesus Silva, 101

Infant mortality, 8, 10, 28, 231

Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

Inflation, 27, 105, 106, 109, 1 14, 130, 217

Initiative, 124, 126, 128, 129, 132 Hindus, 268 269 Hirschman, Albert, 25

220, 226, 235, 239, 258, 260, 262 264, 277 278 Infrastructure, 25, 1 12, 232 234

Hispanics, 162

Institutions, 249 251, 278 279

Holocaust, 268

Inter-American Development Bank, 72

Holsen, John, 34

Interest groups, 255, 258, 260 26 1, 263,

Honduras, 198 Hong Kong, 38, 67, 201, 250 Households, 157, 166, 196 198, 252 Howitt, Peter, 178 Huguenots, 268. See also France

267, 271, 277. See also Factions Interest rates, 1 1 , 55, 109, 1 1 3, 1 19, 128, 132, 226, 228, 258 International Conference on Population and Development, 89

Humana, Charles, 1 2

International Credit Risk Guide, 1 1 0

Human capital. See Education

International Development Association,

Human Development Report (UN), 54 Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 197 198, 240 Hunger, 1 1 , 14, 27, 70, 170, 214

132, 133 International financial institutions, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41 International Monetary Fund, 36, 102,

Husain, Ishrat, 232

104, 109, 1 1 0, 135, 181, 241, 249, 290

Hyderabad, 175

291 International trade restrictions, 155

Immigrant groups, 157

Internet, 179 181

Immigration, 80, 84, 89

Investment, 38, 44, 47, 151 155, 167 168,

Import letters of credit, 149

177, 1 79, 180, 185, 196, 199, 203, 225,

Imports, 134

232, 246, 258, 289, 291

Incentives, 58, 69, 87, 94, 98, 103, 1 1 2, 1 18, 145, 177 178, 221 223, 239, 250, 256, 263, 289 for donors and recipients, 1 15 117 Increasing returns, 56, 145 146, 150 151, 156, 160, 167 leaks of knowledge, 145 148, 150, 152, 160, 1 65 166, 168 169, 178, 271 matches of skills, 145, 155, 159, 1 62, 166 169 traps of poverty, 145, 161, 163 169, 171,

foreign direct, 179, 185 186 rate of return to, 152 154, 158, 260 Invisible hand, 201 Iran, 201, 251 Iraq, 250 251 Iron Curtain, 25, 62 Islamic Empire, 175, 243 Israel, 39, 217 219 Italy, 163, 198, 251, 268, 280 Ivory Coast, 14, 1 09, 135, 136, 201, 206, 281

196 Incremental Capital to Output Ratio (ICOR), 41 Indexation of wages, 218 India, 11, 56, 57, 58, 81, 1 19, 133, 157, 164, 195, 198, 233 234, 243 244, 253, 269 , 286

Jaffna, 274 Jamaica, 12, 71, 1 1 9, 193, 219, 221, 234, 243 Japan, 74, 182 185, 188, 243, 246, 265, 270, 276, 279 Jews, 1 64, 268

339

Index

Jim Crow era, 276

Literacy. See Ed ucation

Johnson, Lyndon, 262

Lithuania, 36

Jubilee 2000, 123, 127

Lucas, Robert, xiii, 30, 56, 57, 58, 97, 157 Luck, 197, 199-200, 203-205, 208, 214

Kaldor, Nicholas, 25

Luddites, 53, 54

Kamarck, Andrew, 26 Kashmir, 287 Kawasaki Steel, 183-184

Machinery, 23, 28-29, 40-41, 47-49, 5053, 54-58

Kazakhstan, 233-234

Madagascar, 1 1 , 74

Kennedy, John F., 33

Maddison, Angus, 62, 65

Kennedy, Paul, 1 8 1

Madison, James, 255

Kenya, 107, 108, 1 1 1, 1 1 7, 1 19, 198, 233234, 271

Malawi, 10, 1 1 , 83, 128, 167, 233-234 Malaysia, 1 19

Kerosene, 173, 177

Mali, 10, 14, 1 28, 233

Khmer, 270

Malta, 38

Khruschev, Nikita, 33, 47

Malthus, Thomas, 87

Killick, Tony, 25, 27

Manhattan, 157

King, Robert, 228-229, 236

Mankiw, N. Gregory, 78, 79, 80, 81, 166

Klenow, Peter, 67

Manley, Michael, 71

Korea, 74, 104, 148, 184-1 85, 206, 231, 244, 265, 270, 279 Kosovo, 267

Man-made disasters, 198, 209 Marginal cost, 49 Marginal output, 51

Kraay, Aart, 14

Marginal product of labor, 93

Kremer, Michael, 94, 95

Marquez, Gabriel Garcia, 210

Krugman, Paul, 66

Marshall, Alfred, 30

Kuznets curve hypothesis, 281

Marx, Karl, 281

Kuznets, Simon, 32, 94. See also

Mauritania, 106, 107

Beneficent Population Growth and

Mauritius, 104, 208

Growth Theories

Mauro, Paolo, 249

Kyrgyz Republic, 167, 234

Mayans, 175 Mayor, Federico, 72

Labor, 29, 40, 48, 57, 79, 146, 1 5 1 , 155, 175-176, 264 productivity, 48, 51, 5 2 skilled, 156, 158, 160-162, 190, 197

Mean reversion, 203, 205, 207 Mexico, 101, 1 02, 123, 164, 1 67, 1 80, 219, 223-226, 233, 242-244, 275, 276, 281 Chiapas, 163, 275-276, 281

supply, 40, 48, 53

Echevarria, Luis, 224-225

unskilled, 158-162, 192, 197

Mexico City, 242-243

Lagos, 232 Laissez-faire, 155, 213

Microsoft, 97, 150, 178 Office, 97, 150

Landsburg, Steven, xii

Windows, 178, 190

Lanjouw, Peter, 253

Word, 186

Latin America, 36, 59, 101, 168, 200, 229, 237, 265 League of Nations, 30 Lebanon, 1 64, 250-251, 268 Lee, Jong-wha, 231

Excel, 186 Middle class, 279-281 Middle East/ North Africa, 48, 59, 1 0 1 , 188 Milanovic, Branko, 280

Levine, Ross, 228-229, 236

Minh, Ho Chi, 262. See also Vietnam War

Lewis, Arthur, 25, 30, 32

MIT, 187

Liberia, 12, 39, 65, 1 15, 125, 210, 245, 250

Mokyr, Joel, 182, 188

Libya, 251

11oldova, 233-234, 243

Lincoln, Abraham, 207

Moluccas, 269

Liquidity, 108

Morocco, 38, 157

340

Index

�ozarnbique, 12, 44, 74, 128, 198, 233

Philippines, 244 245, 282

�ozart, Wolfgang, 207

Plantations, 266

�ughal, 280

Polarization, 255, 259, 260-261, 263, 267,

�uslirns, 268-269, 282

274, 277, 279, 290

�yanrnar, 12, 250

Poland, 268

�yrdal, Gunnar, 206

Political economy, 259 263 Politics, 257-258

Namibia, 201, 251

Population Action International, 88

National Bureau of Economic Research,

Population growth, 87-98

59, 257 Native Americans, 162, 163

family planning, 89, 90, 9 1 , 95, 96 and famine, 1 1, 28, 87, 88, 95

Natural disasters, 198-199

Populism, 264

Nepal, 73

Portugal, 279

New Caledonia, 251

Poverty, 6, 7, 8, 10, 1 1 , 27, 8 1 , 96, 163,

New �exico, 156 Newton, Isaac, 178 New York, 156-158, 207, 233 Nicaragua, 1 19, 198, 201

167, 200, 291 ethnic-geographic poverty, 163-165, 196 traps, 7, 8, 12, 83

Niger, 73

Poverty line, 14

Nigeria, 60, 67, 214, 219, 232, 233 234,

Prague, 181

245, 268, 278

Prediction, 206

Nixon, Richard, 25

Preservation Institute, 181

North Africa, 188

Pricing, 42, 90, 134

North America, 2 1 1 , 266, 289

Pritchett, Lant, 9, 10, 62, 83

Norway, 1 5 1

Privatization, 1 12, 1 13, 129 Producers, 134

Ohio, 266 Oil, 129

Productivity, 6 , 27, 29, 40, 49, 50, 68, 91, 151, 176 177, 182

Oligarchy, 266-267

Protestants, 268 269

Olson, �ancur, 183

Przeworski, Adam, 1 15

OPEC, 21 7 Operations and maintenance, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 Oppression, 8 , 1 1 12, 265-267, 275 277

Public service, 270 271, 274 Public services, 6, 8, 9, 48, 68, 72, 73, 74, 76, 79, 82, 89, 90, 97, 124, 136, 231-234

0-ring, 145, 155-156 Output takeoff, 31, 32

Quader, Noorul, 145-146, 152-154

Pacific Rim, 2 1 1 , 289

Quotas, 148 149

Quality of bureaucracy, 250 Pakistan, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1 1 , 88, 163, 231 -233, 267, 276, 281, 285-286, 291 Lahore, 5, 6, 285-286 Punjab, 285-288 Palestinians, 217

R&D spending, 192 Rate of return, 58, 68, 79, 80, 81, 83, 97 Ravallion, �artin, 13, 14 Raw materials, 52, 68

Papua New Guinea, 198

Reagan, Ronald, 148, 243

Paraguay, 1 1 0, 245

Real estate, 158

Parkman, Francis, 236

Recession, 14, 101, 102

Patent protection, 178

Red Cross, 198

Path dependence, 187-189

Reform, 104, 1 1 7

Pension funds, 1 1 4

Religion, 163-164, 217

Peru, 104, 1 1 4, 176-177, 201, 219, 233-

Rents, 157

235, 265 Peters, Torn, 207

Reunion (French colony), 39 Rodriguez, Francisco, 231

Index

Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 67 Rodrik, Dani, 231, 263 Romans, 173 175, 214, 267 268, 280 Romer, David, 231 Romer, Paul, xiii, 59, 80, 148 Roper Starch International, 241 Rostow, W. W., 31, 32, 33, 34 Rule of law, 250 Russia, 10, 25, 30, 32, 105, 191, 200, 235, 268 per capita income, 33, 130 Rwanda, 267 268 Sachs, Jeffrey, 123, 124, 230 Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 66 San Cristobal de las Casas, 275 Sao Tome, 128 Savings, 30, 32, 34, 36, 44, 51, 81, 145146 Scarcity, 11, 51, 55, 58, 94 food and water, 27, 89 labor, 79 Seers, Dudley, 25, 26 Self-improvement, 159 Sen, Amartya, 6 Senegal, 74, 233 Serbians, 268 Sickness and disease, 6 10, 87, 287 childhood, 8, 9, 10 Sierra Leone, 125, 276 Silicon Valley, 186 187, 189 Simon, Julian, 94 Singapore, 66, 68, 74, 201, 206, 250 Slaves, 266 Smith, Adam, 30, 201 Social cost, 9, 68, 77, 83, 90, 93, 96, 112, 131 Socialism, 154 Sokoloff, Ken, 266 Solow, Robert, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 69, 78, 146, 166 Somalia, 12, 128, 210, 251 South Africa, 164, 250 South America, 266 267 Soviet Union, 32 33, 183, 246, 270, 280 Spain, 251 Special bonded warehouse system, 149 Sri Lanka, 38, 201, 268, 274, 276 Starr County, Texas, 157 Stern, Nicholas, 253 Strout, Alan, 34, 206

341

Sub-Saharan Africa, 197, 206, 270 Substitution, 41, 188 189 Sudan, 74, 125, 198, 250, 278 Summers, Larry, 9, 10 Surinam, 219 Surplus labor, 30 Svensson, Jakob, 249 Sweden, 234 235 Switzerland, 198, 210 Syria, 176 177 Taiwan, 148, 184, 198, 201, 250 251, 265 Tajiks, 270 Taj Mahal, 280 Tamils, 268, 274 Tanzania, 67, 68, 233 Tariffs, 149, 230 231 nontariff barriers, 230 231 tariff rate, 231 trade taxes, 231 Tasmania, 268 Taxation, 67, 68 Tax rates, 234 235, 247 248, 256, 261, 264 Technology, 41, 51 53, 57, 68, 94, 97, 172 174, 177 179, 188-189, 191 192, 211 electricity, 7, 26, 33 labor saving, 53, 54, 55, 66, 74, 97 lighting example, 173 175 old and new, 188 191 technological catch-up, 182 187 Terms of trade, 208, 229 Thailand, 72, 104, 119 Timor, East, 268 Togo, 128, 234 Training, 36, 41, 72 Transitions, 54 55 Transition from Communism, 106, 183, 280 Transportation, 27, 51 Tropics, xi, 15, 55 56, 59 60, 69, 102, 103, 113, 257, 289 Tuberculosis, 287 Tunisia, 38, 39 Turkey, 219, 268 Tutsis, 268 Uganda, 11, 12, 36, 113, 128, 232 233, 243, 278 Ukraine, 74, 234

342

Unemployment, 30, 40, 41, 53, 54, 92 UNICEF, 9, 72, 90 United Kingdom, 54, 1 79 United Nations, 89 UN Development Program, 72 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 71, 72 United States, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 74, 81, 94, 157-158, 161-1 65, 172, 176-177, 1 79-180, 182-184, 188, 192-193, 200, 221-222, 235, 246, 250, 262, 265-266, 268, 273, 276-277 US Agency for International Develop ment, 90, 132 US Congress, 33 University of Maryland, 262 Uruguay, 219 Utility, 72 Uzbekistan, 270 Venezuela, 198, 199, 208, 218, 264 Caracas, 199, 264 Vietnam, 54, 128, 195, 198, 262-263, 268, 270 Volta Project, 26-28 Vreeland, James, 115 Wages, 50, 78, 92, 93, 145, 157, 196, 218, 244, 289, 291 Wanniski, Jude, 206 War, 12, 121, 1 70, 209-21 1 Warner, Andrew, 230 Washington, D.C., 124, 165, 191 Waterman, Robert J., 207 Weinberger, Caspar, 113 West Africa, 164 West Bank, 234 Wilson, William Julius, 273 Women, 6, 7, 12, 288-289 World Bank, 26, 34, 36, 65, 68, 72, 88, 101, 102, 109, 110, 131, 157, 181, 191, 206, 219, 231, 241, 274, 285, 290-291 World Conference on Education, 72 World Human Rights Guide. See Humana, Charles World War II, 29, 30, 184 World Watch Institute, 88 Yeltsin, Boris, 105 Yemen, 128 Young, Alwyn, 66 Yugoslavia, 229

Index

Zaire, 65, 110, 125, 1 64, 198, 219, 245248, 278 Zambia, 10, 14, 42, 43, 74, 125, 128, 145, 155, 196, 214, 219, 250, 276, 279 Lusaka, 240 Zapatista rebellion, 275 Zero Population Growth, 89, 90 Zimbabwe, 44, 197, 245

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References